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This research project investigates the influence of government incentive on supply 
chain behaviour from an operations research perspective, providing insights into 
government green policy making and supply chain management. In the car industry, 
government green incentive is used to facilitate corporate investment in green 
technology in the supply chain by financial support chain supply parties. The existing 
literature has limited understanding of how government ought to provide incentives 
efficiently and how the supply chain should respond to these incentives. This project 
is first to analyse the decision making of all the participating parties in the 
government incentive project. It provides suggestions for government policy makers 
and illustrates managerial implications for supply chain operational strategies. 
 
This research study is divided into three parts, Preliminary Study 1, Preliminary Study 
2 and Main Study 3. Preliminary Study 1 and Preliminary Study 2 constructed the 
initial incentive model, based on which a comprehensive incentive model is built and 
analysed in Main Study 3. Preliminary Study 1 confirmed the influence of 
government incentive on supply chain decision making. A two-stage game theory 
model is established to formulate supply chain behaviour on the basis of a 
mathematical modelling technique. Preliminary Study 2 is focused on practical 
information collection by adopting semi-structured interview. 11 interviews were 
conducted in the car industry including suppliers and manufacturers in Taiwan. The 
collected data is used to provide the necessary information for the establishment of 





incentive model are verified by the implications of Preliminary Study 2. Finally, in 
Main study 3, a multiple period optimisation-simulation incentive model is built to 
simulate the decision-making process of incentive projects. 
 
The findings of this project indicate that government incentives have a positive effect 
on green technology improvements in the supply chain. Four incentive strategies have 
been proposed in response to different market scenarios of the government’s green 
policy making. The High incentive strategy leads to the best green technology 
improvement in the supply chain. However, when the government has limited budget 
for green incentives, it is suggested that the Manufacturer Focus strategy or Supplier 
Focus strategy is implemented instead of the incentives being equally distributed in 
the supply chain. It was found overall, that the best strategy of incentive policy is 
associated with the cost of green technology in the supply chain and the green car 
market size. 
 
Further findings indicated that government incentives also indirectly affect supply 
chain pricing strategies. It was found that as incentives increase, green technology 
level rises, and the supply chain increases its pricing to respond to the costs. Based on 
this finding, this study suggests that the government should provide incentives to the 
consumers directly when the economy depresses and consumers’ greenness sensitivity 
is low. For the supply chain, and based on different market scenarios, the implications 
of optimal green technology and pricing decision are proposed. Finally, it is suggested 





upstream and downstream in order to optimise their own profit when the government 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to the research 
After electricity production, human transportation activities have the second largest 
impact on the environment (US EPA, 2016). Carbon dioxide emission produced by 
transportation accounted for up to 26% of the overall greenhouse gas (GHG hereafter) 
emission up to 2014. In response to this, a variety of international environment 
agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the EUETS (European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme, EUETS), have emerged over the past few years, and governments 
across the world have been appealed to join them. In addition, as consumers’ 
environmental awareness rises, governments are also urged to address the issue of 
GHG emission. Maximising emission reduction becoming governments’ objective 
(Cohen et al., 2015) leads gradually to the introduction of various government green 
interventions on green products. 
 
A green product is defined as an environmentally friendly or sustainable product (Cao 
et al., 2013), which produces less emission, pollutions and waste and can help with 
environmental protection (Ottman et al., 2016). The concept of “green” in this 
research is interpreted as “environmentally friendly” that a product produces less 
carbon emissions from the product use. The green product indicates the “green use” of 
the product and product’s greenness is connected by the green design of the product. 
Because green technology adoption can effectively increase the product’s energy 





products. To reduce emissions, besides transportation, the car industry (automotive 
sector) is widely regarded as the main source of GHG emission due to the large fuel 
consumption of its products (US EPA, 2016). Thus, in many countries, the car 
industry is targeted as a key point to reduce GHG emission (Van Soest, 2005; Barari 
et al., 2012) because of the potential of green car adoption. Within the car industry, it 
is the adoption of green vehicles that is believed to be an effective way to reduce 
GHG emission by transportation (Mak et al., 2013; Gnann et al., 2015). Therefore, in 
many countries, government green policies have been designed to facilitate this 
agenda. In the U.S., the government is seen to implement green policies to stimulate 
the manufacturing of greener cars, and thus reduce fuel consumption (Krutilla & 
Graham, 2012). In the meantime, they also implemented The Energy Policy Act of 
2005 and subsidies hybrid car buyers through the income tax system. In addition to 
the U.S., similar green policies and government incentives can also be found in many 
countries such as U.K. (Plug-in vehicle grant), China (Technology innovation funding), 
France (Bonus-malus system), Germany (Electrical vehicle incentive program), Japan 
(Subsidies to purchasers of electrical vehicles), and Taiwan (Research funding for 
green technology development). To reduce emissions, it is important for the 
government to drive green technology adoption in the car industry by effectively 
allocating incentives (Goulder & Mathai, 2000). It is evident that governments are 
stimulating consumers’ demand for green vehicles and facilitating the adoption of 
green technology by supply chain parties in an attempt to effectively reduce GHG 
emission in the car industry. Thus, the car industry (automotive sector) is selected as 
the research context in this research to investigate the influence of government 





Among government green interventions, many scholars recognise incentive as an 
effective approach to control GHG emission (Chappin et al., 2009; Coria, 2009; 
Dowson et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2003; Fischer & Newell, 2008; Jaffe et al., 2005; 
Requate & Unold, 2003; Van Soest, 2005). In the car industry, government green 
incentive is used to facilitate the corporate investment in green technology in the 
supply chain by sharing the financial burden and making it significantly more 
affordable than before. Supply chain parties thus are becoming more willing to invest 
in green technology innovation.  
 
There are two reasons for car companies’ investment in green technology. First, car 
companies invest substantially in the development and adoption of green technology 
in an attempt to improve fuel efficiency in their products and manufacturing process 
(Xu et al., 2013). Second, car companies seek to develop green products in order to 
cope with the ever-rising environmental awareness of consumers (Barari et al., 2012; 
Flammer, 2015). Because government incentives indirectly reduce the overall cost of 
the green technology investment, these are proven to have a significant impact on 
green technology adoption in hybrid vehicles (Diamond, 2009). The policies of green 
incentive in U.S. (Diamond, 2009), Netherland (Chappin et al., 2009) and Norway 
(Mersky et al., 2016) have also demonstrated a positive impact on green technology 
development in their car industries. Technology development is one of the production 
decisions made in supply chain management. Since the decision on green technology 
development can be influenced by government incentives, this suggests that supply 
chain behaviour can also be influenced by government incentives and expectedly 





This research considers only government incentives from an economic perspective. 
Government disincentives such as environmental regulations and emission allowance 
from a regulatory perspective are not considered. As this research focuses on the 
influence of the government’s intervention to green technology adoption, 
disincentives cannot significantly affect the green technology adoption in the supply 
chain directly. For example, regulatory policies do not result in any difference in 
green technology change for different car models, and they concern more with 
emissions produced during production process instead of emissions produced from the 
use of the product. Therefore, disincentive policies only manage emissions by 
reducing the total quantity of production and the emission and waste in the production 
process. Thus, this research only focuses on government incentives which have a 
significant influence on the supply chain green technology adoption and development. 
The disincentives are not considered in this research which is addressed as a research 
limitation in Section 7.4.3. 
 
Practical Motivation 
In order to increase the efficiency of government incentives in driving green 
technology development and adoption in the supply chain, it is important to 
understand both the ways in which incentive should be given and the corresponding 
decision making in the supply chain. Existing literature tends to investigate this issue 
only from the perspective of the government (Chappin et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2015; 
Coria, 2009; Diamond, 2009; Dowson et al., 2012; Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011; 
Jena et al., 2018; Zhang & Wang, 2017) or only from the perspective of supply chain 





understanding from a perspective involving all  participated parties.. To address this 
gap, this research does not only examine the influence of government incentives on 
the development and adoption of green technology from the perspective of supply 
chain management but also considers the government’s perspective, providing 
managerial insights for both operational decision maker in supply chain and green 
policy maker in government. 
1.2 Contribution to the existing literature 
Green supply chain or sustainable supply chain link the sustainability to traditional 
supply chain management (Ashby et al., 2012). The key concepts in green supply 
chain management include green strategy, green design, green purchasing, 
manufacturing process, logistics, marketing, and recycling (Zhu & Zou, 2011). It was 
indicated that government plays an important role in implementing green policies 
which change the supply chain behaviour when pursuing sustainability in supply 
chain management (Zhao et al., 2012; Sheu & Chen, 2012; Chung et al., 2013). 
Researchers have been investigating sustainability in supply chain management in 
various contexts, such as operation strategy (Lam et al., 2013; Swami & Shah, 2013), 
government incentive (Georgiadis, 2004; Sheu et al., 2005; Webster & Mitra, 2008; 
Jin et al., 2011; Sheu & Chen, 2012), and supply chain economics modeling (Cabral 
et al., 2012, Sarkis, 2003; Zhu et al., 2008; Mirhedayatian et al., 2013; Zhu, 2013).  
 
Different approaches and theories have been employed to analyse supply chain 
management from operational research perspective, such as fuzzy theory (Tsai & 





et al., 2012; Sheu & Chen, 2012; Zhang & Liu, 2013). Specifically, issues concerning 
supply chain incentives have been discussed extensively in the literature. For instance, 
Webster and Mitra (2008) and Jin (2001) looked at green product promotion by 
government incentives while Chen and Sheu (2009) investigated supply chain pricing 
problems with government intervention. Zhao (2012) examined the manufacturer’s 
decision making under the consideration of the government’s environmental penalty. 
Despite the great quantity of the research in the area of supply chain management and 
operational research, discussions have usually revolved around optimisation problems 
for single supply chain party (Jin, 2011; Sheu & Chen, 2012). However, governments 
provide incentives to multiple supply chain parties, and the product’s greenness is 
determined by multiple participated supply chain parties rather than a single party. 
How the whole supply chain parties’ behaviour may have responded to government 
incentives is still unknown and how government incentives may have affected the 
supply chain green technology adoption is not clear either, which suggests a 
theoretical gap in the extant literature. Hence, the present research focuses on 
investigating supply chain behaviour, which is influenced by government 
interventions from an operational research perspective and contributes to the supply 
chain management literature. 
 
In order to identify incentive influence, a theory-based government incentive model 
will be built in Preliminary Study 1. It is followed by the qualitative empirical 
research in Preliminary Study 2 which provides practical data to verify the theoretical 
model and produces the foundation of the simulation model in Main study 3. 





behaviour and government incentive strategy. In addition to the theoretical 
contributions to the extant literature, this research also aims to provide practical 
implications to industrial practitioners and suggestions for policy management for 
governments’ green policy decision makers. 
Green technology is also called clean technology (Hall & Helmers, 2013) or 
emission-reducing technology (Krass et al., 2013). Green technology adoption 
indicates the level of green technology applied in car design, and it affects the carbon 
emissions produced from car use. In the car industry, the adoption of green 
technology is a technology innovation for green cars (Daziano & Bolduc, 2013). It 
has been found that in the car industry, higher gasoline prices can increase green 
technology adoption (Diamond, 2009) and that gasoline price is positively related to 
hybrid car sales but only for high-level green technology cars (Gallagher & 
Muehlegger, 2011). Market consumers prefer to buy a green car with higher green 
technology (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008) and with lower emissions (Daziano & 
Bolduc, 2013). Previous studies have identified the significant relationship between 
green technology adoption and green car sales, indicating the importance of green 
technology when the government aims to increase market sales and thus reduce 
emissions from car use. Thus, promoting green technology adoption is the main focus 
when investigating governments’ green policy management of emission reduction in 
the car industry. 
 
Secondly, the uncertainty of green preference regarding consumer demand is 





demonstrated by Cohen et al. (2015), who took a random factor into a price dependent 
demand function to investigate the influence of demand uncertainty on manufacturing 
industry response. However, for green products, not only the price (Wu et al., 2009) 
but also green preference can affect the demand (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008; Lee et 
al., 2013). For example, when the price of gasoline increases, consumers show more 
willingness to buy green vehicles than when it is low. In addition, consumers are more 
sensitive to the product’s greenness when they have a firm intention to behave in an 
environmentally friendly way. Thus, green preference is uncertain because it is 
dependent on consumers’ perception. Although price sensitivity was used as a 
variable in the demand function before Abad (1994), no attempt has been made to 
consider both price and consumer green preference as uncertainties when managing 
green technology adoption in the supply chain. By considering the uncertainty of 
green preference in the hybrid vehicles market, the supply chain practice can be 
formulated more closely than a pure price dependent demand. The present project 
aims to study how supply chain management behaviour is influenced by government 
incentives considering the uncertainty of price sensitivity and consumer green 
preference with the market demand. 
 
In summary, this research enquiry first investigates the influence of government green 
incentive to supply chain behaviour (Preliminary Study 1 and Preliminary Study 2); 
and second, it illustrates supply chain optimal decision making by simulating the 







1.3  Research questions and objectives 
The present study aims to investigate the influence of government incentive on supply 
chain behaviour by looking at the response of the supply chain and the market 
affected by the incentives, and to provide strategic insights for government incentives 
and managerial suggestions for supply chain decision makers. Preliminary Study 1 
proposes a mathematical game model to investigate the influence of incentives supply 
chain and green product market. The influence of the incentive is focused on the 
evaluation of 3P (people, planet, profit). To examine the influence of the incentive, 
Preliminary Study 1 includes the supplier and the manufacturer only to discuss the 
impact of the incentive in the supply chain. Preliminary Study 2 aims to explore the 
industry information to develop a practical based incentive model by semi-structured 
interviews. To build an incentive model which takes Preliminary Study 1 and 
Preliminary Study 2 as a foundation, the simulation method is chosen to apply in 
Main Study 3.  Simulation modelling is appropriate to analyse the decision-making 
process in the supply chain because the theoretical foundation of this type of model 
has a better flexibility to formulate an economic model (Page, 2005) and simulation 
modelling is a way to help with relaxing the assumptions in Preliminary Study 1. 
Main Study 3 adopts a simulation approach to analyse the decision-making process of 
the government incentive project, it identifies the influence of the government 
incentive on supply chain behaviour from a supply chain management perspective. 
 
Issues concerning the influence of incentives on supply chain operations have been 





(Webster and Mitra, 2008; Jin, 2001), the influence on supply chain pricing (Chen & 
Sheu, 2009) addressing this issue from manufacturer’s perspective only (Fischer et al., 
2003; Goulder & Mathai, 2000; Krass et al., 2013; Zhao, 2012). Of the great quantity 
of research in this area, numerous discussions have revolved around optimal 
decision-making problems (Jin, 2011; Sheu and Chen, 2012). How the whole supply 
chain behaviour may have responded to the government incentives are still unknown, 
and this suggests a theoretical gap in the extant literature. To fill this literature gap, the 
present study focuses on investigating supply chain behaviour, which is influenced by 
government interventions. The project seeks to answer hitherto unresolved research 
questions and thus add new knowledge to the literature. Each sub-study question 
responds to the research questions and they are also interrelated to each other. 
 
Main Research Question: 
How do government incentives affect supply chain behaviours? 
 
Sub-research question 1: 
How do government green incentives affect the supply chain’s green technology 
decision making? 
 
Sub-research question 2: 
How do government green incentives affect supply chain’s pricing? 
 
To answer the research questions, Preliminary Study 1 and Preliminary Study 2 firstly 
investigate the influence of government incentives based on a game theory model and 





research question based on a comprehensive simulation-based incentive model. 
 
The literature indicates that government policy influences the operating strategy of the 
supply chain (Zhao et al., 2012; Sheu & Chen, 2012), and government interventions 
can also lead to green supply chains integration (Sheu et al., 2005). To achieve the 
integration in the green supply chain, the government provides incentives to supply 
chain, which can help to overcome the conflicts of operational goals among supply 
chain parties (Sheu et al., 2005). An example of the integration could be driven by the 
incentives is the integration of logistics flows. The goals of the supply chain parties in 
reverse-logistics chain are different from the manufacturer’s in the forward supply 
chain. This is because the recycling in the reverse logistics will increase the 
manufacturer’s cost. Government incentives can thus be used to cover the cost of 
recycling for the manufacturer to achieve the integration of the logistics flows. In 
addition, government subsidies can help promote green production in the supply chain 
and increase the product market demand (Neto et al., 2008; Webster & Mitra, 2008; 
Jin, 2011). Thus, there is strong evidence to indicate that government action has a 
significant effect on green products. Thus, Preliminary Study 1 aims to address the 
findings from the above literature as well as evaluate the government’s influence 
through 3P that is, profit (supply chain), planet (environment) and people (market). 
 
The objective of Preliminary Study 1: Examining the influence of government 
incentive by conducting a mathematical game modelling approach. 
 
In previous studies, only limited parties have been selected to research into the 





incentive model based on game theory (two supply chain parties), and Webster and 
Mitra (2008) proposed an incentive game model that included only manufacturer and 
remanufacturer. Zhang and Liu (2013) also have built four incentive models based on 
a different structure of the cooperated game. However, practical operations are more 
complex than a two or three stages game model, and it is expected to have more 
parties in the incentive network. Hence, Preliminary Study 2 attempts to identify the 
decision-making process in the incentive projects which will be used as the 
foundation for the Main Study 3. 
 
The objective of Preliminary Study 2: Verifying the theoretical incentive model and 
constructing the component/framework of a comprehensive green product incentive 
model based on qualitative data. 
 
The research project aims to confirm the effect of government incentive and provide 
practical managerial implication through model analysis. Although government 
incentive strategy has been discussed in the literature (Chen & Sheu, 2009; Jin, 2011; 
Sheu & Chen, 2012), it seems that none of the government incentive strategies was 
suggested based on practical information but on theoretical mathematical models. For 
this reason, the research question of Main Study 3 adopts the initial incentive model 
in Preliminary Study 1 as its foundation and applies the results from Preliminary 
Study 2 to build a comprehensive simulation model. 
 
The objective of Main Study 3: Investigating the influence of government incentives, 
providing efficient green product incentive strategy for governments and optimal 





process in the incentive project. 
 
Eventually, the findings of the three sub-studies can provide governments and green 
product providers suggestions for making incentive, pricing, and green technology 
decisions. Also, the study contributes novel knowledge to the literature of operation 
management and economics by establishing an incentive model based on an 
optimisation-simulation modelling approach. 
 
1.4 Structure of the research 
This project aims to investigate the influence of government incentive on supply chain 
behaviour by building a green product incentive model through several interrelated 
studies. There are three parts in this research enquiry (Preliminary Study 1, 
Preliminary Study 2 and Main Study 3); first, a mathematical game incentive model is 
used to investigate the incentive influence on supply chain and market. In Preliminary 
Study 1, the government, the manufacturer and the supplier will be considered in the 
model. Next, the objective of the Preliminary Study 2 is focused on practical 
information collection by adopting the semi-structured interview to enhance and 
adjust the modelling choices/assumptions of the incentive model in Preliminary Study 
1. To investigate the influence of the government incentives on supply chain 
behaviour, Main Study 3 combines the foundation of the model from Preliminary 
Study 1 and Preliminary Study 2. In the Main Study 3, a comprehensive incentive 
model is created based on of a simulation approach that contains the government, 
supply chain parties and consumers. An optimisation-simulation approach is put into 





the supply chain behaviour changed by the government incentives. The objectives, the 
applied theories and methods for the three sub-studies are presented in Table 1. 
 
Chapter 1 of this project contains the introduction. It is followed by a literature review 
of related topics in Chapter 2. An overview of the methodology is included in Chapter 
3. Next, Chapter 4 and 5 comprise the initial investigation of the influence of 
government incentives, Preliminary Study 1 and Preliminary Study 2. Chapter 6 
contains the Main Study 3 of this project, a simulation modelling research of the 
government incentives. The conclusion and discussion of the results are presented in 






Table 1 - The structure of the research proposal 
 
 Objective Method Method and research design 
Preliminary 
Study 1 
Investigating the influences of the 
government incentives on the supply 
chain, market demand and the 
environment. 
Game theory model 
Given an incentive rate to solving a 
mathematical game model to gain optimal 
strategies of the supply chain 
Preliminary 
Study 2 
Developing a comprehensive and 
thorough incentive model that 
includes various parties based on 
industrial information. 
Semi-structured interview 
Qualitative research: Gathering practical 
information by semi-structured interviews 
from managers in the car industry to 
establish the foundation of the simulation 
model in Main Study 3 
Main Study 3 
Constructing a simulation model 
according to the research framework 
of Study 2, analysing interactions 
among government, supply chain 
and consumers, providing insights 




Building a simulation model of the 
decision-making process in the government 
incentive project. Combining the game 
theory model in Preliminary Study 1 and 
the qualitative research in Preliminary 








Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This research project aims to investigate the influence of government incentives on 
supply chain behaviour from a perspective of supply chain management. A 
comprehensive literature review of existing literature is presented in this chapter. A 
systematic literature review is an effective way to capture a general knowledge of 
current literature, thus the systematic literature review as suggested by Bryman and 
Bell (2007) is used. Before the systematic literature review, my PhD supervisors, who 
have knowledge and research experiences in the research area, were invited to be 
review panel. Professional suggestions regarding the literature review were given in 
regular meetings. 
 
Based on the discussion with the review panel, the objectives of the literature review 
were summarised as follows: 
1. To understand the influence of environmental issues on government policy and 
its indirect effect on the supply chain behaviour. 
2. To obtain an understanding of the development of sustainability in supply 
chain, and how it relates to green technology and green product in the supply 
chain. 
3. To identify government incentives for emissions reduction in the supply chain.  
4. To identify the gaps in the literature that this research can address and make a 
contribution to existing literature. 





identified to be reviewed. “The influence of the increasing awareness of 
environmental issues on government policy”, “The influences of environmental issues 
and government policy on supply chain behaviour”, “Sustainability in supply chain 
management”, “Green technology and Green Products”, “Sustainable/green Supply 
Chain Management”; “Government Intervention in sustainable supply chain”; 
“Automotive sector and its green practice”. In addition, the review of the 
methodologies applied in supply chain management is also demonstrated in this 
section. 
 
Based on the identified review objectives and review topics, “government policy”, 
“government incentives”, “supply chain management” were selected as the initial 
keywords for literature search. Other keywords, which are relevant to the issues in 
question, were also considered. They are presented in Table 2. 
 
Due to that this research aims to take a perspective of supply chain management 
literature that has been selected was mainly from the area of “Operations 
Management”, “Operations Research”, and specifically on sustainable supply chain 
management. In addition, literature from other related fields, including management 
and accounting, Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Engineering, Mathematics, 
Computer science, was also included. Different combinations of the keywords were 
used in the literature search. Three main databases were used to search the literature: 
SCOPUS, ScienceDirect and EBSCO. Searching target included books, journal 
articles, research working papers, government public reports, and conference 














































Supply chain management 
Sustainable supply chain 
Green supply chain 
Green supply chain management  



































Based on the above literature search, several topics are identified, government policy 
in the supply chain, the green issues in the supply chain, the development of green 
technology and green product. The result of the search has achieved the goals stated at 
the beginning of the section. Key findings are summarised as follows: 
1. The influence of the environmental issues on government policy has been 
discussed widely in the literature, and it also drives the adoption of green 
technology in the supply chain.  
2. The positive effect of government incentives on green technology 
development in the supply chain is suggested in the literature, which shows 
the connection between environmental issues, government green policy, and 
supply chain behaviour.  
3. The traditional supply chain has adopted greener practice due to the increasing 
awareness of environmental issues. Today, supply chain parties are more 
willing to participate in green supply chain activities as a result of government 
policy and market trend.  
4. Green supply chain management and sustainable supply chain management 
have gained much attention recently, which results in the development of 
green product and the adoption of green technology production in the supply 
chain, including car industry.  
5. Although previous studies have investigated the influence of government 
incentives on green technology in supply chain and identified potential 
implications, gaps, in terms of how supply chain decision maker should 





incentives, still exist in the literature. Addressing these gaps will make both 
theoretical and practical contributions to the literature, thus this research aims 
to address these research gaps from operations research perspective. 
 
The literature review of this thesis is structured as follows. Firstly, the influence of the 
increasing awareness of environmental issues on government policy and supply chain 
behaviour will be reviewed in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Secondly, the sustainability in the 
supply chain, green technology and the development of the green products in the 
sustainable supply chain will be discussed in sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6. Thirdly, 
government green intervention, the automotive sector and its green practice will be 










Figure 1 - The framework of literature review 
 
2.2 The influence of the increase in environmental awareness on governments’ 
policy 
The WTO (world trade organisation) announced that sustainable development and 
environmental protection are the primary objectives in the management of global 
trades (World Trade Organisation, 2013). Environmental sustainability has become a 
concern among businesses because of pressing environmental issues, such as global 
warming (Xu et al., 2013). As a result of the globalisation of businesses and the 
increase in consumption, stakeholders and national legislations today expect business 
managers to take not only economics but also environmental impacts into 
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consideration (Dahlsrud, 2008; Malladi & Sowlati, 2018). The excessive consumption 
of resources, the consequential waste, and environmental pollution have become a 
concern as serious as economic growth. Resource crisis has also become a worldwide 
threat in recent years. The natural disaster was considered as extreme events which 
are caused by the scarcity of environmental resources (Bhavnani, 2006). There are 
fears that dramatic climate changes will increase frequency of extreme events 
(Tompkins & Adger, 2004). To solve this problem, a country’s development should 
not only concentrate on the economic but also environmental factors. Governments’ 
green intervention is thus driven by the pressure of environmental protection, and 
previous research has identified green policy as an effective approach to control GHG 
emission (Chappin et al., 2009; Coria, 2009; Dowson et al., 2012). It is necessary for 
governments to effectively implement green policies to drive/lead industries to 
become more environmentally friendly. 
 
Both developing and developed countries have conducted the green policy. For 
example, China has adopted The Green Fence Policy in 2013 in order to address 
environmental issues in the Chinese market. Similarly, the UK government proposed 
the UK Climate Change Act 2008 which requires the government to publish carbon 
budget every five years to achieve the government’s target of emission reduction by 
2050 (Hitchcock, 2012). Due to human activities since the industrial revolution in the 
18th century, the emission has become a significant issue (Sarkis et al., 2011). 
Governments have started to adopt green policies in order to prevent industries and 
society from producing too much emission. For example, the green policy in the 





environmentally friendly cars is encouraged (Krutilla & Graham, 2012). Another 
example in the UK is that the government adopted green policies to manage the 
environmental emission caused by the industrial revolution. In the year of 2013, UK 
was facing an energy crisis with record-breaking hikes in energy bills and the threat of 
blackouts by 2015. In the same year, UK government announced the Green Deal 
Cash-back Incentive Scheme, which assigns incentives to consumers based on their 
improvement in energy saving, in an attempt to promote environmentally friendly 
behaviours in the country. Many other governments in developed countries also 
implement strict environmental regulations in order to force industries to change their 
operation strategies and lower emissions from fossil fuel consumption (Xu et al., 
2013). As the government is expected to be responsible for environmental protection, 
green policies are conducted in most of the countries in order to lead the industry and 
society to be more environmentally friendly. It is in this context that this research 







2.3 The influences of environmental issues and government policy on supply 
chain behaviour 
 
Figure 2 - The influences of environmental issues and government policy on 
supply chain behaviour (arrows in the figure indicate the influence of one concept to 
another) 
 
Consumptions, Emissions and Government policy 
Figure 2 shows the influence of one concept on another. The topics of consumptions, 
emissions, government policy and supply chain behaviour are directly or indirectly 
connected, as shown in Figure 2. Consumption is the main issue related to carbon 
emissions. The global consumption database from The World Bank states that 
consumption, including private consumption and general government consumption, is 
increasing globally (The World Bank, 2019). In China, it has risen dramatically by 










was $12.4 trillion in 2008 and then went up to $13.3 trillion in 2011. This great 
amount of consumption is leading to ruinous emissions, causing a trade-off between 
consumption and emissions (Clarke & Reed, 1994). Environmental regulations are 
made to prevent the emissions which are caused by the huge consumption of energy. 
The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) in the WTO conducts Technical 
Barriers to Trade Agreement to the participated member countries so that 
governments can share information about the ways in which the green 
actions/regulation they are adopting has significant influences on trading behaviour 
and production activity in the industry. This indicates that the effect of government 
policy on industrial operations is confirmed (Figure 1), and governments worldwide 
are seeking effective green policies.    
 
Supply Chain Behaviour 
Organisations are becoming increasingly interested in green production as a result of 
the pressing environmental issues (Barari et al., 2012; Saberi et al., 2018). The 
concept of “green” has become ubiquitous among industries, and thus companies 
today are willing to integrate the concept of “green” into their supply chain 
managerial strategies. Additionally, sustainable development is often taken as a useful 
strategy in the competitive market. The greenness of a product is promoted in the 
supply chain to then encourage green activities such as recycling, remanufacturing, 
and reusing among businesses. By looking at the product manufacture in many 
industries, it can be found that the supplying process is incomparable to what it was 
before; for example, the combination of forward logistics and reverse logistics in the 





Specifically, the forward supply chain is the process of delivering the product to the 
market, and the reverse supply chain is the adding of environmentally friendly 
elements into the supplying process (Carter & Ellram, 1998). Becoming green can not 
only help to gain market share but also contribute to the sustainability of the business. 
The above evidence suggests that supply chain operation is changing as a result of 
sustainable development. 
 
Due to the increase in environmental consciousness, the behaviour of the decision 
maker in the supply chain is changing; not only from the point of view of researchers 
in operations management but also for supply chain practitioners and governments 
(Sarkis, 2003). Environmental consciousness is influential for the behaviour of both 
consumers and companies (Swami & Shah, 2013) so that policymakers attempt to 
implement green policy to provide greener products to the market in order to control 
emissions from the use of the products. In the past decade, the sustainable 
development of the industry has created pressure on enterprises (Seuring & Muller, 
2008) that has driven them to consider not only profit but also the influence of 
product design. The necessity of integrating the environmental and business factors 
into company managers’ decision making has been indicated in the literature (Sarkis, 
2003). As the supply chain pursues sustainability, and because the implementation of 
the green policy by the government can change green supply chain behaviour, the 
government’s role in implementing green policy must be emphasised (Zhao et al., 
2012; Sheu & Chen, 2012; Chung et al., 2013). Supply chain pricing strategy (Sheu & 
Chen, 2012) and supply chain technology strategy (Zhao et al., 2012) are two areas of 





significant factor to change supply chain decision making (Chappin et al., 2009; Coria, 
2009; Dowson et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2003; Jaffe et al., 2005), the particular ways 
in which it influences supply chain behaviour is still unknown. To address this 
question, the present study researches into the influence of government green policy 
on the change of supply chain behaviour. 
 
In addition, product design is also becoming “greener” in many different industries. 
Fujii and Managi (2013) have studied the relationship between emissions and 
economic growth in a number of countries between 1970 to 2005. They indicated 
several industries, such as paper, pulp, and printing industries, wood products industry, 
and construction industry, which stayed “Green” during economic growth (the term of 
“Green” is defined as environmentally friendly in this study: a product produces less 
emission from the usage or production). This phenomenon suggests that the green 
trend was pursued in those industries when they were planning their supply chain 
strategy. Srivastava (2007) advocated furthermore that companies have the 
responsibility to protect the environment, which should be reflected in their product 
development, process design, operations, logistics, marketing, regulatory compliance 
and waste management. Based on the induction of the green concept in the supply 
chain, supply chain behaviour has been changing simultaneously. 
 
 
2.4 Sustainability in supply chain management 
Sustainability is becoming such an important issue in supply chain management (Ahi 





the past decade. It was defined that supply chain contains delivery of information, 
materials, and money among the parties in a chain, and it is dynamic (Jain et al. 2006, 
2007). Due both to industrial environment changes and the gradual increase in 
people’s green awareness, traditional supply chains cannot fill all operating needs 
anymore. The operating needs in industries indicate the importance of emission 
reduction and energy saving. Hence, there are two new different types of the supply 
chain that link sustainability and the traditional supply chain, that is, green supply 
chain and sustainable supply chain (Ashby et al., 2012). No significant difference 
between those two topics has been indicated by previous literature; Ashby et al. (2012) 
defined both green supply chain and sustainable supply chain as considering the 
sustainability issue in supply chain management. 
 
To the components of the traditional supply chain, the “green” element is added to 
constitute the green supply chain operation process. A green supply chain includes 
green strategy, green design, green purchasing, manufacturing process, logistics, 
marketing, and recycling (Zhu & Zou, 2011). In his illustration of the operating 
phases of the green supply chain, Sarkis (2003) complemented this list by adding 
procurement, production, distribution, reverse logistics and packaging. A green supply 
chain is more focused on the impact of production activities on the environment in 
that it balances the environmental issues and economic development, which further 
enhances/supports sustainability. It is gaining significant attention from consumers, 
industries, and governments (Vachon & Klassen, 2008). Organisations are also 
interested in green products because of environmental issues (Barari et al., 2012). To 





the development of the sustainability, the present project is interested in investigating 
product design/production associated with green technology in the field of supply 
chain management. 
 
Sustainability has become an important issue for businesses to plan strategies. The 
relationship between sustainability and the company’s performance such as the 
financial/economic, environmental, social and operational aspects have received 
significant attention by previous studies (Quarshie, Salmi & Leuschner, 2016). 
Business sustainability suggests that the strategies of an enterprise should focus on 
economic, long-term development, environmental, resilience, social, stakeholder and 
volunteer issues (Ahi & Searcy, 2013). It was indicated that sustainability is a popular 
term among businesses such as the mobility industry (Ma et al., 2018). To achieve 
sustainable development, enterprises should not only focus on short-term profit but 
also the sustainability of their business (long-term perspective). In the industry, the 
development of sustainability connects to various phenomena, for instance, corporate 
social responsibility activities, green products, green supply chain (Darnall, Jolley & 
Handfield, 2008; Zhu, Sarkis & Lai, 2007), and green technology development. These 
are all driven by the development of sustainability and have effects on supply chain 
decisions. A more detailed literature review of green products and the green supply 
chain is presented in the later section. 
 
The development of sustainability not only changes the behaviour of the business but 
also that of the government. As environmental awareness increases, the government 





al., 2015). Green policies such as incentives (Coria, 2009; Diamond, 2009; Neto et al., 
2008; Webster & Mitra, 2008; Jin, 2011), regulations (Chen, 2001; Chen & Sheu, 
2009), and taxation (Coria, 2009; Sheu & Chen, 2012) have been conducted in the 
supply chain. The literature states that the government’s policy making is influenced 
by sustainability planning (Brugmann, 1996; Preuss, 2007). Drawing on the above 
literature, it can be observed that the government’s green policy making is driven by 




2.5 Green Technology and Green Products 
 
Green technology is defined as energy-efficient technology (Gallagher & Muehlegger, 
2011) or clean technology (Hall & Helmers, 2013). Green technology adoption is 
positively related to emission reduction (Krass et al., 2013). In the car industry, hybrid 
cars and electric cars are products of applied green technology (green cars), and they 
produce fewer carbon emissions than non-green cars. Daziano and Bolduc (2013) 
indicate that the adoption of green technology in the car industry is technology 
innovation, and green technology adoption is positively affected by the gasoline price 
(Diamond, 2009). Green technology is an environmentally friendly technology 
applied in product design and manufacture. This research employs the definition of 
Krass et al. (2013) which sees green technology as the emission reduction technology 
and argues that higher green technology tends to result in lower emissions in the use 





Businesses often adopt green technology when pursuing sustainability development. It 
is observed that nowadays companies are more and more willing to add green 
elements into their products to reduce emissions.  A previous study by Min and Galle 
(1997) argued that one of the main sources of emissions is the supply chain. They also 
suggested that this issue could be solved by product material reduction and waste 
elimination. For example, companies can change the product manufacturing 
procedure in order to reduce emissions. Furthermore, Zhuo et al. (2011) note that 
green technology innovation is a way to improve both material utilisation and waste 
reduction. That is, having better green technology can help industries to decrease the 
emissions caused by production activities. Therefore, green technology improvement 
of the supply chain is seen as a way to effectively reduce the produced emissions in 
this issue. The level of green technology indicates product greenness. The higher level 
of greenness incurs less emission from the usage. It is expected that a higher level of 
green technology is associated with less energy consumption and will thus lead to the 
reduction of emissions. In this research, green technology improvement is defined as 
the increase of green technology level between the specific observed time points. 
 
“Green product” means that the product is manufactured by either green material, 
through green technology, or green elements are included in the process of delivering 
it to market, and that it is more environmental oriented than non-green products. 
Green products can help with environmental protection by producing less emissions, 
pollutions and waste (Ottman et al., 2006). A green supply chain is key for an 
enterprise to promote green products, and a “green product” is defined as representing 
environmentally friendly or sustainable products (Cao et al., 2013). Green product 





environmental sustainability (Dangelico & Pujari, 2010). With the growth of the 
economy, more market consumers, supply chain parties and governments are 
interested in green product than before (Chen, 2001). To improve a company’s 
performance, the development of green products has gained businesses’ attention 
(Chen, Lai, & Wen, 2006). Over the past decade, green products have been developed 
by companies to raise environmental awareness (Barari et al., 2012). It is indicated 
that green innovation is an important and efficient way to reach both economic and 
environmental success (Lee & Kim, 2011). Notably, green product manufacturing is 
often regarded as an approach for a company to gain profit and achieve environmental 
protection. Corporate competitive advantage is positively affected by its green 
innovation performance (Chen et al., 2006; Dangelico & Pontrandolfo, 2010). To 
conclude, green products innovation/development is becoming important for 
companies (Dangelico & Pujari, 2010) and has been conducted widely by businesses 
as a competitive weapon. 
 
Previous research has indicated three main research topics of the green product, 
including strategic decision making and problem solving in business and product 
development, product design, and green marketing (Baumann, 2002). In addition, 
literature such as Oliver and Lee (2010), Tsay (2009), and Pickett-Baker and Ozaki 
(2008) has also focused on green product consumption. Oliver and Lee (2010) 
discussed green product design in the car industry and they indicated that the social 
value associated with green products is related to the intention of purchase. That is, 
customers’ consuming preferences depend on the social value of the green products. 





the resource crisis in Taiwan, and it was found that consumers would buy green 
products because they believe using them can help to improve the environmental 
impact (Tsay, 2009). However, in some circumstances, consumers can only recognize 
cleaning products but not green products (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008). Although 
the trade-off between a green product’s high price and its green technology has been 
discussed (Olson, 2013), consumers still tend to purchase green products from greener 
companies (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008). This phenomenon is due to consumers’ 
believing that the greener product can bring more benefit either financially or 
environmentally. For example, saving on fuel consumption by driving a greener car 
and producing less emissions from use. It is expected that the greener the product is, 
the more market sales will occur (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008). Thus, the degree of 
greenness is a key issue associated with green product demand in the market. In the 
supply chain, it is noteworthy that the supplier has the power to decide the green 
degree of raw materials (Cao et al., 2013), while the manufacturer has the power to 
lead the “green degree of the product” by changing its green technology level. Supply 
chain roles can determine their green technology levels and thus influence the market 
demand of green products (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008; Lee et al., 2013). The 
supplier and manufacturer are recognized as the two main and most influential roles 
among supply chain parties that impact on the greenness of a product (Lee & Kim, 
2011). 
 
2.6 Sustainable/Green Supply Chain Management 
Sustainable/green supply chain is a type of managerial and operational tool which 





supply chain management is defined as the work that has been done in order to reduce 
the environmental impact caused by the supply chain activities (Swami & Shah, 2013). 
Previous studies regarding green supply chain management tended to focus on the 
issue of purchasing, operation, marketing, logistics, and reverse logistics (Sarkis, 
1995). Recently, other topics have also attracted academic interest, such as green 
supply chain modelling (Cabral et al., 2012; Sarkis, 2003; Zhu et al., 2008; Chen & 
Sheu, 2009; Ghosh & Shah, 2012; Mirhedayatian et al., 2013; Zhu, 2013); reverse 
logistics in supply chain (Thierry et al., 1995; Jayaraman et al., 1999; Fleischman et 
al., 2000; Savaskan et al, 2004; Bia & Sarkis, 2013), and green supply chain operation 
strategy (Lam et al., 2013; Cao et al., 2013; Swami & Shah, 2013). 
 
Green supply chain management is an operational activity of reducing environmental 
ruin, enhancing ecological efficiency, albeit keeping the same profit and market share 
(Buyukozkan & Cidci, 2012). It was stated that the elements of green supply chain 
management include product life cycle, life cycle of operation, measuring 
performance, and environmentally organisational policies (Sarkis, 2003). Sustainable 
supply chain management considers not only economic but also social and 
environmental performance (Carter & Rogers, 2008). Sustainable supply chain 
management is considered as an extension of Green supply chain management, and 
some research also confirmed the overlap in definitions between sustainable supply 
chain management and green supply chain management (Ahiv& Searcy, 2013). It was 
argued that green supply chain pays more attention to environmental issues, while 
sustainable supply chain management focuses more on economic and social impacts 





management and sustainable supply chain management are addressed by looking at 
the topics of carbon emissions (green technology adoption), supply chain profit, 
consumer benefit (price change). 
 
Green supply chain activities such as used products collection and sorting, product 
reusing, recycling, and waste disposal (Rebitzer et al., 2004) are new concepts to the 
traditional supply chain. The operating phases of green supply chain contain 
procurement, production, distribution, reverse logistics and packaging (Sarkis, 2003). 
There are two main differences between green supply chain and the traditional supply 
chain. First, compared to the traditional supply chain, green supply chain adds reverse 
logistic which collects the used product and remanufacture rather than dispose of 
them as waste. Second, green supply chain has its own constructs including green 
strategy, green design, green purchasing, and recycling (Zhu & Zou, 2011). On one 
hand, green strategy drives a company to make business decisions towards a more 
environmentally friendly direction (Olson, 2008), while green design focus more on 
life cycle assessment and environmentally conscious design than non-green product 
design (Srivastava, 2007). On the other hand, green purchasing can help to reduce 
environmental impact from the consumption (Liu et al., 2012), and recycling has the 
same environmentally friendly effect that reduces the total consumption of materials. 
The concept of “green” in sustainable supply chain indicates an environmentally 
friendly design, which results in less carbon footprint. The green product is the output 
of a green supply chain and sustainable supply chain and it has less environmental 






As the product of a green supply chain, green products have a different product life 
cycle in comparison to non-green products. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, 
green products frequently contain reverse logistics such as recycling, as well as 
recovering/reusing and remanufacturing, and the product life cycle is more complex 
than that of non-green products. However, it was indicated that remanufacturing 
activities will not be suggested when a company attempts to optimize both its 
financial and environmental costs (Bazan, Jaber, & El Saadany, 2015). Thus, it is still 
controversial to conclude whether remanufacturing can bring benefit to a company 
both financially and environmentally. Secondly, resource consumption, material 
preparation, production process, and the product end-of-life of green product are 
different from non-green products, and they cause different levels of environmental 
impacts (Rebitzer et al., 2004). This indicates a difference of carbon footprint between 
green and non-green products. Because of its greenness from either green material, 
green production process, or product green design, using green products can produce 
less carbon emissions than non-green products. Based on the two reasons above, 
green products generate less consumption compared to non-green products in two 
ways. First is through recycling and remanufacturing in the supply chain, and the 
second is via applying green design into the supply chain so that less emission will be 
produced during its use. This project focuses on investigating the second way because 
that is considered to be the more efficient approach to reduce the emissions. 
 
Previous studies have investigated the strategy of sustainability for green products 
from the point of view of supply chain management (Cao et al., 2013; Lam et al., 





discussed (Cao et al., 2013). Implications have been provided regarding the strategy 
of raw material procurement in the supply chain. In a mathematical modeling paper, 
Lam et al. (2013) have built a two-stage game theory model of green strategy that is 
related to resource utility and carbon footprint reduction. The study applied game 
theory to describe the interactions in supply chain; the model also considers the 
efficiency of resource using and the reduction of emissions at the same time. The 
coordination between manufacturer and retailer in a green supply chain has been 
addressed by Swami and Shah (2013). They investigated the contribution of the 
manufacturer’s and retailer’s decision making to a sustainable supply chain. It is 
believed that supply chain behaviour is different in a green supply chain to a 
traditional supply chain. Supply chain operations connect to greenness/sustainability 
closely in a green supply chain, and these behaviour changes bring benefit to their 
performance. In a green supply chain, research has discussed the impact on 
environmental performance, economic performance and operational performance of 
supply chain behaviour change (Fang & Zhang, 2018). The argument coincides with 
the concept of triple bottom lines (3BL) in sustainability development which includes 
the environmental, financial and social perspectives (Norman & MacDonald, 2004). 
From the above review of the literature, it can be concluded that the idea of “green” 
development in the supply chain impacts on supply chain behaviour, and this 
phenomenon influences the supply chain’s environmental, economic and operational 
performances. 
 
2.7  Government Intervention in sustainable supply chain 





supply chain management (Zhao et al., 2012; Sheu & Chen, 2012; Chung et al., 2013). 
With regard to this, the literature has revealed that the implementation of green supply 
chains could be achieved through government intervention (Georgiadis, 2004; Sheu et 
al., 2005). Government intervention can influence the strategies of the parties (i.e. 
supplier and manufacturer) in the green supply chain (Zhao et al., 2012). To promote 
the idea of green, such as green activities and green products, the government should 
establish green policies such as subsidies, taxes, or incentives toward green products. 
It is known that the government also has an influential role in green supply chain 
development in terms of the financial capability to support industries. Furthermore, 
governments are under pressure from international environmental regulations 
(Hitchcock, 2012), and it is a governmental responsibility to adopt a green policy. 
Sustainability has also become important for governments because of climate change 
assessments (Barari et al., 2012), such as the Kyoto Protocol and the EUETS 
(European Union Emission Trading Scheme, EUETS) in 2005 which is currently the 
widest applied globally. EUETS is an emission regulation for 31 countries in the 
world, meaning that governments are facing regulatory pressure to develop 
sustainability (Hitchcock, 2012). In the UK, the Climate Change Act (2008) indicates 
that the UK government will provide a five-yearly green budget to support its target 
of carbon emission reduction by 2050. As pressure from national or global regulation 
increases, governments are more and more willing to support and even drive 
sustainable development in the present decade. Due to the above drivers and 
motivations, more and more countries’ governments are willing to participate in green 
development activities. In summary, the literature above shows the governments’ 





plays a leading role in sustainable development. The green supply chain’s parties’ 
willingness to increase and improve green production technology is influenced by the 
government’s carbon emissions policy (Zhao et al., 2012). Namely, a government’s 
policy can be adopted to encourage green technology implementation. In this context, 
this study aims to illustrate the appropriate incentive strategy for governments and the 
optimal decision making for supply chains when receiving government incentives. 
 
The topic of government incentive in green supply chain management has been well 
researched recently (Georgiadis, 2004; Chen & Sheu, 2009; Hafezalkotob, 2015; Jin 
et al., 2011; Neto et al., 2008; Sheu & Chen, 2012; Sheu et al., 2005; Webster & Mitra, 
2008; Zhuo & Wei, 2017). Government intervention can be classified into incentive 
and disincentive. Incentive reveals a positive technique to promote sustainability and 
environmentally friendliness such as subsidies and financial incentives (Hafezalkotob, 
2015; Neto et al., 2008; Webster & Mitra, 2008; Jin, 2011; Sheu & Chen, 2012; Zhuo 
& Wei, 2017). Disincentive, however, indicates a negative way to control emissions or 
resource consumption. For instance, there are the environmental regulations/policies 
(Chen, 2001; Chen & Sheu, 2009), waste penalty and punishment (Zhao et al., 2012), 
and taxation (Sheu & Chen, 2012). The review of both incentive and disincentive of 
government intervention in sustainable supply chain is included below. 
  
Firstly, the literature indicated that government policy can lead the operating strategy 
of the supply chain (Zhao et al., 2012; Sheu & Chen, 2012) and that government 
provided support can help to promote green products (Webster & Mitra, 2008; Jin, 





integrate green supply chains (Georgiadis, 2004; Sheu et al., 2005). The influence of 
government’s green intervention on supply chain management has been studied. Neto 
et al. (2008) have reviewed the influence of subsidies on the environmental impact 
and supply chain costs from the perspective of logistic network. Chen (2001) 
proposed a quality-based model concerning the development of new products with 
conflicting traditional and environmental attributes. In this model, he analysed the 
effect of interactions between the supply chain and the government’s environmental 
policy on green product development. The result has shown that green product 
development and strict environmental regulations are not necessarily good for the 
environment. Thus, it is notable that not all of the government interventions influence 
positively environmental protection and the development of sustainability. Because 
the disincentives of green policies such as regulations and penalties, are applied 
consistently to all levels of green products and not differentiated by their greenness 
level. In the background case of Taiwan, the disincentives such as supply chain 
emission regulation can only control the emissions produced during the production 
process and not affect the products’ greenness. In this case, disincentives are not 
greenness-dependent, and thus cannot directly drive the supply chain to manufacture 
greener products to avoid disincentives. Consequently, in this study, I only consider 
incentives and exclude the disincentives. In other countries, disincentives may have 
effect on product greenness, and thus the consideration of only incentives is seen as a 






In a previous study, a two-period game theory model was built based on the notion of 
interaction between manufacturers and re-manufacturers (Webster & Mitra, 2008). 
They examined the effect of government subsidies as a means to promote the 
development of remanufactured products (considered as green product). The results 
suggested that governments should subsidize both producers and consumers rather 
than incentivize a single party. Another game theory model was established to find the 
optimal environmental-regulation pricing policy in green supply chain by Chen and 
Sheu (2009). They suggested that the government’s regulation can promote the 
extended product responsibility for the companies. As the government makes the 
regulation stricter, the manufacturer will increase their product recyclability (green 
technology). Thus, this study aims to investigate the ability of the government’s 
incentive policy to raise the green technology level of the green supply chain. The 
development of the green product, which addresses environmental issues through 
product design and innovation, is receiving attentions from practitioners and 
governments globally. Thus, the present project focuses on green product innovation 
to explore the influence of government incentive on supply chain behaviour. 
 
From the government’s perspective, a game theory model has been built in a previous 
study to investigate the government’s optimal subsidy policy (Jin et al., 2011). 
Governments’ goal was maximising social welfare and enhancing the demand of 
green products. Their results indicated that as the government subsidizes green supply 
chains, social welfare will improve and green product demand will rise. It was also 
noted by Jin et al. (2011) that green product prices will decrease in order to increase 





not considered the green level of the product, so they observed only the influence of 
subsidies on demand which is reflected by the change of price but not of green 
technology. It was proven that green technology has an impact on green product 
market demand (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008; Lee et al., 2013). Thus, the present 
study considers the government provided incentives to the supply chain parties, and 
investigates the affected change in supply chain behaviour (both pricing and green 
technology strategies). 
 
The influence of government financial policy on the green supply chain has been 
discussed by Sheu and Chen (2012). They built a three-stage game model to illustrate 
how government intervention will promote a green product. Their results have 
indicated that governments provide taxation and subsidization to green supply chains 
as a way to promote green products. They concluded that through the government 
intervention, both social welfare and supply chain profit can be improved. With regard 
to the disincentive policy, it is indicated that government’s punishment and penalty 
affect the manufacture’s decisions, and disincentives can reduce the emissions by 
improving the manufacturer’s production method (Zhao et al., 2012). This means that 
when the government increases the emission penalty, manufacturers will attempt to 
expand in green areas in order to avoid the punishment. Thus, it is assumed that the 
government green policy can drive the manufacturer to increase/improve their green 
technology level. In this study, it is considered that the government provides 
incentives to supply chain parties to encourage them to increase green investment and 
be increasingly environmentally friendly. This project considers the notion that 





are the two main supply chain parties who determine product greenness (Lee & Kim, 
2011). This could reduce the likelihood of one company receiving the entire incentive 
fund as well as increase the green level of the product. 
 
Although it is confirmed that government green intervention such as incentives can 
influence the supply chain operations (Chen & Sheu, 2009; Jin et al., 2011; Neto et al., 
2008; Sheu & Chen, 2012; Webster & Mitra, 2008; Zhao et al., 2012), little is known 
about the influences of government intervention on environmental impact, supply 
chain’s decision making and market demand (based on a triple bottom lines concepts). 
For this reason, the current research project aims to analyse the effect of government 
intervention on environment, economy, and society dimensions. 
 
 
2.8 Automotive sector and its green practice 
 
The automobile industry is widely regarded as a main source for GHG emission due 
to the large fuel consumption of its products (US EPA, 2016), and because car 
manufacturers increase the production efficiency towards mass production 
(Nieuwenhuis & Wells, 2007). Thus, in many countries, the automobile industry is 
targeted as a key point to reduce GHG emission (Van Soest, 2005; Barari et al., 2012). 
Among different kinds of green products in the market, the green car is targeted as 
one of the most important green products to develop, when society and the 
government seek environmental suitability. Within the automobile industry, the 
“adoption of green technology” is believed to be an effective way to reduce GHG 





global survey of 2007 showed that 38% of consumers believed that driving 
fuel-efficient cars was the most effective way to reduce the global warming (Bonini & 
Oppenheim, 2008). In the green car market, one of the most popular car models, the 
TOYOTA Prius, has sold 4.2 million cars by February 2018. Another example of 
green car model, Tesla, which not only have achieved significant market share in 
America but also has been successfully introduced into the Chinese market (Wells & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2012). Notably, the cumulated sale of all TOYOTA electric car models 
was 11.47 million up to 2017. This green car sales resulted in a 90 million ton of CO2 
reduction compared to the sales of non-green cars (TOYOTA MOTOR 
CORPORATION, 2018). This indicates that the development of green cars can 
significantly reduce carbon emissions, and this argument has also been confirmed by 
previous research (Lee et al., 2013). Other than TOYOTA, car brands such as Ford, 
Mercedes and BMW have also participated in green car technogy innovation (Wells 
& Nieuwenhuis, 2012). It can thus suggest that the recent green technology 
innovation in automotive sector has received significant attention by both supply 
chain parties and governments, due to that the development of green technology is 
proven to be an efficient way to reduce emissions. 
 
Until 2014, carbon dioxide emission by transportation only accounted for up to 26% 
of the overall greenhouse gas (GHG hereafter) emission. However, human 
transportation activity has become the second largest impact on the environment after 
electricity (US EPA, 2014). In response to this, a variety of international environment 
agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the EUETS (European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme, EUETS), emerged over the past few years, and governments across 





environmental awareness, governments are also urged to address the issue of GHG 
emission. Governments’ objective to maximise emission reduction (Cohen et al., 2015) 
has led to the introduction of various government green interventions, such as 
incentives, and this is recognized as an effective approach to control GHG emission 
by many scholars (Chappin et al., 2009; Coria, 2009; Dowson et al., 2012; Fischer et 
al., 2003; Fischer & Newell, 2008; Jaffe et al., 2005; Requate & Unold, 2003; Van 
Soest, 2005). 
 
As this research focuses on government green intervention which tend to have 
influence on emissions reduction, the current green policies in different country are 
discussed as follows. In the U.S., the government is seen to implement green policies 
to stimulate the manufacturing of greener cars, and thus reduce fuel consumption 
(Krutilla & Graham, 2012). In the meanwhile, they also implement The Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, and provide subsidy to hybrid car buyers through the income tax system. 
In addition to the U.S., similar green policies and government incentives can also be 
found in many other countries and regions, such as U.K. (Plug-in vehicle grant), China 
(Technology innovation funding), France (Bonus-malus system), Germany (Electrical 
vehicle incentive program), Japan (Subsidies to purchasers of electrical vehicles), and 
Taiwan (Research funding for green technology development). It is evident that 
governments are stimulating consumers’ demand for green vehicles and facilitating 
the development and adoption of green technology by manufacturers in an attempt to 
effectively reduce GHG emission.  
 





becoming more environmentally friendly in 21th century. Existing literature suggests 
two reasons that underpin automobile companies’ investment in green technology. 
First, they invest substantially in the development and adoption of green technology 
in an attempt to improve fuel efficiency in their products and manufacturing process 
(Xu et al., 2013). It was indicated that a sustainable car product can lower total 
consumption in car industry (Nieuwenhuis, & Katsifou, 2015).  Second, car 
companies seek to develop green products in order to cope with the ever-rising 
environmental awareness of consumers (Barari et al., 2012; Flammer, 2015). In 
addition to that, many governments adopted green policies to facilitate the corporate 
investment in green technology by sharing the financial burden and making it 
considerably more affordable than before. Government incentives are important for 
the development of green technology in automobile industry for two reasons.  Firstly, 
in automobile industry, price reduction is the most influential factor for the diffusion 
of the green cars (Cecere, Corroche, & Guerzoni, 2018), and incentives can help to 
reduce the car price and promote sales. Secondly, green technology investment is 
long-term profit oriented, which contradict to the short-term objective of profitability 
in financial capital market (Cecere et al., 2014). The initiation of green technology 
innovation can be difficult, which indicates the importance of government’s financial 
support. Incentives provided by the governments are proven to have a significant 
impact on the green technology adoption in hybrid vehicles (Diamond, 2009). The 
policies of green incentives in U.S. (Diamond, 2009), Netherland (Chappin et al., 
2009) and Norway (Mersky et al., 2016) have also demonstrated a positive impact on 
green technology development in their automobile industries. Technology 





Since the decision on green technology development can be influenced by 
government incentives, this suggests that supply chain behaviour can also be 
influenced by government incentives and expectedly towards a more environmentally 
friendly direction. 
 
It is found that governments tend over focus on emission reduction, so that supply 
chain parties in automobile industry require a better operational strategy to respond to 
government green interventions (Nieuwenhuis, Wells, & Vergragt, 2004). In order to 
increase the efficiency of government incentives in driving green technology 
development and adoption in the supply chain, it is important to understand both the 
ways the incentive should be given and the corresponding decision making in the 
supply chain. Existing literature tends to look at this issue from the perspective of the 
government, and thus lacks an understanding from the perspective of supply chain 
management. To address this gap, this study aims to examine the influence of 
government incentives on the development and adoption of green technology from the 
perspective of supply chain management, and illustrates the optimal decision making 
for supply chain management. 
 
 
2.9 Conclusion  
By reviewing the existing literature, this project attempts to fill the identified research 
gaps. First, the incentives, which depend on green technology, are considered when 
the government provides incentives to the supply chain. Although the influence of 





the literature (Diamond, 2009; Fischer & Newell, 2008; Phaneuf & Requate, 2002; 
Van Soest, 2005), no previous research has considered green technology dependent 
incentive which is currently applied in China and in the background case of this 
research, Taiwan. Because China has recently been recognized as the biggest source 
of GHG emission growth in the world (Boden et al., 2013), the impact of its 
government green incentives is significant. In order to drive green technology 
development by the government incentives, providing incentives based on supply 
chain’s green technology performance is an efficient way. However, as green 
technology dependent incentives have not been discussed neither in policy 
management nor supply chain management research, this project aims to fill this gap 
in the literature. 
 
Secondly, in incentive projects, both government policy-making and supply chain 
parties’ decision-making are important to the adoption of green technology in the 
supply chain. A number of studies investigate incentives from the government’s 
perspective (Chappin et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2015; Diamond, 2009; Dowson et al., 
2012; Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011; Jena et al., 2018; Zhang & Wang, 2017). 
Others focus on supply chain management perspective (Fischer et al., 2003; Goulder 
& Mathai, 2000; Krass et al., 2013). None of the previous studies, however, have 
taken the government and supply chain’s decision-making into account 
simultaneously, thus posing a gap in the literature, which the current project aims to 







Thirdly, this study aims to consider market uncertainty when investigating the 
influence of government incentives. Market uncertainties have been identified as key 
elements when modeling market demand (Bernstein & Federgruen, 2005; Burgers et 
al., 1993; Cardoso et al., 2013; Gupta & Maranas, 2003; Xiao & Yang, 2008). 
However, in the existing policy management and supply chain management studies, 
no study has considered market uncertainties such as price sensitivity and green 
preference in the market with regard to the influence of government green policy. The 














Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1 Research philosophy and methodology 
Objectivism is an ontological position (Bryman & Bell, 2007), and objectivism 
advocates that the social phenomena and meanings of the social phenomena have an 
existence, and it is independent of the individual’s perspective (Bryman, 2008). With 
regard to the questions of ontology within the social sciences, objectivism and 
constructionism are often considered as two main ways to discuss the nature of social 
entities (Bryman, 2008). Positivism was defined as an epistemological position, and 
Positivism proposes to use the natural science method to explore social reality and 
social phenomena (Bryman, 2008). Positivism advocates the existence of an objective 
reality that people can learn from (Jonassen, 1991). The research project supports the 
ideas of objectivism and explores the research topic under the guidance that social 
occurrences and their implications exist unaffected by individuals (Bryman, 2008). As 
the government provides incentives to supply chain parties, their behaviour is changed 
by the adoption of the incentive. It is believed that the influence of the government on 
supply chain behaviour is an objective fact that exists beyond any individuals, which a 
scientific examination can be used to explore. Accordingly, a mathematic model is 
built in the project to test the incentive influences by the government. Based on the 
positivist viewpoint, I can confirm the impact of incentives by examining the 






3.1.1 Mix-method adoption 
Mixed method can address the research question more effectively than single research 
method (Malina, Nørreklit, & Selto, 2011). Mixed method is better than single 
method because it can ensure both validity and reliability of the research finding 
(Cadden, Marshall, & Cao, 2013). It was suggested that the choice of research method 
depends on the research questions instead of simply the epistemological or 
methodological considerations (Kelle, 2006). To address the research question of this 
research: “How do government incentives affect supply chain behaviours?”, both 
modeling approach and the support of practical information, which can enable the 
model to optimally investigate the research question, are needed. Although 
quantitative modeling method is commonly applied in the field of operational 
research, qualitative approach is believed to reveal more information than quantitative 
approach when collecting practical data (Matthyssens, 2007). In the study of 
Hüttinger, Schiele, & Schröer (2014), qualitative method was used to collect the 
empirical evidence from automotive manufacturers at first. The findings from the 
qualitative analysis was then used to construct the framework of quantitative method. 
Their study has focus on factors which affect supplier’s behaviour in terms of treating 
specific customers differently. In order to increase the reliability of the research, the 
authors used a qualitative approach to collect practical information to support and 
build the foundation for the quantitative method. In addition to Hüttinger, Schiele, & 
Schröer (2014), mixed method has been widely adopted in supply chain management 
studies (Cadden, Marshall, & Cao, 2013). Thus, this research employs mixed-method 
design to investigate the influence of government incentives on supply behaviour 






In order to answer the research question, this research project applies mix-method that 
utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods. The mixed-method design in this 
research is based on three phases. It begins with a quantitative approach which is 
based on the extant literature. It is followed by a qualitative study which explores and 
gathers the necessary information from practice of car supply chain. Eventually, a 
quantitative modeling method is conducted to develop and build a comprehensive 
model that is based on the theoretical framework from phase 1 and conceptual 
framework from phase 2. Three phases are discussed in three sub studies respectively. 
Preliminary Study 1 and Main Study 3 used quantitative modeling method, whereas 
Study 2 adopted qualitative method to enhance and improve the model in Preliminary 
Study 1. Specifically, Preliminary Study 1 adopts a quantitative method on the basis 
of mathematical modeling. A game theory-based model is established in Preliminary 
Study 1 to develop an understanding of the influence of green incentives in supply 
chains. In Study 2, semi-structured interviews have been conducted in order to enable 
the development of the incentive model in Preliminary Study 1 into a simulation 
model. The qualitative data are adopted to verify and enhance the model. In Main 
Study 3, a simulation modeling approach is used to analyse the decision-making 
process of the incentive model. The structure of the mixed-method design is presented 






Main Study 3 - Quantitative modeling study
Simulation modeling Building a comprehensive incentive model on the results of Study 1 and Study 2
Preliminary Study 2 - Qualitative study
Semi-structured interviews Verify and enhance the components and assumptions of incentive model in Study 1
Preliminary Study 1 - Quantitative modeling study














Figure 3 - The mixed-method design of the research 
 
 
3.2 Selected methodologies applied in this research 
  
3.2.1  Preliminary Study 1: Game theoretical modeling research 
 
i. Understanding the influence of incentives on supply chain 
 
Firstly, Preliminary Study 1 aims to investigate the influence of incentive on supply 
chain, market and environment, and find out how supply chain would respond to 
government provided incentives for green technology. This study verifies the effect of 
government incentive by observing pricing and technology strategies. I consider the 
government and the parties involved in green product manufacturing process (the 





model of government incentive on green products. The justification of applying game 
theory model is discussed in the following section. 
 
 
ii.  Game theory 
Game theory has been widely used in the studies of supply chain management and 
operation management (Esmaeili, Aryanezhad, & Zeephongsekul, 2009; Reyes, 2006; 
Huang & Li, 2001; Zhao et al., 2010), economics and management science. Methods 
applied in modeling the problems of green supply chain management vary across 
studies, but game theory (Jin et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2012; Sheu & Chen, 2012; 
Ghosh & Shah, 2012; Zhang & Liu, 2013) and fuzzy theory (Tsai & Huang, 2009; 
Wang, et al., 2012; Wang, 2013) are predominantly used. Game theory is considered 
as a tool for analysing the interaction among decision makers that includes conflict 
and cooperation issue (Leng & Parlar, 2005) and can be used to analyse supply chain 
decisions (Lukas & Welling, 2014; Nagarajan & Sošić, 2008). That is, it can be 
applied in formulating/constructing the decision-making process of multiple parties. 
In this research, multiple decision makers are identified and modelled, thus game 
theory is an appropriate method to conduct the scenario. 
 
Previous studies have adopted game theory to model the interactions in supply chain. 
Firstly, game theory is widely used in terms of the supply chain these days, paying 
more attention on the competition and cooperation issues (Leng & Parlar, 2005). For 
instance, Ghosh and Shah (2012) built a game model to check how different channel 
systems influence price, profit, and the green degree of each role in the green supply 





demand considering game, that is, decision making with cooperation, one leader and 
one follower, Stachelberg game type I and II. Sheu (2011) also proposed a three-stage 
game model to formulate the competitive green supply chain based on governments’ 
financial intervention. When more than three players are involved, game theory model 
becomes difficult to solve. Thus, game theory is normally used to describe the 
relationship between only two players. The preliminary Study 1 aims to formulate the 
interactions between supplier and manufacturer in government incentive project. 
Hence, according to the literature, game theory is an appropriate tool to analyse the 
green supply chains’ decision-making process on the basis of the government’s green 
intervention. Based on the foundation of the research background it is possible to 
suggest that information is shared among the parties, and this can be formulated as 
one of the scenarios in game theory mechanism. Accordingly, in Preliminary study 1, 
game theory is adopted to create the theoretical research framework of government 
incentive project. 
 
As Preliminary Study 1 aims to establish a model including the government, the 
supplier and the manufacturer, whose decisions are influenced by each other’s 
decisions, game theory appears to be an appropriate tool to be used in Preliminary 
Study 1. In order to focus on the unique interaction between supplier and 
manufacturer in the supply chain, two-stage game theory model, which is commonly 
used by supply chain management studies (Bhattacharya, 2016; Cai, Chiang, & Chen, 
2011; Chen et al., 2018; El Ouardighi, 2014; Huang & Li, 2001; Zhang and Liu, 
2013), is chosen in the research. First stage of the model focuses on the supplier’s 





manufacturer’s decision making. To solve the game problem, it is assumed that 
supplier and manufacturer are under the scenario of perfect information game. Games 
of perfect information indicate that the players in the game are aware of each other’s 
decision information when making decisions (Gale & Stewart, 1953). In each stage of 
the game model, single optimisation problem is used to formulate the player’s 
objective function with constraints. The application of optimisation problem in game 
theory model were found in many studies of supply chain management (Ghosh & 
Shah, 2012; Gjerdrum, Shah, & Papageorgiou, 2002; Sheu, 2011; Zhang and Liu, 
2013), thus this research also forms optimisation problems to describe supply chain 
behaviour based on the requirement of the game model.  
 
Nash equilibrium is a common way to present the optimal solutions of the game 
model (Rosenthal, 1981). By following Rosenthal (1981) and Ben-Porath (1997), 
Nash equilibrium and backward induction were used to obtain the optimal solutions in 
this study. In this two-stage game model, it requires backward induction technique 
which solves the optimisation problem (Reny, 1993) from the later decision maker to 
the former decision maker. In Preliminary Study 1, supplier makes decision first and 
manufacturer responds to supplier’s decision. Hence, in backward induction, 
manufacturer’s optimal solutions are solved first and then these optimal solutions will 
be taken into supplier’s objective function to gain supplier’s optimal solutions. The 








3.2.2 Preliminary Study 2: Qualitative empirical research 
 
i. Practical information collection for incentive model verification and 
establishment 
The present project aims to create a both theoretical and practical based product 
incentive model. To develop an incentive model which considers the operating 
background of the supply chain should not only be based on theory but also rooted in 
industries’ practical knowledge. It is indicated by Wright et al. (1996) that pure model 
based statistical approaches lack proper historical, economic, and technical 
information, and suggested that including human judgment is a way to fill the 
shortage (Wright et al., 1996). As a result, Study 2 adds the experts’ perspectives into 
the model design.  
 
Supply chain management is for managers in the industry, it is necessary to collect 
information from practice in order to fit the industrial operations. Previous research 
often adopted qualitative methods to gather the industrial information to construct the 
frame of supply chain. For example, case study (Towers & Burnes, 2008; Youn et al., 
2012), focus group (Lu et al., 2013), and interview (Fawcett et al., 2007; Wild & Zhou, 
2011; Perry & Towers, 2013). Previous studies have used interview data to build the 
framework of the supply chain, for instance, Wild and Zhou (2011) developed a 
conceptual framework of the supply chain operations among the non-government 
organisations, they used in-depth interviews to explore empirical knowledge. In a 
similar study, Fawcett et al. (2007) employed semi-structured interviews and surveys 





performance. In a recent study, a conceptual supply chain framework was built by 
Perry and Towers (2013) in relation to CSR implementation in the fashion 
manufacturing industry. They collected the interview data from the managerial and 
operational level staff from companies as well as from non-participant observation of 
the industrial environment. Interviewing industrial insiders is an appropriate method 
to structure the supply chain operations framework. The opening question of a 
semi-structured interview can help to capture richer and wider information without 
missing focus (Gill, et al., 2008). Hence, in the second study of the research project, 
semi-structured interview has been chosen to explore the supply chain framework in 
the car industry. 
 
 
ii. Semi-structured interview 
 
To gather rich information from practical perspectives about the car industry supply 
chains, the government incentives on green products, and the interactions among 
supply chain parties in the incentive project, an interview is conducted following the 
game theory model in Preliminary Study 2. For the research topic of this research 
project, which has been investigated by the literature, different professionals, and 
educational and personal histories of the participants, the use of a standard interview 
schedule/procedure has been suggested (Barriball & While, 1994). Semi-structured 
interviews make it possible to explore the perspectives, viewpoints, experiences of the 
participants (Gill, et al., 2008), and the interview will start with a list of prepared 
questions to ensure the collected data is focused correctly. In the semi-structured 





main themes to develop the incentive model framework. Collected data will be 
analysed with software to ensure the quality of the procedure. Thus, semi-structured 
interview is adopted in this research to capture essential information. Following Gill, 
et al (2008), a list of prepared questions will be asked. Then the interviewee will be 
given deeper/further enquires upon the initial response. This research also follows the 
guidance of Brenner, Brown, and Canter (1985) to reduce interviewer bias. During the 
process of interviewing, each participant will mainly focus on one specific topic that 
he/she is familiar with. For example, the manager of the car company will be asked 
only car supply chain related questions instead of those regarding green products or 
government incentive. Thus, the depth of the interview is ensured by setting the 
interview questions in advance. The participants will be drawn from the managerial 
level of a company, who are believed to possess the decision-making power. Drawing 
on the literature, 10 to 12 interviews are planned (Gaskell, 2000). After the data 
collection, a qualitative analysis software, Nvivo, will be conducted to analyse the 
semi-structured interview data to gain the main/sub themes. Details of the 
semi-structured interview will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 
3.2.3 Main Study 3: Simulation modeling research 
 
i. Simulation method 
Simulation approaches have been widely applied since early 1990s, focused mainly 
on the decision-making context in supply chain operations (Jahangirian et al., 2010). 
These approaches provide a useful tool to formulate/construct multiple parties with 





2006). In the field of economics, simulation modeling is well known as a tool to 
enlarge problems that are to be explored (Arthur et al., 1997). In the relevant studies, 
Amini et al. (2012) have employed the simulation method to analyse the profits under 
different production-sales policies, by simulating the interaction process of the supply 
chain and the market to obtain the best policy. In a review paper, Santa-Eulalia et al. 
(2012) indicated that modeling and simulation are frequently employed to understand 
and explore complex supply chain systems, and identify, for instance, the problems of 
planning, scheduling, coordination, and dynamic. In Main Study 3, multiple parties 
will be associated with the incentive providing process. All of these relevant parties 
will be involved in the decision-making system, and they will interact with others. 
This is why simulation has been considered to be an appropriate tool for capturing the 
decision making among the parties involved. The game theory model in Preliminary 
Study 1 only considers the government, the supplier and the manufacturer. However, 
as the number of parties included in the research increases in Main Study 3, the 
simulation model becomes more appropriate than game theory for the study, because 
the simulation approach is not constrained by the number of parties in the model, nor 
the complexity of the decision-making process. Hence, in order to formulate the 
decision-making process in the green products incentive model among multiple 
parties, Main Study 3 adopts the simulation modelling approach. 
 
In addition, simulation can be used to model complex environments such as the 
supply chain (Slats et al., 1995), and it is suitable to solve mathematical models that 
include complicated decision making (Macal & North, 2006). This study attempts to 





Simulation is an appropriate method to analyse decision making in the supply chain 
(Tako & Robinson, 2012). Compared to the traditional simulation, which takes a 
“what if” approach, this study adopts a combined approach, which integrates 
simulation and optimisation, and thus increases the efficiency of analysing continuous 
decision variables such as incentives and pricing decisions in supply chain models 
(Wan et al., 2005). Having combined game theory with optimisation and simulation 
method, a stochastic simulation model will be developed to investigate the supply 
chain pricing and technology strategy. The dynamic factor in the model is the demand 
uncertainty, which is illustrated by the green technology sensitivity factor and price 
sensitivity factor. Details of the simulation model are presented in Chapter 6. 
 
 
ii. Simulating the decision-making process of the incentive model 
 
The mathematical model built in Preliminary Study 1 has been verified and adjusted 
in Preliminary Study 2, which formulates the real-life case more precisely. Because of 
the practical information added into the incentive model in Preliminary Study 2, the 
complexity of the model increases. Specifically, complexity of the model increases 
due to more participated parties is considered and the mechanism of decision-making 
process in the incentive model is more complicated than only one supplier and one 
manufacturer in Study 1. Main Study 3 thus relaxes the constrains and assumptions 
from game theory model to formulate the details of the multi-period incentive project 
which fits the reality closely. Optimisation-simulation modeling is used to formulate 
the interactions and behaviour between the government, supply chain parties and 





can be reflected in the simulation process. A comprehensive simulation-based 
incentive model is demonstrated in Main Study 3 in order to understand the influence 
of government incentives on supply chain behaviour, especially on the green 
technology adoption. Sensitivity analysis is then conducted to confirm the 
relationships between parameters and decision variables. In addition, different 
government incentive strategies are compared via numerical analysis to provide the 






Chapter 4:  Preliminary Study 1: Game theoretical 
modelling research 
 
4.1  Introduction 
To respond to the research question “How do government incentives affect supply 
chain behaviours?”, Preliminary Study 1 examines the influence of government 
incentive based on the concept of triple bottom lines. In order to understand whether 
the government incentive has a positive influence on the 3P (people, planet and profit), 
these concepts are tested differently. Influences on product price and green product 
demand are considered for the “people” concept; influence on the green technology of 
the supply chain leads to the “planet” concept; and influence on supply chain profits 
are linked to the “profit” concept. 
 
To investigate the influence of government incentive on the supply chain on the basis 
of considering the relevant parties’ interactions, an analytical approach is adopted in 
this study, which is also used in the literature of green supply chain management (Jin 
et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2012; Sheu & Chen, 2012; Ghosh & Shah, 2012; Zhang & 
Liu, 2013). Specifically, the mathematical game model is used to formulate the 
decision-making process of the government, supplier and manufacturer. The 
Preliminary Study 1 aims to examine the influence of government incentive on supply 
chain decisions. Existing literature suggests that game theory model is a suitable 
approach to analyse supply chain decision making (Lukas & Welling, 2014; 
Nagarajan & Sošić, 2008). When there are conflicts and cooperation between 





among decision makers (Leng & Parlar, 2005). In Preliminary Study 1, it is 
considered that the government provides incentives to supply chain including the 
supplier and the manufacturer, and cooperation is in existence between them. Hence, 
game theory model is suitable to be used to capture this scenario. Game theory has 
also been adopted to build the government incentive model regarding the interaction 
among parties in the supply chain (Mitra, 2008; Jin wt al., 2011; Chen & Sheu, 2009; 
Sheu & Chen, 2012). Thus, the study employs game theory as a foundation to 
establish the green supply chain incentive operating framework, and then to analyse 
the influence of incentives from the 3P (people, planet and profit) perspective. 
 
Firstly, supply chain activities consist of material and information delivery among 
each party (Jain et al. 2006). During these transfer processes, decision making is an 
issue in supply chain management as it determines the cost, profit and the 
competitiveness of the industry. To maximise payoffs, the decision maker considers 
all the conditions and available options. There are different dimensions of decision 
making discussed in the literature, such as operation strategy (Lam et al., 2013; Cao et 
al., 2013; Swami & Shah, 2013) and green supply chain model (Cabral et al., 2012; 
Sarkis, 2003; Zhu et al., 2008; Chen & Sheu, 2009; Ghosh & Shah, 2012; 
Mirhedayatian et al., 2013; Zhu, 2013). Similarly, to most of the literature, the present 
study also focuses on the green strategy (green technology level) and the pricing 
problem. 
 
It is notable that although there are several parties in the sustainable supply chain, the 





parties to the greenness of a product (Lee & Kim, 2011). Drawing on previous work 
on the green issues, the present research project aims to investigate green technology 
in supply chain. When the government provides no disincentives, only the supplier 
and the manufacturer are involved in technological decisions, thus this study takes 
both the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s behaviour into consideration. Webster & 
Mitra (2008); Chen & Sheu (2009); Zhao (2012) have indicated the importance and 
their influences on the supply chain decisions. In the supply chain operations, market 
demand is also involved in the game model, together with pricing and technology 
decisions that are considered in Preliminary Study 1. It is assumed in this study that 
the supplier and the manufacturer will independently determine the technology 
investments and pricing levels based on market demand information and government 
incentives. Incentive decisions are made by the government to support green 
technology adoption in the supply chain. 
 






Figure 4 is the operations of the model in the study. The solid black line represents 
forward logistics and the red wording represents the decision variables of each party. 
First, the government leads the operating process in this study. It is assumed that there 
is a supply chain with one supplier and one manufacturer. In the supplying procedure, 
the supplier spends a certain amount of money to buy raw material and processes 
them into a productive material. Those materials then will be sold to a manufacturer at 
a wholesale price determined by supplier. Next, the manufacturer uses the purchased 
materials to manufacture the products and deliver them to customers in the market. 
The market demand function is affected by both the supplier’s and manufacturer’s 
green technology level, and both their objective functions include demand function. 
Thus, demand function is the component that links supplier and manufacturer’s profit. 
 
Expected themes of Preliminary Study 1 
Preliminary Study 1 aims to test the incentive influence by examining the responses 
of the people, planet and profit. The concept of the 3P is presented in expected theme 
1 and 2 in the present study. Firstly, it is assumed that the goal of the government is to 
pursue the 3P in terms of being environmentally friendly due to the pressure of 
international regulations. In the literature, Chen and Sheu (2009) and Zhao et al. 
(2012) have indicated that government intervention can positively promote the green 
product market demand. Furthermore, Sheu and Chen (2012) confirmed that the 
government’s financial support can successfully promote green products to the market, 
increase the green supply chain profit and improve green technology (Cao & Yao, 
2013; Zhao et al., 2012). According to the literature above, I expect the relationships 






Expected theme 1: The amount of financial incentive per unit from the government 
has a positive influence on the people (i.e. price, market demand). 
Expected theme 2: The amount of financial incentive per unit from the government 
has a positive influence on the planet (i.e. green technology level). 
Expected theme 3: The amount of financial incentive per unit from the government 
has a positive influence on supply chain profits (i.e. profits of the supplier and the 
manufacturer). 
 
In supply chain operations, it often happens that the supplier and the manufacturer are 
not in a cooperative relationship and are considered as two independent parties. Cao 
and Yao (2013) indicated that green incentives on suppliers can expand their R&D 
technology. On the other hand, Graczyk (2011) discussed the subsidy on the 
manufacturer and Zhao et al. (2012) confirmed that the government policy impacts on 
improving the manufacturer’s green production technology. According both to the 
supply chain practice and the literature, the supplier and the manufacturer are 
independently influenced by the government’s strategies. Similarly, these may cause 
the green incentive to have various impacts on the supplier and the manufacturer. 
Hence, there is an expectation as follows: 
 
Expected theme 4: The influence of the financial incentives on the manufacturer and 
the supplier is different, that is, the response of the supply chain varies among parties 
 





way to respond to the market environment. Sheu and Chen (2012) suggested that the 
green supply chain will change the pricing strategy (wholesale price and product sale 
price) to maximise their profits when the government provides financial support. 
Hence, in the game model, the supplier and the manufacturer consider the market 
conditions when setting the wholesale and the product price, and decide their green 
technology levels. The price, therefore, may be affected by the incentive. 
 
Expected theme 5: The financial incentives from the government will change the 





4.2.1  Assumptions 
(1). It is assumed that there is a perfect information game and there exists a sub-game 
perfect equilibrium in the incentive model. 
 
(2). Market structure is a monopoly, the competitor’s price is considered as given and 
the influence of the monopolist’s price on others’ pricing strategy is ignored 
(Krugman & Obstfeld, 2008). There is only one supplier and one manufacturer in the 
same supply chain. Because these two parties are usually included as influential roles 
in the supply chain in similar studies (Webster & Mitra, 2008; Zhao, 2012; Jin & Mei, 
2012), Preliminary Study 1 also takes them into consideration and Preliminary Study 






(3). The green product demand is extended by the linear demand curve 
(  , ). A linear market 
demand has been applied by Constantinides et al. (1981) in a maximum-profit 
objective function, this study formulates the market demand function on the basis of 
Constantinides et al. (1981). Furthermore, the model considers that the “green 
technology” in the supply chain will affect the demand. The higher the green 
technology levels of the supplier and manufacturer, the higher the demand. The 
demand function will be:  while the  and  represents 
the green technology levels of the supplier and the manufacturer. The rate of green 
technology indicates the improvement of emissions reduction, that is, in comparison 
to the previous level of emission produced by the product use, the percentage of 
emission reduction reflects the improvement of green technology level.   indicates 
the factor determining supplier’s green technological influence on overall greenness, 
and    is the factor determining manufacturer’s green technological influence on 
overall greenness. Thus, in the demand function, it is assumed + =1  .  
  
4.2.2  Framework of the model 
Regarding the game model of this study, it was explained in the Introduction that the 
government aims to promote green products in the market. At the same time, however, 
the objective of the manufacturer and the supplier is to maximise their profits. The 
decision variable for the government is the incentive paid to each party, and the 
manufacturer and supplier’s decisions are their prices and green technology levels. 
Due to pricing strategy being the most decision-making focus, the current study 
demand a bp   =   demand market size effect factor price 





considers wholesale prices and product prices as dependent upon the supplier and the 
manufacturer’s decisions. Apart from pricing, the green technology level is also 
considered as a decision variable for the supply chain. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Decision process of the Game model 
 
This study builds a game model with regard to the interactions between the 
government, the manufacturer and the supplier. It is assumed that these entities make 
decisions based on precise and accurate information. First, the government announces 
its incentive scheme to both the manufacturer and the supplier. Next, the supplier 
determines the optimal decisions on the basis of maximising profit, and the decisions 
include wholesale price and green technology level. The information of the decisions 
from the supplier will be delivered to the manufacturer, to whom the incentive rate, 
wholesale price, and the supplier’s green technology are given. Then, the 





technology level based on knowing the incentive from the government and the 
supplier’s decisions. The structure of the decision process of the incentive model is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
This study will use backward induction to solve the sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium for this mathematics game model. First, it will solve the decision of 
optimal price and green technology level maximising the profit of the supplier. Next, I 
substitute the optimal pricing and technology decision into the manufacturer’s profit 
function to determine the decisions. The detailed process of obtaining optimal 
solutions is presented in section 4.2.4. 
 
 
4.2.3  Formulation of the game model 
 
I Green technology level 
The present study defines green level by evaluating the levels of emission prevention 
and treatment in technologies. High green technology can reduce the emissions of the 
product use and the environmental impact. Considering different green technologies 
have different grades,and involving more green elements (with lower emission) 
indicates a higher score. According to the regulation of the EIPPCB (European 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Bureau), the definition of green 
technology contains certain techniques that can reduce/minimize environmental 
pollutions and emissions. Thus, this project considers that green technology is 
positively related to environmental friendliness, and technology level varies for each 





technology decisions to make. 
 
In this study, green technology level indicates the percentage of the green 
improvement compared to the default level: the higher the level, the more 
environmentally friendly the improvement. More environmentally friendliness means 
less emissions from the product use and less environmental impact from the product 
waste. When the  equals 0 it means the supplier has put no effort into improving 
green technology in the supplying process. Similarly,  equals 0 represents the 
manufacturer’s lack of investing in green technology, and thus a lack of improvement 
in green manufacturing technology. In other words, the higher  and  will need 
more green investment from the supply chain (cost) but will be more environmentally 
friendly. 
 : Level of green technology adoption by supplier 
 : Level of green technology adoption by manufacturer 
 
II Government incentive 
To promote green environment friendliness, I propose that the government incentive 
rate should be based on the green technology improvement level. Namely, the amount 
of incentive depends on the supply chain’s green technology level. 
The incentives received by the supplier with a green technology level Ts :  
( ) 














where the following definitions are applied: 
 : The incentive rate given by the government to the supplier  
 : The incentive rate given by the government to the manufacturer 
 
III Market demand 
In the green market, a company providing greener products can attract more 
consumers (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008). That is, the greater willingness to invest 
the manufacturer/supplier has the higher level the green technology will be. It is 
reasonable to assume that the “green degree” of the product may influence the 
demand in the market. Accordingly, I assume the greener the product is, the higher 
demand will occur in the green market; the demand function is presented below: 
Green Product demand function: 
 
 
where the following definitions are applied: 
Decision Variables 




 : The factor of market price influence in the demand function 
 : The factor of the overall green technology level influence in the demand function 
：Factor determining supplier’s green technological influence on overall greenness 
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：Factor determining manufacturer’s green technological influence on overall 
greenness 
 
However, green technology level is affected by the investment of technology 
development which shows there is a certain amount of cost in adopting/expanding the 
green technology. Namely, the green investment can raise the demand but also the 
technology developing cost for companies. Thus, the supply chain roles have to face a 
trade-off of the green technology investment and the increase of product demand. 
Enkvist et al. (2007) indicates that “low-cost” green technology improvement in terms 
of emissions reduction is widely applied by businesses. Lowering emission associated 
with consumption is relatively easy at first, but the cost rises when organisations aim 
to significantly change technology. Given this, it is assumed that the green technology 
cost for the supplier and the manufacturer is as follows: 
Green technology improvement cost for the supplier:  
Green technology improvement cost for the manufacturer:  
 
where the following definitions are applied: 
: The factor of improving green technology cost of the supplier 
: The factor of improving green technology cost of the manufacturer 
 
IV Marginal profit of product selling 
For the supplier, revenue is from the wholesale activity of the product with the 












material to wholesale products). The government offers product incentives by product 
sales, this means that the government provides a certain rate to the supplier for 
every item that has been sold. Also, is the manufacturer’s incentive for every 
item sold to the market. Wholesale price is , and represents the cost of the 
supplier. For the manufacturer, however, there is a cost “ ” of buying products from 
the supplier and they can be sold to the market for price “ ”. 
Thus, the marginal profit of the supplier and the manufacturer will be: 
Marginal profit of the supplier: ( ) 
Marginal profit of the manufacturer: ( ) 
 
where the following definitions are applied: 
: The per-unit wholesale price charged to the manufacturer 
: Unit cost of production for the supplier, the unit cost of production for the 
manufacturer has been normalized to zero without loss of generality. 
 
V Profit function of the supply chain parties 
According to the definitions presented above, it is assumed that the government 
provides incentives to the supplier. That means the decision variable for the 
government is the amount of incentives to the supplier and the manufacturer, leading to 
the profit function of the supplier and the manufacturer as follows: 
 
Supplier’s objective profit function 
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Manufacturer’s objective profit function 
 
 
where the following definitions are applied: 
: Profit of supplier 
: Profit of manufacturer 
 
The Government’s objective 
The detail of the government’s objective function will be presented in the Main Study 
3. With regard to social welfare, Preliminary Study 1 attempts to focus on the 
combination of three dimensions from the concept of the 3P drawing on Fisk (2010) 
which is people, planet and profit. Thus, this study takes environment emissions, 
supply chain profit and market consumption into consideration of the government’s 
objectives. 
 
In summary, this study builds an incentive game theory model that considers the 
interaction of governments, the supplier and manufacturer. The construction is mainly 
based on the consideration of the responses of the supplier and the manufacturer. The 
model is built to illustrate the influence of the incentives on the supply chain and the 
market. This study will also investigate the incentive allocation to the supply chain. 
The sensitivity analysis and incentive allocation analysis are presented in the result 
section of this chapter.  







4.2.4  Optimal pricing and technology level decisions of supply chain 
Maple 16 and MATLAB 2012 are used for the optimisation problem-solving process 
in the present study. In the two-stage game model, a backward induction is conducted 
to obtain the optimal solution. There are two stages of decision making in the green 
product incentive model: the manufacturer makes the decisions after the supplier. 
Thus, in the procedure of obtaining the optimal solution, I solve the problem from the 
manufacturer first and backwards to the supplier, as shown below in stage 1 and stage 
2. The notation of “*” is used to represent the optimal solution for decision variables. 
 
Stage 1. Optimal solutions of the manufacturer 
The manufacturer has two decision variables, the product price  and the green 
technology level , all other parameters are considered as known while the 
manufacturer makes the decision, and it is a maximisation problem of the 
manufacturer’s profit: 
 
   (1) 
Subject to: 
 , and ( ) 0s ma bp c T T      
 
Theorem 1. There is a unique optimal strategy including product price and the green 
technology level of the manufacturer in this model. The optimal solution maximises 
globally the manufacturer’s profit in the supply chain model. See the proof of 










The problem-solving process of the unique optimal pricing and technology level 
decisions is summarised as follows: 
 
Assume that the manufacturer makes the product price in the market  and green 
technology level as . The manufacturer pays the wholesale price  and considers 
a green technology marginal cost  to maximise its profit, which is equation (1). 
Equating first partial derivative of  with respect to ,  to zero, I obtain: 
   (2) 
 (3) 
 
By collecting terms in equation (2), given Ts, Tm and w, the optimal price is obtained 
as: 
 
  (4) 
 
Substituting the equation (2) in equation (3), and given w and Ts, I obtain the optimal 
solution of Tm: 
 (5) 
 
In addition, taking the Tm* into equation (4), and given w and Ts, the optimal solution 
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Stage 2. Optimal solutions of the supplier 
Assume that the supplier sets the wholesale price charged to the manufacturer  and 
green technology level . The supplier has production cost  and green 
technology improvement unit cost  to maximise its own profit. Thus, the 
objective profit function of the supplier will be:  
 
  (7) 
 
Substituting ,  which is obtained from the stage 1 into the supplier’s objective 
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wholesale price and green technology level of the supplier. Also, the optimal solution 
maximises globally the supplier’s profit in the supply chain model. See the proof of 
negative definition in Hessian matrix in Appendix 2. 
 
Due to the word limitation of the paper, the optimal solution of the wholesale price 







With regard to the result chapter in the research project, the analysis of the 
mathematic game model is presented to state the influence of the incentive. There are 
two sections in this chapter; 4.3.1 is the sensitivity analysis of the game model, and it 
is followed by the investigation of the government incentive allocated strategy in 
section 4.3.2. 
 
The sensitivity analysis is divided into three parts by the 3P concepts. In other words, 
I discuss the incentive influence through the three dimensions of people, planet, and 
profit. In the study, the sensitivity analysis is not only focused on the influence of 
each parameter on the decision variables, but also the extended decision variable 
which is product demand. Similarly, the study indicates the effect of the parameters 
, , , , , , , ,  on the , , , , ,  and the demand. The 
sensitivity analysis is divided into three parts including (1) the influence of the 
incentive, (2) the influence of the market factors, and (3) the influence of the supply 
chain cost on pricing and green technology strategy, supply chain profit and product 
demand. The main focus will be (1) the influence of the incentive which is structured 
in Figure 6. Furthermore, the analysis of government green incentive allocation in the 
supply chain is also presented to understand the best incentive strategy for the 
government in 4.3.2. 
  








4.3.1 Sensitivity analysis of the two-stage game model  
 
I The influence of government incentive 
The incentive on supplier and the incentive on manufacturer ( , )  
 
Figure 6 - The structure of government influence evaluation 
 
In order to confirm the influence of government incentive on the supply chain, 
the market and the environment, I attempt to evaluate the concept of the 3P that 
contains planet, people and the profit as demonstrated in Figure 6. It is observed 
that the pricing strategy and market demand to understand the incentive effect on 
“people”, which indicates the consumers in the market. Secondly, I analyse the 
green technology decisions of the supply chain to investigate the influence on 
“planet”, and I consider whether the higher green technology improvement (less 
emission) has a positive influence on the planet. Thirdly, I investigate the “profit” 







 People: Influence on market demand and the product price (p, demand) 
 
Demand 
It was found that the demand increases while the government provides more 
incentives on green products. The demand is affected by the green technology level 
and the product price. However, only the rise of green technology level is inflected 
on the product demand, the price is constant regardless of whether the government 
provides more incentives or not. Thus, the incentive does help to boost the green 
product demand by motivating the supply chain’s characters to improve their green 
technologies; expected theme 1 is proved. 
 
 
Product Price (p) 
In the model, the incentive does not significantly affect the market price. In other 
words, the pricing decision of the manufacturer is not influenced by the amount of 
incentive given by the government. Although the manufacturer is in charge of 
setting product market price, neither the incentive on the supplier nor the 
manufacturer have any significant influence on the manufacturer’s product pricing 
strategy. To conclude, market price is not significantly affected by government 
incentives from either supplier’s or manufacturer’s side. 
 
 






To investigate the incentive’s impact on the planet, the change of green technology is 
presented. Figure 7 and Figure 8 represent the green technology level of the 
manufacturer and the supplier while the government provides different incentive rates 
to the supplier. It is confirmed that the incentive to the supplier can enhance their own 
green technology level, hence, expected theme 2 is confirmed in an agreement. For 
the supplier, the more incentive they receive, the higher green technology level will be 
achieved to maximise the profit. However, the supplier’s incentive rate does not 
significantly affect the manufacture’s green technology level. Only when the incentive 
rate is within certain low range and certain high range, a positive effect of the 
incentive on manufacturer’s green technology decision is in existence. This can be 
explained by that the manufacturer would not be driven by the supplier’s incentive to 
invest in green technology unless their own’s cost of technology innovation is covered 
by the profit generated by the increased demand. However, the manufacturer would 
not continue the green technology innovation unless the supplier’s incentive rate 
reaches nearly its maximum and at the same time the supplier makes great effort in 
green technology innovation.  In this case, both the supplier and the manufacturer 










Figure 8 - The influence on the manufacturer’s green technology level of 
increasing the supplier’s incentive 
 
 






























































































































manufacturer. It is confirmed that the manufacturer’s incentive can enhance their 
own green technology level which confirms the expected theme 2. The 
manufacturer’s decision of the green technology level is also followed by the 
incentive rate, and they have a closely linear relationship. Based on the 4 figures 
above, it can be found that the influence of supplier’s incentive and manufacturer’s 
incentive on supply chain green technology decisions are different, thus expected 
theme 4 is confirmed. 
 



































































Figure 10 - The influence on the supplier’s green technology level of increasing 
the manufacturer’s incentive 
 
 
Further, the study identifies the difference of the incentive’s influence of the two 
supply chain parties. It is remarkable that the incentive has more influence on the 
supplier than on the manufacturer. That means the efficiency of the incentive on the 
supplier and the manufacturer is different. Thus, expected theme 4 is verified and 
confirmed. Specifically, the result shows that the government giving an incentive to 
the supplier can increase the green technology level of the supplier itself as well as 
the manufacturer (Figure 7 and Figure 8). However, when the manufacturer 
incentive is raised by the government, only the manufacturer’s green technology 
level improves instead of both the manufacturer’s and the supplier’s. The supplier’s 



































































 Profit: The incentive influence on the supply chain profit ( , ) 
With regard to profit in the supply chain, it is verified that incentive is positively 
related to the profit by the adoption different values of the incentive in the model. 
Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14 show that the trend of the profit rises 
when the government increase the incentive rate. The marginal profit of the product 
selling increases with the incentive rate, thus the total profit of each party is 
expected to become higher when they receive incentives from the government. 
 
Both the manufacturer and the supplier receive a benefit on the profit when they 
have more financial intervention from the government. However, it is notable that 
the improvement of the profit for the supplier is more significant than for the 
manufacturer. Namely, the supplier, as a leader in the game model, gains more 
financial advantage than the manufacturer from the incentive. Moreover, the study 
proves that the incentive is positively related to the profit of the manufacturer and 
the supplier, which supports expected theme 3. 
 
 









































































































































































































Figure 14 - The influence on the supplier’s profit of increasing the 
manufacturer’s incentive 
 
Lastly, with regard to expected theme 5, the study also illustrates the change of the 
pricing strategy through giving various values to the parameter of the incentive. 
From the observation of pricing decisions including wholesale price and the 
product price in the market (w, p), it is proven that pricing decisions are not 
affected by the government incentive. That is, the supply chain does not respond to 
the incentive by changing the prices. The wholesale price and the product price are 
constant despite whether the government offers more incentive to either the 
supplier or the manufacturer. When the incentive has made a change, the supply 






































































II The influence of the market factors 
The green product market size, the effect of the green technology level on 
demand, the weight of the supplier’s green technology relating to the demand, 
and the weight of the manufacturer’s green technology related to the demand ( , 
, , ) 
 
 Market size:  
Market size plays an important role in that it influences the product demand and 
profit in the model. The sensitivity analysis indicates that the size of the green 
product is positively related to the demand, the profit of the manufacturer and the 
supplier. Moreover, the response of the supply chain to the green technology 
level is also affected by the market size. When the market scale becomes larger, 
that indicates profitability, and the supplier and the manufacturer are more likely 
to invest their green technologies. Figure 15 and Figure 16 present the reaction of 
the manufacturer and the supplier under the different values of the market size. 
The manufacturer closely follows the market size to increase the green 
technology level as shown in Figure 16. However, this phenomenon does not 
appear on the supplier side. The supplier improves the technology discretely as 
the incentive increases in Figure 15. The reason of the ladder-sharp trend of the 
green technology level is caused by the supplier, who can only be motivated by 










Figure 15 - The influence of the market size on the green technology level of the 
supplier 
 
Figure 16 - The influence of the market size on the green technology level of the 
manufacturer 
 
 The influence of the green technology level on demand:  
In the model, it is assumed that there is a constant representing how much the 






























































































































the importance of the green technology level for the consumers in the market. If 
the consumer’s willingness to buy the product is extremely dependent on the 
green level, the green technology of the product has a significant relationship 
with the demand. First point, the higher importance of the green level for the 
consumer results the more demand and profit in the supply chain. Moreover, 
under different cases of the parameter setting, all the technological decisions are 
affected by the importance of the green level for the consumer. To be more 
specific, the supplier is willing to improve the green technology level when 
consumers take “green” as an influential factor, as shown by the trend in Figure 
17. It is notable, however, that the manufacturer does not react in the same way 
as the supplier. When consumers show their preference of the “green”, the 
manufacturer responds by changing the green technology level only under 
certain situations. That is, if the influence of the green technology on the demand 
is less than a critical value that is shown in Figure 18, the manufacturer will 
enhance the green technology to fulfill the consumer’s need. However, in most 
cases, the manufacturer does not base their technological decisions on the 







Figure 17 - The relationship between the green technology level of the supplier 




Figure 18 - The relationship between the green technology level of the 
manufacturer and the influence of the green technology level on demand 
 



























































The influence of the green 




























































The influence of the green 
technology on product demand






technology on the demand: ,  
In the two-stage game model of the study, the green technology level of the 
supply chain is one of the factors leading the product demand. The weight means 
the percentage of the supplier and the manufacturer affecting the demand. If 
equals 1, that indicates that the supplier’s green technology level is in charge of 
affecting the demand. Further, α= 0.5, β= 0.5 means the supplier’s and the 
manufacturer’s green technology are equally related to the demand. From the 
sensitivity analysis of the parameter, the study points out that the weights of the 
supplier and the manufacturer are associated with the decision-making process of 
the model. It is remarkable that when the green technology is more 
supplier-driven, there is a negative effect on the overall demand and the profit of 
the supply chain. Similarly, as consumers care more about the supplier’s 
technology and the willingness to buy the product is based upon that, there is a 
negative effect on the demand and the profit. As the supplier holds more power 
over influencing the demand, the optimal decision of the green technology of the 









Figure 19 - The weight of the supplier’s green technology related to the demand 
 
 


























































































































III The influence of the supply chain cost 
The cost of the raw material for the supplier, the marginal cost of increasing 
green technology for the manufacturer, and the marginal cost of increasing green 
technology for the supplier ( , , ) 
 
To compare the effect of those cost factors in the game model, various values of 
parameter setting are conducted. All the costs of the supplier and the 
manufacturer lead to lowering the demand and profit, and make no change to 
their pricing strategy. Demand and profit decrease as cost rises. At the same time, 
however, the wholesale price and the product price are constant while costs 
change. This means that to maximise the profit, the supply chain characters 
would need to adopt a new green technology strategy in order to respond to the 
cost differences rather than achieving that through pricing strategy. The 
supplier’s cost involves raw material cost and marginal green technology cost. It 
is straightforward that raw material cost decreases the optimal green technology 
level of the supplier and makes no change to the manufacturer. Next, the 
marginal green technology cost of the supplier is negatively associated to the 
optimal green technology of both parties as shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22. 
As a result, the supplier’s marginal cost of the green technology plays an 
important role that negatively affects the whole supply chain’s green technology 
level. Further, the marginal green technology cost of the manufacturer is not as 








Figure 21 - The influence on its green technology decision of the green 
technology marginal cost of the supplier 
 
 
Figure 22 - The influence on the manufacturer’s optimal green technology level 
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4.3.2 Incentive allocation on the supply chain 
This section discusses the proportion of providing incentive to the supply chain. To 
investigate the best incentive strategy for the government, the study compares three 
different ways of allocating incentive to the supplier and the manufacturer. Firstly, this 
section presents the trend of the profit and the green technology level of supply 
chain’s characters when the government provides equal incentive to the manufacturer 
and the supplier. In other words, the supplier and the manufacturer receive the same 
amount of incentive .  This is then followed by the example of the 
government giving a higher percentage of incentive to the manufacturer. In contrast, 
the case of the supplier holding more green incentive from the government will also 
be discussed. 
 
I Incentive Divided Equally 
The manufacturer and the supplier receive the same amount of incentive from the 
government 
When the government incentivises equally the manufacturer and the supplier, the 
figures show that both their profits increase exponentially as the incentive rises. 
Also, when the government’s financial support is the same for both sides, the 
amount of profit increase is approximately equivalent. That means that in this 









Manufacturer’s profit Supplier’s profit 
  
Figure 23 - Manufacturer’s profit 
based on different incentive rates 
(incentive divided equally) 
Figure 24 - Supplier’s profit based 
on different incentive rates (incentive 
divided equally) 
 
It is confirmed that the manufacturer and the supplier’s decision of green 
technology level is affected by the government’s incentive policy. Higher 
incentive can encourge the supply chain to improve the technology so that the 
green level of the product increase. 
 
II Manufacturer Focused 
The manufacturer receives more incentive than the supplier from government 
From the modeling result, it can be observed that both the manufacturer and the 
supplier’s profit increases when the government offers more incentive to the 
green product. For the manufacturer, the more the incentive the higher the profit. 
Also, the supplier has a positive increase when the government provides more 
incentive. It is notable that profit rises slightly under a small amount of incentive 
but significantly when the incentive reaches a certain value. 
 
 





Manufacturer’s profit Supplier’s profit 
  
Figure 25 - Manufacturer’s profit 
based on different incentive rates 
(manufacturer focused) 
Figure 26 - Supplier’s profit based 
on different incentive rates (manufacturer 
focused) 
 
Under the scenario of manufacturer focused incentive strategy, incentives can 
help to improve the manufacturer’s green technology level. In terms of the 
supplier, nevertheless, only the incentive rate locates between certain ranges can 
increase their green technology level. That is, when the incentive rate becomes 
too low or too high, the increase in incentive rate has no significant positive 
effect on supplier’s green technology level. A possible explanation of the effect is 
that the supplier only invests in green technology when the incentive rate breaks 
even with the technology cost. However, beyond the breakeven point, supplier 
will not continue to invest even when incentive rate increases, because the 
investment does not have any positive effect on profit. In addition, the overall 
increase in the supplier’s green technology level is not as much as that of the 
manufacturer. Manufacturer focused incentive strategy can encourage more 
green technology improvement from manufacturer’s side and much less from 
supplier’s side, because most of the incentives are provided to the manufacturer, 







Figure 27 - Manufacturer’s green 
technology level based on different 
incentive rates (manufacturer focused) 
Figure 28 - Supplier’s green 
technology level based on different 
incentive rates (manufacturer focused) 
 
 
III Supplier Focused 
The supplier receives more incentive than the manufacturer from the government 
When the supplier has a higher percentage of the government’s incentive, the 
profit trend is different to when the manufacturer holds more incentive. The 
larger the incentive, the better the profit for both the manufacturer and the 
supplier. When the government increases the financial support, the supplier’s 
profit grows linearly. However, the profit of the manufacturer rises exponentially 
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Manufacturer’s profit Supplier’s profit 
 
Figure 29 - Manufacturer’s profit based 
on different incentive rates (supplier 
focused) 
Figure 30 - Supplier’s profit based on 
different incentive rates (supplier 
focused) 
 
Compared to the Manufacturer focused type, the green technology decision of 
the supplier has the same impact as the increase of the incentive in the Supplier 
focused type. That is, except when both parties share the incentive equally, the 
influence of the incentive on green technology trend is the same in both the 






4.4 Summary of the Findings 
Firstly, market demand can be promoted by increasing government incentive; 
however, the market price stays the same while demand increases. A reason for this 
phenomenon is that the supply chain parties’ willingness of investing in green 
technology is enhanced by the incentives. Incentives increase the profit of the green 
product and also lead the supply chain parties to improve their green technologies. 
Thus, the influence of incentives on people (market and consumers) is confirmed, and 
a positive impact is demonstrated. 
 
It is noteworthy that the incentive to the supplier can drive the whole supply chain to 
having a better level of green technology of the product. The financial intervention on 
the manufacturer can only motivate itself while the supplier remains unaffected. 
Moreover, both the manufacturer and the supplier have higher profits when they have 
more financial intervention from the government. However, the improvement of the 
profit is more significant for the supplier than the manufacturer, meaning that the 
supplier gains more benefit when the government incentivises green technology in the 
supply chain.  
 
Due to the supplier not interacting with the market directly, while the manufacturer 
does, the supplier’s response to the change of market size is not as sensitive as the 
manufacturer’s. If the consumer’s preference is highly based on the green degree of 
the product, however, the supplier will improve its own green technology level in 
order to generate more demand. However, the manufacturer is rarely motived to make 






4.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
Preliminary Study 1 has verified the influence of the government incentive on supply 
chain decisions. It has been found that the government’s incentives can affect the 
decisions making process of the supply chain. Providing financial support does drive 
the supplier and the manufacturer to expand the green technology of the production. 
Incentive, furthermore, has a positive effect on supply chain green technology level, 
supply chain profit, but limited effect on the product market price. 
 
In relation to the literature, the study confirmed the results of previous studies (Sheu 
& Chen, 2012; Jin et al., 2011) that green product incentive is positively related to 
environment friendliness and to the supplier’s profit. Offering incentives to the 
supplier and the manufacturer is a way of promoting green products to the market. 
  
Apart from the fact that incentives can motivate supply chain roles to enhance their 
green technologies, incentives also have a positive impact on product demand and 
they can increase supply chain profit. However, it is notable that a green supply chain 
only responds to the increase of incentives by reaching a different green technology 
level. Pricing (as another decision variable) strategy is not affected significantly by 
the incentives. In other words, the wholesale price of the supplier, and the product 
price of the manufacturer do not change gradually when the incentive increases. In 
summary, the supply chain tends to rise the green technology level when it is 
profitable to implement. Neither the supplier nor the manufacturer would adjust their 






Furthermore, the impacts of the incentive on the supplier and the manufacturer are 
compared, with an aim to assess the differences between their responses. The results 
have suggested that the government should offer more incentives to the supplier than 
to the manufacturer, precisely because, when the government provides financial 
support to the supplier, the incentive can encourage both the supplier and 
manufacturer at the same time, to improve their green technology. In contrast to 
incentivising the supplier, manufacturers’ incentive is only positively related to the 
manufacturer’s green technology degree and it does not affect both. For this reason, 
the government should increase its allocation of incentives to the supplier to stretch 









This study attempts to gather evidence-based information to understand the decision 
making in the supply chain given government incentives. The results of this enquiry 
will be used to verify and adjust the assumptions of the mathematical model in Main 
Study 3. The literature indicates that the qualitative method is used to explain humans 
behaviour, help seek the reason behind this behavioural phenomenon, or have a better, 
detailed understanding of the practice. In this project, Study 2 is designed to capture 
practical information in the car industry in terms of supply chain operations and 
government green incentive mechanisms. A semi-structured interview is employed to 
obtain a better understanding of practice in the car supply chain. It is indicated in the 
study of Palinkas et al. (2011), that a mixed method design is more appropriate in 
implementation research than either qualitative or quantitative approach alone 
because their combination brings richer information of the focused research issues. In 
the mixed method design, quantitative method is often used to examine and test a 
hypothesis based on a conceptual research framework. In this study, the qualitative 
method is used to access practical evidence from the supply chain in the car industry 









i. Context of the study 
Taiwan is chosen to collect the qualitative data in Preliminary Study 2 for two reasons. 
Firstly, this study aims to understand the decision making in car supply chain based 
on the government incentive project. Taiwanese government does provide various 
type of incentive to supply chain, five government departments work together toward 
to green technology development of green cars in the supply chain. Not only the 
government actively offers incentives to supply chain, but car supply chain parties 
also have the willingness to participate in incentive projects. As a result, most of car 
supply chain parties in Taiwan have experience in participating in government 
incentive projects. Thus, the decision making in car supply chain in Taiwan is suitable 
to be investigated in Preliminary Study 2. Secondly, to manage the problem of carbon 
emissions from transportation, the Taiwanese government has focused on incentives 
on green technology innovation and pay less attention to disincentives. This reduces 
the bias of the influence of disincentives on green technology development in car 
supply chain.  
 
However, the scale of the green car market in Taiwan is not as big as other countries 
such as China and U.S. which indicates it is less competitive between product 
providers. Although there is no evidence suggests the government’s incentives have 
more influence on supply chain behaviour in a larger scale of markets than smaller 
ones. The number of supply chain parties available to be interviewed in Taiwan is 
fewer than in a bigger scale of the country. The collected data may reflect less 
information due to the small market scale which is considered as a limitation. To 





of the car companies who do manufacture in Taiwan have been interviewed which 
ensured the completeness of collected information. 
 
ii. Sampling and target companies 
In Preliminary Study 2, the non-probability sampling approach is selected which is 
normally applied by qualitative studies. In this study, the collected data is used to fill 
the lack of information for the establishment of the mathematical model in Main 
Study 3. Capturing accurate information necessary for the project is more important 
than seeking a large sample size (Jankowicz, 2005). The objective of the present study 
is to investigate and collect evidence-based practical information from car supply 
chain parties, and that is why specific interviewees are targeted.  Because it is 
commonly used to identify the samples that may have rich information regarding the 
research interest and propose, purposive sampling is adopted in this study (Palinkas, 
et al., 2015).  
 
Because Study 2 attempts to collect practical information from the supply chain, 
particularly in the car industry, car supply chain parties have been selected to be 
interviewed. The two main parties in supply are the supplier and the manufacturer, in 
addition to whom an additional interviewee has also been selected. This interviewee is 
a government officer who has six years’ experience in government green incentives 
projects in the Taiwanese car industry. There are ten interviewees from the car supply 
chain altogether and one from government green incentive. To obtain the information 
needed for the research, it is important to identify the appropriate interviewees from 
the car industry. In this study, selected participants were from the R&D department, 





design and the innovation department. They are selected because green technology 
innovation is managed by them in the company, and they are familiar with green 
technology decision making. Having been closely involved in the incentive project, 
they also possess the knowledge concerning the interactions between companies and 
the government in the incentive project. Hence, it is believed that all the selected 
interviewees are appropriate informants for the research. 
 
 
The following table shows green car companies in Taiwan and the selected companies 
in the interview, if they do manufacturing in Taiwan, and whether their suppliers and 
manufacturers are included in the interview. 
 









Number of Interviewees 
Manufacturer Supplier 
TOYOTA Yes Yes 1 1 
LEXUS Yes Yes 1 1 
Yulon-Nissan Yes Yes 1 1 
Luxgen Yes Yes 1 1 














Personal interview has been used because it can generate more insightful data than 
other data collection techniques (Robson, 2002). Especially for sensitive information 
such as supply chain decisions, government funding and incentives project details, 
personal interview is a more effective tool compared to questionnaires (Millington et 
al., 2005). Thus, a personal interview has been adopted in Study 2. 
 
 
iii. Access to participants 
In the purposive sampling, the interviewer is required to have some degree of access 
to the targeted interview participants. In this study, access to interview participants 
has been gained through personal contacts in the car industry and the relevant 




iv. Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis is important for qualitative research. The analysis unit should be 
small enough to be considered as the “meaning unit” for the data analysis (Graneheim 





in the project, and it is suggested that a study should have a suitable unit of analysis 
corresponding to the research problem (Collis & Hussey, 2003). This study aims to 
explore supply chain behaviour in the car industry, with the suppliers and 
manufacturers (main supply chain characters) as the targeted roles which have their 
own companies’ independent information. Thus, the supply chain party is selected as 
the unit of analysis. 
 
v. Data collection 
Interview data were collected through face-to-face interviews at car supply chain 
companies. Participants were from the R&D department, the green technology 
development associated team, and managers from product design and the innovation 
department. The following section explains the reasons for choosing the 
semi-structured interview to collect qualitative data in this study. 
 
This project aims to collect rich information regarding the supply chain practice in the 
car industry, and both unstructured interviews and semi-structured interviews allow 
interviewers to obtain rich data. Notably, a semi-structured interview can not only 
help researchers to collect detailed and rich information from interviewees but also to 
remain focused on key research topics (Saunders et al., 2007). As the objective of 
gathering qualitative data in this study is to confirm and verify the structure of the 
model in Main Study 3, it is necessary to remain focused on the interview questions. 
Hence, a semi-structured interview is considered as a more appropriated approach for 






In the semi-structured interviews, interview questions are pre-determined, and their 
order is sorted systematically and consistently to encourage participants to develop 
their ideas (Berg, 2004). The order of questions is designed to help guide participants’ 
thinking: following a list of questions and sub-questions that rich information is 
revealed. In addition, the semi-structured interview has a better focus on central issues 
during the interview because the interview questions are predetermined. Except for 
the existing components in the model, unexpected information from the interview 
may also be valuable for the model as it can be used to adjust and modify its 
components and assumptions. Thus, the semi-structured interview is selected in this 
study for its flexibility of gathering rich and insightful information but also for 
keeping in focus predetermined central issues that help participants to develop their 
thinking and ideas. 
 
When a research project is involved in highly confidential or commercially sensitive 
issues, a semi-structured interview is a suitable data collection method 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991). In this study, it is determined that 
information of the car supply chain operation, supply chain behaviour, and the 
influence of incentive on supply chain decisions are aimed to be collected. For 
example, supply chain parties are asked the production and pricing decisions which 
are considered as sensitive information for companies. Thus, the semi-structured 
interview has been chosen to gather the required information from the interviewees. 
 
vi. Interview guides 





interview guide in this study which is presented in Appendix 5. The quality of the 
semi-structured interviews can be ensured when a clear interview guide is followed, 
and for this reason, an interview guide was prepared before the start of interviews. 
Having the interview guide, the interviewees will have a better understanding of the 
professional terms that appear in the interview questions. 
 
There are two sections in the interview guide. Before the start of the interview, the 
first section is read to the interview participants. This section includes the research 
background and the interviewer’s background, research procedure and the agreement 
of confidentiality. The second section is also read to the interview participants during 
the interview. This includes the content of interview questions that are pre-determined 
and have covered all the research issues in this study. 
 
vii. Interview questions development 
In this study, there are 9 leading central questions and 21 sub-questions (prompt 
questions) in the interview questions. Firstly, 9 leading central open-ended questions 
were developed depending on the key components, the assumptions of parameters’ 
setting in the simulation model in Main Study 3 which was required to be confirmed. 
There are 6 main categories in the leading interview questions: government incentives, 
green technology issues, green car supply chain operations, the market demand trend, 
and emission trade. Secondly, 21 sub-questions based on 9 central questions were 
added to help capture richer information. These sub-questions were extended from the 
central questions which can help guide the participants to answer the questions 





cover the same topics, yet with different focuses. For example, green technology 
development questions for supplier focus on the green degree of the key components 
such as the green design and use of materials in the motor and battery. Green 
technology development questions for manufacturer focus on the design of car 
integration system and the design of the vehicle power system. The concept of 
emission trading is also introduced to interviewees before asking questions: 
“Emission trading is the trade of permitted emissions between different parties. The 
government determines the emission obligation of the participating parties, and the 
unused permitted emission unites can be traded with or sold to other parties”. The 
following table shows the connection between pre-determined interview leading and 
prompt questions and expected evidence-based implications to be used in the model in 








Table 4 - Interview questions and corresponding issues in the mathematical 
model 
Interview questions Corresponding research issues 
1. What was the best-selling green car 
in your company in the past five 
years? 
P1. Why do you think this model 
could become a best seller? 
P2. What role do you think the 
government has played when you 
promoted this model? 
 Practice evidence: Background 
case of the green vehicle which fits 
the incentive model 
 Government’s intervention in 
green cars’ market promotion 
2. When your company delivers the 
green car marketing strategy, which 
factors of the car do you think 
influence most consumer 
preferences? 
P1. Can you give me an example of 
the car model and its sales? 
P2. Why do you think these factors 
affect consumers’ choices? 
 Key factors which affect market 
demand (consumers choices) 
 The relationship between the 
relevant factors and the car 
demand 
3. Can you describe what factors your 
company considers when 
developing a new green model? 
P1. Can you give an example? 
P2. What are the issues you consider 
during the process? 
P3. What are the main reasons 
stopping/driving your company 
from/toward green technology 
 Supply chain decisions in green car 
production 
 Supply chain strategies for green 
technology development 
 The objective of the manufacturer 
and the supplier 
 Motivations and the barriers in 





Interview questions Corresponding research issues 
innovation? 
4. Which roles in the car supply chain 
do you think are relatively 
influential for green vehicle green 
technology development? 
P1. Why do you think so? 
P2. Can you give me an example? 
 Supply chain parties involved in 
the decision of final car greenness 
5. Which key production 
processes/components are highly 
relevant to a green vehicle’s green 
technology? 
P1. Why do you think so? Does 
your company have any problems 
accessing these key components? 
P2. Which parts of the ones that you 
have described account for most of 
the production cost? 
 Key production processes and car 
components relate to green 
technology 
 The sources/supply of these key 
components and the costs 
6. Following the previous question, do 
the government’s incentives affect 
green car design in your company? 
P1. If yes, can you describe how 
government policy affects the car 
design? 
P2. If no, does tax/emission penalty 
or any other government policy 
impact on the green technology 
design? 
 Current incentives on green cars 
provided by the government in car 
supply chain 
 The impact of tax and emission 
penalty related policy on the green 
technology development of green 
cars 
7. Has your company received any 





Interview questions Corresponding research issues 
government incentives/funding for 
green technology development? 
P1. If yes, can you provide an 
example? 
P2. If no, did your company try to 
apply, and what was the reason for 
the failure? 
P3. Do you know any of your 
upstream/downstream that has 
received the incentives? 
supply chain 
 Supply chain coordination driven 
by green technology incentives 
8. Following the previous question, 
what are the incentives you have 
received and how did you apply for 
them? 
P1. Do you think the government 
financial support has influenced 
your company’s green technology 
innovation? Why do you think so? 
P2. Do you think the incentives 
affect operation decisions and why? 
 The mechanism of incentives to be 
applied in the supply chain 
 The practical influence of 
incentives on green technology 
development 
 Operational decisions affected by 
the government’s incentive policy 
9. Has your company participated in 
the emission trading in Taiwan and 
for what reasons? 
P1. If yes, for how long? 
P2. If yes, has your company traded 
for buying permit or selling? 
P3. If no, do you know any if your 
upstream/downstream take part in 
the emission trading? 
 Emission trading circumstances 
 Existing mission thresholds 
 The participation of supply chain 







viii. Language of interviews 
In this study, Mandarin has been chosen as the interview language due to it being the 
official language in Taiwan. Despite some of the interviewees speaking a certain 
degree of English, Mandarin was still selected to avoid any misunderstanding, and 
also because Mandarin is the interviewees’ first language. Before the interview, the 
English version of the interview guide is translated into Mandarin by a Chinese 
Mandarin native speaker who well understood the background of this research enquiry. 
This study also invited a second fluent Mandarin Chinese speaker to translate the 
Mandarin version of the interview guide into English. All the inconsistencies between 
these two versions were found and revised. 
 
 
ix. Interview quality improvement 
For the purpose of reducing interviewer bias to improve the interview quality, this 
study follows the guidance of Brenner, Brown, and Canter (1985): 
 Asking the question by reading the written sentences of the interview 
guide 
 Asking the questions slowly and use the correct manner of speaking 
 Following the pre-determined order of interview questions to ask the 
participants 
 Ensuring all the interview questions are asked 
 Applying the interview response card if necessary 
 Using the recording technique through all interviews 





 Expressing an interest in hearing the interviewees’ answers 
 Ensuring the interviewer fully understands each answer given by the 
interviewee 
 Do not to agree or disagree with the interviewees’ answers 
 
In this study, based on the consent of participants, 9 of 11 interviews were recorded by 
a tape recorder. Another 2 interviews were recorded in written form as requested by 
the interviewees. During these two interviews, detailed notes were taken to rebuild the 
interviews afterwards. 
 
x. Data collection summary 
11 semi-structured personal interviews were conducted, 10 of them from the car 
industry and one from a government department. 11 interviews’ worth of data was 
collected over 3 months. At the start of the interviews, participants’ names, personal 
contact details and their company names were recorded. But, on account of the 
confidentiality agreement in this study, this information has not been revealed in this 
dissertation, and all the associated companies have also been kept anonymous in the 





5.3.1 Data analysis 





principles of the thematic analysis indicated by Braun and Clarke (2006). The key 
concepts and variables derived from the literature were built before the interview, and 
the interview data emerged later to adjust the model. This study also follows Aronson 
(1995)’s interview procedure to conduct the thematic analysis as presented in Figure 
31. Nvivo 11 software was used to analyse the interview data. 
 
In the thematic analysis, the first step was to collect the data into a transcribable form. 
The next one was to prepare the transcription for analysis. Initially, the interviews 
were executed in Mandarin Chinese. Thus, firstly the interview recordings were 
transcribed into Microsoft documents (Word 2016); Secondly, these transcripts were 
translated from the Mandarin Chinese version to English before they were analysed. 
To enhance the reliability of the interview data, this translation was done by a 
professional translator. Additionally, this study invited a colleague of the researcher, 
who does not only have a good understanding of the research background but can also 
speak both English and Mandarin Chinese fluently, to revise these two versions of the 
transcripts. The inconsistencies have been found were revised. 
 
The third step of the thematic analysis was to identify the categories for coding. In 
this study, categories were initially identified based on the parameters/components 
and assumptions of the incentive model. In order to obtain the required information 
for the incentive model, six categories were pre-determined: government incentives, 
green technology issues, green car supply chain operations, the market demand trend, 
and the emission trade. Although these pre-determined categories have covered the 





unexpected information that might contribute to the enquiry. Thus, new categories 
were then created accordingly. 
 
The fourth step of the thematic analysis was data coding. Relevant sub-themes were 
added to the main categories based on the definitions of the categories. There were 
two parts of coding to ensure its reliability and quality. Firstly, after the first coding, 
all the interview transcripts were re-coded a few weeks later. All the inconsistency 
was identified and modified. Secondly, several randomly selected transcripts were 
coded again by a colleague of the researcher. The coding of these two versions were 
then compared. In both parts of the coding process, a high level of coding reliability 
was achieved (above 85 percent) which is considered to be good reliability (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
 
Next, displaying the data and generating the conclusions. All transcripts were 
reviewed and coded, and all of the codes were assigned to construct the sub-themes, 
then the action was repeated several times. After this, the framework of the main 
themes and sub-themes was summarised to form the arguments and draw the 









Figure 31 - Thematic analysis process  
Collect the data
Transcribe collected data 
Identify the categories
Coding: Generate the related 
patterns into sub-themes
Display data
Build the arguments and 
generate the conclusion
Pre-determined categories 
obtained from key concept 






5.3.2 Development of themes 
There are six categories identified in the result of analysis which are 
Government Incentives, Green Technology, Market Trend and Demand, Green 
car supply chain, Emission Trade and Other green policies. The following 
tables present the themes and sub-themes for each category.  
 
Category 1: Government Incentives 
Firstly, Under the category of government incentives, it was found that the majority of 
interviewees indicated government incentive has an effect on supply chain operations. 
The affected direct supply chain decision including Production related decision (see 
Quote C1-1 in Table 5), Price (see Quote C1-2 in Table 5) and Product design (see 
Quote C1-3 in Table 5). At the same time, apart from these supply chain decisions, 
indirect effect on supply chain operations regarding green car development and 
investment was also revealed (see Quote C1-4 and C1-5 in Table 5). Although the 
majority of interviewees have revealed the effect of government incentives on supply 
chain operations, there was one interviewee indicated government incentives have no 
influence on supply chain operations due to this company is at the early stage of 
incentive project (see Quote C1-6 in Table 5).  
 
In addition, government incentives for supply chain and consumers are both revealed. 
Incentives for supply chain, including the supplier and the manufacturer; Incentives 
for consumers was also indicated (see Quote C1-7 in Table 5). When the government 
provides incentive to the car industry in Taiwan, the first step is an application of the 





such as the Industrial Technology Development Program (Section industry 
professionals)” and Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) in Taiwan. 
During the incentive period, the government monitors the progress and performance 
of the green technology innovation (see Quote C1-9 and C1-10 in Table 5). Companies 
are asked to submit a report in each funded period and the government committees 
review their performance then adjust their incentive rate accordingly (see Quote C1-11 
and C1-12 in Table 5). In the incentive project, supply chain parties consider their 
investment cost and profit when involving in green technology innovation (see Quote 
C1-13, C1-14 and C1-15 in Table 5). It was also indicated that the decision making in 
incentive project is based on meeting government expectations (see Quote C1-16 in 
Table 5). 
 
Category 2: Green Technology 
Regarding the determinant parties of green technology, manufacturer and supplier are 
identified in most of the interviews (see Quote C2-1 in Table 5). Quote from 
TOYOTA manufacturer: “TOYOTA and LEXUS we have factories in Taiwan, some of 
our car models are imported as parts and only assemble in Taiwan but some are 
manufactured in Taiwan”; “Our up-stream, suppliers, have also applied for 
government funding”, it can be observed that both the supplier and the manufacturer 
have influence on green technology and they both participate in the government 
incentive project. Two Taiwanese local car brand, Yulon-Nissan and Luxgen recently 
have also participated in manufacturing green cars. At the same time, the theme of 
“Suppliers from other countries“ was also identified (see Quote C2-4 in Table 5). In 





one of the interviewees, a government official has indicated the importance of the 
government in green technology development of green cars (see Quote C2-5 in Table 
5).  
 
When supply chain parties discussing the drivers of making green technology 
investment, a list of reasons are mentioned, including Regulation (see Quote C2-6 and 
C2-7 in Table 5), Profit (see Quote C2-8 in Table 5), Market trend (see Quote C2-9 in 
Table 5), High fuel price (see Quote C2-10 in Table 5), Having good relationship with 
government (see Quote C2-11 in Table 5), For potential future market (see Quote 
C2-12 in Table 5), Competitive advantage (see Quote C2-13 in Table 5), Being 
environmentally friendly, CSR reason (see Quote C2-14 in Table 5). 
 
For car supply chain parties, a car’s green technology is defined as fuel efficiency (see 
Quote C2-15, C2-16 and C2-17 in Table 5); Car's greenness (level of environmental 
friendliness) (see Quote C2-18 in Table 5). Specifically, the green technology of green 
cars is mainly affected by the green degree of three key components, Motor, Engine, 
and Battery (see Quote C2-19 in Table 5). The motor was indicated in the interviews 
(see Quote C2-20 and C2-21 in Table 5). Engine (see Quote C2-22, C2-23 and C2-24 
in Table 5) and Battery (see Quote C2-25 in Table 5) are also identified to be 
influential to car’s green technology in the interviews. 
 
To improve the green technology of green cars, there are few obstacles and difficulties 
revealed by participated supply chain parties. One of the reasons is financial difficulty 





Technological difficulty in Taiwan is also another reason that car supply chain cannot 
improve their technology significantly (see Quote C2-28 in Table 5). Thirdly, Green 
technology expert recruitments problem (see Quote C2-29 in Table 5). 
 
Category 3: Market trend and Demand 
In the green car market in Taiwan, there are few issues appeared to be associated with 
consumer choices. Firstly, price is indicated as one of the factors (see Quote C3-1 and 
C3-2 in Table 5). In addition to price, green technology is also mentioned as a key 
factor which relates to consumer purchasing behaviour (see Quote C3-3 in Table 5). 
Other factors that have an influence on green car purchasing behaviour are Green 
preferences (see Quote C3-4 in Table 5), Warranty (see Quote C3-5 in Table 5), Fuel 
price (see Quote C3-6 in Table 5) and Charging station (see Quote C3-7 in Table 5). 
 
Category 4: Green car supply chain 
In the green car supply chain, the manufacturer must source the part from the supplier 
because of the complexity of car parts. However, it was found that vertical integration 
takes place in the car supply chain when specific components contain key 
technologies (see Quote C4-1 and C4-2 in Table 5).  
 
In the car supply chain, supplier and manufacturer are our targeted interviewees. 
Expect these two parties, there are few more tiers have been indicated in the interview 
“Retailer” and “Dealer” from direct and non-direct selling store, and “Aftermarket”. 
Cooperation between the supplier and the manufacturer is mentioned (see Quote C4-3 





focuses of this study. For supplier’s operational decisions in incentive projects, several 
keywords have been indicated, including Price (see Quote C4-4 in Table), Motor (see 
Quote C4-5 in Table 5), Engine (see Quote C4-6 in Table 5), Battery (see Quote C4-7 
in Table 5) and airbag (see Quote C4-8 in Table 5). For the manufacturer’s operational 
decisions, “Price” and “Car design” have been indicated in the majority of the 
interviews. Price refers to the price of the green cars offered to the market (see Quote 
C4-9 in Table 5). Several key words regarding manufacturer’s car design decisions 
including “Weight”; “Transmission”; “Tyres”; “Software system”; “R&D”; “Motor”; 
“Key component”; “Engine”; “Car Interior”; “Car body”; “Battery”. 
 
Both the supplier and the manufacturer indicated their objectives are maximising the 
profit (see Quote C4-10 and C4-11 in Table 5). A manufacturer said: “When 
manufacturing a green car, we only consider whether it can be sold to the market and 
whether it is profitable”, and a supplier said “Our equipment cost and variable cost 
will be summed up, as long as there is a reasonable profit we will continue to supply 
parts to the manufacturer”. As profit reflects the difference between the cost and 
revenue, “Cost” was mentioned as another keyword in the supplier and the 
manufacturer’s objectives. 
 
Category 5: Emission Trading 
No evidence in the collected data shows car supply chain parties have participated in 
emission trading, but one manufacturer indicated will consider in the future (see 
Quote C5-1 in Table 5). One of the interviewees, government officer has indicated 





company has indicated its intention to consider emission trading (see Quote C5-3 in 
Table 5). For this company which is on developing stage, it was indicated that this 
plan of participation in emission trading aims to follow government policy (see Quote 
C5-4 in Table 5). However, the majority of the interviewees expressed no experience 
in emission trading. When they are asked their intentions of participation emission 
trading in the future, themes of “Unnecessary to participate” (see Quote C5-5 in 
Table 5), “Other or no specific reasons” and “No current exact regulation for the 
emission of production” were identified. Thus, currently, supply chain parties don’t 
have the pressure of managing emissions. In Taiwan, emissions regulations only 
applied in few specific industries, car supply chain parties who have the intention to 
participate mainly due to “Reduce emissions in production for future green policy” 
and “Cooperation with government’s future emission trade relevant policy”. 
 
Category 6: Other green policies 
Expect the incentive related green policy, there are several other green policies have 
been mentioned in the interview. Supply chain parties believe the government will 
introduce new emission regulation and increase the number of charging stations in 
Taiwan. It was also indicated by a manufacturer that the Chinese government pays 
more attention to promote green car innovation in the supply chain compared to the 
Taiwanese government. Besides, there is clear emission regulation for car supply 
chain in China. Another green polices in Taiwan indicated were Green Mark, Green 






Table 5 - Quotes from the semi-structured interviews 
Quote 
number 
Quote from the interviews 
Quote C1-1 We have added two production lines with an extra team to manage government project 
Quote C1-2 We can provide green cars to the market with a more affordable price 
Quote C1-3 
The material used for the body of the car is more high-temperature resistance in our green 
cars, without government incentives we will not use this because the cost is higher than 
normal materials 
Quote C1-4 We started to invest in green cars production since we received the government’s funding 
Quote C1-5 
Our green technology innovation department was set up to cope with government incentive 
project 
Quote C1-6 
The current technology innovation plan is based on the company’s marketing strategy and it is 
not entirely dependent on government incentives 
Quote C1-7 Government has been offering tax reduction for green cars consumers in the past few years 
Quote C1-8 The government decided an initial incentive rate to our proposed plan 
Quote C1-9 
Government officers came to check if we have achieved what we have proposed in the 
proposal of the funding 
Quote C1-10 
The government looked at our green technology at the end of each term and compared it with 
the previous period. The review is basically dependent on whether we have better or worse 
green technology in the current term 
Quote C1-11 
Last year, the government reduced the percentage of the incentive in the budget of the 
technology project after the substandard periodical review 
Quote C1-12 
Our incentive rate is cut down from 14% to 8% because last term’s review result was not very 
satisfactory 
Quote C1-13 We only invest in green cars development when it is profitable 
Quote C1-14 
Our manager wants to apply for government incentive funding to cover some of our cost of 
green technology innovation because it is very likely to have a negative profit in the first few 
years of the green technology investment 
Quote C1-15 
We won’t be able to improve the technology of manufacturing without national science 
department’s funding 
Quote C1-16 
Our company normally follow government project’s plan closely in order to continually 
receive the funding from the government 
Quote C2-1 
A green car’s core green technology and its market value are dependent on the original car 
design team, including mid-stream in the supply chain which is the supplier, and down-stream 






TOYOTA and LEXUS we have factories in Taiwan, some of our car models are imported as 
parts and only assemble in Taiwan but some are manufactured in Taiwan 
Quote C2-3 Our up-stream, suppliers, have also applied for government funding 
Quote C2-4 
There are many parts in one car, we buy them from different countries such as China, Europe 
and America 
Quote C2-5 
Five government departments are involved in promoting green car’s technology innovation, 
including Bureau of Energy (Ministry of Economic Affairs), Environmental Protection 
Administration (Executive Yuan), Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Finance, and 
Department of Industrial (Technology Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Quote C2-6 
Government’s regulation has become more and more strict, this is why we are actively 
developing green cars 
Quote C2-7 
National-Sixth regulation (car’s emissions regulation) is very strict now and manufacturing 
green cars is the only way to lower the emissions 
Quote C2-8 
When manufacturing a green car, we only consider whether it can be sold to the market and 
whether it is profitable 
Quote C2-9 Green car is a future market trend 
Quote C2-10 Fuel price increases so consumers buy more green cars than before 
Quote C2-11 
This incentive project is not only for receiving funding in these three years but also maintain a 
good relationship with the government department 
Quote C2-12 
Now we don’t expect to have profit from these green car models because the innovation cost is 
very high at the beginning, however, we target China market as the potential market which 
has a significantly bigger scale than Taiwan 
Quote C2-13 
When other brands are all producing green cars, we need to participate to maintain a 
competitive advantage 
Quote C2-14 
Especially our CSR department who is active to make the company’s image to link to 
environmentally friendly by promoting green car models 
Quote C2-15 The most important factor to measure the car’s green technology is its MPG (miles per gallon) 
Quote C2-16 Greener cars consume less fuel when driving 
Quote C2-17 Green technology means the level of saving the fuel consumption 
Quote C2-18 
Green technology is related to car greenness”; “I think a green car is an environmentally 
friendly car 
Quote C2-19 
A green car’s battery, engine and motor are the most important key components regarding its 
fuel efficiency 
Quote C2-20 
For green car models, we need a good motor so we adopted the motor from Tomita Motor who 
has also supply TESLA 







We manufacture engine by ourselves because we cannot find a suitable engine from other 
suppliers, the engine is one of our key technology so we don’t want to use other brand’s engine 
Quote C2-23 
The engine is the most expensive component in the green car and the design of the engine is 
related to fuel efficiency 
Quote C2-24 
It’s very expensive to design a new engine so MAZADA and Nissan have used the same R18 
engine in some of their car models, HONDA always let the supplier develop new engines, so 
their car price is more expensive than TOYOTA 
Quote C2-25 
Part of the fuel consumptions is replaced by the battery in green car design, the battery can 
supply the electricity to drive the motor, the green technology of battery is very important, so 
we have to intervene 
Quote C2-26 
Now we don’t expect to have profit from these green car models because the innovation cost is 
very high at the beginning 
Quote C2-27 
We won’t be able to improve the technology of manufacturing without national science 
department’s funding 
Quote C2-28 
The scale of Taiwanese green car market is small, and scale of car companies are relatively 
small as well, unlike other international car companies can have the latest green technology 
innovation 
Quote C2-29 It is very difficult and expensive to hire suitable professional experts in Taiwan 
Quote C3-1 
Consumer only buy the cars they can afford, that is why in Taiwan you can see those cars 
prices lees than 100 million TWD is more popular than expensive ones 
Quote C3-2 Car consumers are very sensitive to the price 
Quote C3-3 
Except for the green technology from our innovation department, supplier’s technology and 
price of the parts are important and they also affect the final price offered to the market. Our 
goal is to sell the car, the more the better, if the price is too high then it will be difficult to sell 
Quote C3-4 
Some consumers naturally prefer green products so they buy green cars, we also found some 
consumers only care about how much they can save in the future with a green car 
Quote C3-5 
Battery problem is another issue, normally you need to change the green car’s battery every 
five years. I don’t know why suppliers haven’t overcome this problem. In fact, it is an extra 
cost for consumers, so some car seller provides a warranty to cover a few years 
Quote C3-6 
People buy green cars to save the expense of fuel, especially when the fuel prices increases in 
some years, green cars become more popular 
Quote C3-7 
In the city areas, the charging services is limited. There are nearly no charging stations in the 
mountain areas so electric cars are still not accepted widely by consumer now 
Quote C4-1 
We manufacture batteries for I3 and I8 series, another example, LEXUS also produce their 





cheaper to buy from a supplier, as long as we can sell cars to market, we will still produce 
batteries by ourselves 
Quote C4-2 
We used to buy the engine from Huaching, but now we have merger Huaching into our 
company 
Quote C4-3 
We need to manage our “know-how” by ourselves but also discuss with our supplier, asking 
the supplier to produce a part with a good level of quality to meet our requirement. For green 
technology development and car design, I think we cannot be totally independent 
Quote C4-4 
We open the mould to produce the part, providing to different channels, normally we decide 
the price of the part sold to the manufacturer, but the price cannot be too high 
Quote C4-5 We design a motor to fulfil manufacturer’s needs, motor relates to a car’s driving duration 
Quote C4-6 
The manufacturer comes to us for a specific engine but normally they have known what kind 
of engine they need. There are four levels of certification for engine suppliers, the 
manufacturer will seek for the one with right level as their engine supplier 
Quote C4-7 
We produce batteries for hybrid and electric cars, the batteries for electric cars can determine 
its duration. The design of the battery is much more complicated than a car’s motor 
Quote C4-8 
For example, TOYOTA and Honda have been using the same airbag. The technology level of 
an airbag is not as important as engine or battery because no company wants to invest in 
developing the airbag 
Quote C4-9 
The market price is normally set by the car manufacturer, car dealer or the store sales cannot 
change it 
Quote C4-10 
When manufacturing a green car, we only consider whether it can be sold to the market and 
whether it is profitable 
Quote C4-11 
Our equipment cost and variable cost will be summed up, as long as there is a reasonable 
profit we will continue to supply parts to the manufacturer 
Quote C5-1 Our company doesn’t join emission trading, maybe head office will consider this in the future 
Quote C5-2 
At the moment, emission trading in Taiwan only high-tech industry has involved, car supply 
chain hasn’t participated 
Quote C5-3 
I was told that we are still evaluating the possibility of joining emission trading soon, so we 
don’t buy or sell any in emission trading now 
Quote C5-4 
We know the government is going to have emission regulation soon so emission trading will 
become a trend in the industry 
Quote C5-5 
I don’t think emission trading is necessary for Taiwan, we don’t have that market. One of our 











1. Influence of incentives on supply 
chain operations 
1. Government has no effect  
2. Government has an effect i. Supply chain decisions a. Production related; b. Price; c. 
Product design 
ii. Green car development and 
investment 
 
2. Incentives for the supply chain  
3. Incentives for the consumers  
4. Government green incentive 




2. Project processing 
 
I. Regular review by government a. Report for government 
b. The evaluation performance 
regarding green technology 
improvement 
II. Technology investment and 
renew the production lines 
a. Profit consideration 
b. Cost consideration 










1. Determinant parties 1. Manufacturer 1. Manufacturers in Taiwan a. TOYOTA; b. LEXUS; c. 
Yulon-Nissan; d. Luxgen; e. 
Volvo; f. BMW; g. HONDA 
2. Manufacturers in other countries from the upper 
stream of the supply chain 
a. TOYOTA; b. Volvo; c. 
BMW 
2. Supplier 1. Suppliers in Taiwan 
a. TOYOTA; b. LEXUS; c. 
Yulon-Nissan; d. Luxgen 
2. Suppliers from other countries 
a. China; b. U.S.; c. 
European countries 
3. Government  1. Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs 
  
2. Environmental Protection Administration, 
Executive Yuan  
3. Ministry of the Interior 
4. Ministry of Finance 






2. The drivers of making 
green technology investment 
1. Regulation  
2. Profit 
3. Market trend 
4. High fuel price 
5. Having s good relationship 
with government 
6. For potential future market 
7. Competitive advantage 
8. Being environmentally 
friendly, CSR reason 
3.   Key components of 
green technology 
1. Motor  
2. Engine 
3. Battery 
4.  Definition of green 
technology 
1. Fuel efficiency  
2. Car's greenness (level of 
environmental friendliness) 
5.  Barriers to green 
technology improvement 
1. Short of funds  
2. Technological difficulty in 
Taiwan 











1. Price   
2. Charging station 
3. Green technology 1. MPG (fuel efficiency) 
2. level of Environmentally friendliness  
3. Car performance and endurance 
1. Warranty  
2. Fuel price 











1. Vertical integration  





2. Objective 1. Profit 
2. Cost 
3. Manufacturer 1.Operation decisions 1. Price  
2. Car design a. Weight; b. Transmission; c. Tyres; d. Software 
system; e. R&D; f. Motor; g. Key component; h. 
Engine; i. Car Interior; j. Car body; k. Battery 
2. Objective 1. Profit 
2. Cost 
4. Dealer, Retailer 1. Direct selling stores  
 2. Non-direct selling stores 










1. Participating 1. The manufacturer does not join   
 2. Decision made by the company 
head office 
2. On developing stage 1. Planning for future government 
policy 
 
2. Planning to join the emission 
trading soon 
3. No experience 1. Reason for not participating 1.Unnecessary to participate 
2. Other or no specific reasons 
3. No current exact regulation for the emission of 
production 
2. Will consider emission trading 
for future plan 
1. Reduce emissions in production for future green 
policy 
2. Cooperation with the government’s future emission 













1. New emission regulation 
2. Charging station 
2. Green policy in 
China 
1. Emissions regulation 
2. Balance of grey and green car manufacturer 
3. Green mark  
4. Green incentives 
for scooters 
5. Car emission 
regulation 




5.3.3 The use of collected data in the incentive model in Main Study 3 
 
 Application of qualitative data 1:  
i. Corresponding component in the model: Demand function, car 
greenness definition, background case 
ii. Corresponding model assumptions:  
 The demand of green vehicle is price and green technology 
dependent. 
 Higher greenness of the vehicle has less fuel consumption during 
driving (better fuel efficiency). 
 
Implications from interview Adjustment in the model 
• Background cases: Nissan, 
Lexus, TOYOTA, BMW, 
Luxgen. 
• Factors of consumer preferences 
indicated are price and green 
technology (MPG, operation 
performance and endurance), 
charging stations, warranty, fuel 
price, green preference. 
• The government uses the Green 
Mark Standard to evaluate the 
green technology level of 
businesses including the car 
industry. 
 
• Use the revealed example to 
establish the background case 
for the whole model (actual 
case from the car industry in 
Taiwan). 
• Car greenness (green degree of 
the car) is based on the 
combination of the supplier 
and manufacturer’s green 
technology improvement. 
• The demand function is built 
based on vehicle price and car 
greenness which is presented 
in section 6.2.4 in Main Study 
3. 
• Secondary data to be adopted 
in greenness variable: MPG 
(miles per gallon is used to 
154 
 
indicate greenness of the 
vehicle.  
 
Summary of application 1: 
Application of qualitative data 1 includes the background cases to the incentive model, 
decision makers of car greenness and the key factors affecting market demand. In 
addition, the collected data, car sales data in Taiwan (2011 to 2015) has been used to 
obtain the distributions of the sensitivities of price and green technology for use in 
Main Study 3. 
 
 Application of qualitative data 2:  
i. Corresponding component in the model: Identifying decision makers, 
the definition of car greenness  
ii. Corresponding model assumptions:  
 Both the supplier and manufacturer’s green technology level will 
affect the car’s final greenness. 
 The supplier and manufacturer have pricing and technology 
decisions to make in the product innovation process. 
 
Implications from interview Adjustment in the model 
• Supplier and manufacturer are 
the two main parties who 
determine the vehicle’s 
greenness (depends on their 
green technologies), and receive 
incentives from the government. 
(decision makers). 
• Supply chain parties: both 
supplier and manufacturer will 
be included in the incentive 
model who have interactions 
with the government and the 
consumer. 
• Car greenness is determined by 
both the supplier and 
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• Decision variable: Price 
(reflected by cost), green 
technology decision: 
manufacturer decides motor, 
engine and battery to use, 
designing vehicle integration 
system; supplier produces these 
key parts to support/sell to the 
manufacturer. 
• Government incentives are 
important for green technology 
development: the better the 
performance of green 
technology improvement, the 
higher the incentive percentage. 
Quote from the interview, “We 
won’t be able to improve the 
technology of manufacturing 
without national science 
department’s funding.”; “Our 
incentive rate is cut down from 
14% to 8% because last term’s 
review result was not very 
satisfactory”. 
• In the green car market, the 
greener the car and the lower 
price, the better the sales. 
Consumers consider not only 
the price but also the car 
performance when selecting 
cars. Consumers care about the 
car’s fuel efficiency the most, 
manufacturer’s green 
technology, it is assumed that 
there is a proportion of the 
supplier’s green technology 
level that contributes to car 
greenness, and there is a 
proportion of the manufacturer’s 
green technology’s effect on the 
final car greenness, and the total 
of these two factors equals one. 
The above demonstrates that the 
final car greenness is reflected 
by both the supplier and the 
manufacturer’s green technology 
levels. This argument has been 
applied in section 6.2.2 in Main 
Study 3. 
• The supplier and manufacturer 
decide their pricing and 
technology decisions every 
period under the principle of 
profit optimisation. 
• Definition of green technology 
improvement is the parentage of 
improvement between the 
original green technology level 
and the level after the 
investment of green technology. 
When supply chain parties have 
no green technology investment, 
there is no technology 
improvement. From application 
1, it is assumed that the product 
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other indicators matter variously 
between individuals. 
• No capacity limitation problems 
have been indicated by neither 
the supplier nor the 
manufacturer. 
greenness can boost market 
demand to a certain degree, thus 
a positive effect from product 
greenness on demand is 
formulated in section 6.2.4 in 
Main Study 3. 
• Assumption of unlimited 
production capacity is 
supported. 
 
Summary of application 2: 
Application of qualitative data 2 has identified the associate parties in the car supply 
chain who have participated in the government’s green inventive project and their 
relevant decision making. Car greenness and market demand function are also built 
based on the information revealed and these findings are applied in Main Study 3. 
 
 Application of qualitative data 3:  
i. Corresponding component in the model: Supply chain objectives 
ii. Corresponding model assumptions: 
 The supplier and the manufacturer have their own objective and 
their decision making depends on profit maximisation. 
 Supply chain parties cooperate with the government regarding 
green technology development. 
 
Implications from interview Adjustment in the model 
• Main motivation and objective 
for the supply chain is profit, 
profit extend reason: market 
• The objective function for 
supplier and manufacturer is 
profit maximisation in the model, 
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potential and current trend, 
Chinese market, competitive 
advantage. 
• Green technology costs include 
variable cost and fixed cost. 
• Other factors also revealed such 
as “good for company” reason: 
Corporate image, relationship 
with the government. 
• In the green incentive projects, 
the government covers a certain 
percentage of the cost of green 
technology investment in the 
proposed project as incentives 
provided to the supply chain. 
 
objective functions are presented 
in section 6.2.5 in Main Study 3. 
• In the objective function, supply 
chain parties’ manufacturing cost 
is based on a fixed and a variable 
cost. Incentives from the 
government are not given per 
product unit sold as assumed 
before but are funding based. A 
certain percentage of the project’s 
investment is covered by the 
incentives and given periodically.  
• The incentive is formulated as a 
percentage of production cost, 
including fixed cost and variable 
cost. This is used as an incentive 
given method in the supply chain 
in Main Study 3, called 
“government incentive rate”. 
 
Summary of application 3: 
Firstly, the application of qualitative data 3 presents supply chain parties’ motivation 
in participating in the government’s green technology incentive project and their 
objectives of decision making. Secondly, the cost function is formulated into two parts, 
variable cost and fixed cost. Thirdly, the government’s incentive giving method is 
identified for use in Main Study 3.  
 
 Application of qualitative data 4:  
i. Corresponding component in the model: Government incentive 




ii. Corresponding model assumptions:  
 The government provides incentives to supply chain in order to 
promote green technology development. 
 The incentive is provided per unit, separately to the supplier and 
the manufacturer. 
 Government reviews companies’ technology performance and 
changes the incentive rate depending on the green technology 
level. 
 
Implications from interview Adjustment in the model 
• Consumers have the fuel taxes 
and vehicle license tax 
reduction for hybrid and electric 
vehicles, the reduction is a fixed 
amount and applied per car. 
• The incentives provided in the 
car industry in Taiwan include: 
(1) Excise from 30% reduces to 
15% for hybrid cars; reduces to 
0% for electric cars. (2) R&D 
green technology funding, 
national innovation and 
investment support funding: By 
proposing a research project to 
apply for funding, an incentive 
rate is assigned after the 
approval of project application. 
• In some cases, the manufacturer 
and supplier apply for the 
funding together and share the 
review, but the incentive 
percentages are independent. 
• Tax reduction is not considered in 
this study because it is the 
consumer’s buying benefit 
instead of the supply chain’s 
green technology investment’s 
benefit which is not the focus of 
the study. Tax shows no 
difference in different car models. 
• Government incentives include 
“excise reduction”, “technology 
funding”, only green technology 
funding project is adopted 
because “excise reduction” 
remains consistent between 
different car greenness levels of 
car models. 
• An initial incentive rate is given 
for the first period of the project. 
• Incentive rate changes depending 
on the previous period’s project 
review, this is applied to establish 
section 6.2.3 in Main Study 3. 
• Project reviews are based on the 
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• The government expects supply 
chain parties to progress 
gradually the green incentive 
project, companies are asked to 
demonstrate the improvement 
in green technology in each 
review period. 
• The government adjusts the 
incentive rate after the 
periodical review. The rate 
increases when the performance 
is better than the expected 
improvement and decreases 
when the company fails to 
achieve the planned progress. 
change of green technologies 
improvement between last and 
current period, it is also affected 
by the government’s technology 
change sensitivity on incentive 
rates. This application is 




Summary of application 4: 
Application of qualitative data 4 includes the selection of government incentive policy 
adopted in this project, details of government incentive mechanism, supply chain 
parties’ green technology improvement review, and government’s incentive rate 
adjustment mechanism. The relevant components and functions in the model of Main 
Study 3 are built and revised accordingly. 
 
 Application of qualitative data 5:  
i. Corresponding component in the model: Emission trade mechanism in 
car supply chain 
ii. Corresponding model assumptions:  
 Supply chain parties in the car industry have participated in the 
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emission trade market. 
 
Implications from interview Adjustment in the model 
• Government has been promoting it 
but no car company has actually 
participated in Taiwan but for the 
hi-technology industry. 
• Only Kuozui (TOYOTA 
manufacturer) has considered 
emission trade and it is still under 
development. 
• Although emission trade does not 
yet prevail in the car industry, still 
emission trade is part of the 
incentive model in terms of the 
Taiwanese government’s aims to 
apply it comprehensively in 
industries in 2020, and the car 
industry is one of the targets. 
• The decision making of emission 
trade in the supply chain is deleted 
from the model in Main Study 3. 
 
 
Summary of application 5: 
Based on the literature, it was assumed that emission trade has an influence on supply 
decision making, however, there is no evidence that the car supply chain has 
participated in the emission trade market in Taiwan. The emission trade platform has 
been established in Taiwan in 2010. Until 2012, there were already more than 250 
companies in the trade market. The high technology industry was the first group to 
participate in the emission trade market, but the car industry has not yet done so. Thus, 




The components of the game theory model in Preliminary Study 1 have been verified 
and enhanced by the qualitative empirical research in Preliminary Study 2. The 
161 
 
qualitative data in Preliminary Study 2 has shown the details regarding the mechanism 
of the current government incentive policy and green technology development in the 
car supply chain in Taiwan. After the data analysis, six pre-determined categories 
(Green technology issues, Green car supply chain operations, the trend of market 
demand, and Emission trade) have been modified and updated. Six new categories 
were identified, including Government incentives, Green technology, Market trend 
and demand, Supply chain in the car industry, Emission trade, and Other green polices. 
Several important adjustments have been made. Firstly, the application and allocation 
in the supply chain of government incentives have been adopted to support the 
assumptions of the mathematical incentive model. Secondly, supply chain decision 
making has been used in the formulations of the supplier and manufacturer’s 
behaviour. Thirdly, for the consumer response, market demand is also revised taking 
into consideration the uncertainties indicated in the interviews. Fourthly, the incentive 
project performance evaluation and incentive rate adjustment rule have been 
formulated on the basis of qualitative data. Finally, the emission trade part is deleted 
from the incentive model as the interview data reveals no evidence that emission trade 
is applied in the car industry in Taiwan. In summary, most concepts and assumptions 
of the incentive model have been verified and adjusted or revised based on the 
qualitative data in Preliminary Study 2 and will be used as the foundation of the 
simulation model in Main Study 3.  
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6.1.1 Problem description 
Governments are seeking to reduce greenhouse gas (hereafter GHG) emissions 
(Cohen et al., 2015), for example from vehicles, as environmental awareness rises. An 
incentive policy is recognized by many scholars as an effective approach to control 
GHG emissions (Chappin et al., 2009; Coria, 2009; Dowson et al., 2012). In the car 
industry, government incentives have been proved to have a significant impact on the 
growth of green technology adoption in hybrid vehicles (Diamond, 2009), and 
emission reduction in general (Cohen et al., 2015). Thus, in order to effectively reduce 
carbon emissions, it is important for the government to drive green technology 
adoption in the car industry by effectively allocating incentives (Goulder & Mathai, 
2000). 
 
Government incentives are considered to be an investment to achieve a better 
environment, and to increase welfare. The welfare resulting from incentives is seen as 
a return on the government’s investment in them. Providing such incentives can not 
only drive the supply chain’s green technology innovation in the car industry, but also 
bring benefits to consumers, and this too is considered as a return on the incentives. 
To achieve good green policy making, a government must allocate resources 
reasonably to maximise the efficiency of its incentives. Hence, this research 
investigates supply chain decision making under green technology incentives 





6.1.2  Objective of government 
For the government’s objective, Fischer et al. (2003) suggested that welfare resulting 
from incentives includes two dimensions: technology innovation for the supply chain 
and environmental benefits. The first dimension is green technology innovation, that 
is, the increased ability of the supply chain to manufacture greener products when the 
government provides incentives. The second dimension is environmental benefits– 
government incentives can also reduce the environmental impact of product use 
because emissions are expected to reduce when green technology innovations have 
been implemented. It is thought that when a higher level of green technology is used 
in a green product – such as improving the fuel efficiency of a green car, in the 
present case – consumers also benefit simultaneously because a greener/better product 
is provided in the market. The environment, supply chain parties, and consumers are 
all affected by the incentives, and so these three subjects are considered by the 
government when drawing up an incentive policy. 
 
Krass et al. (2013) proposed a mathematical model to investigate green policies and 
the choice of green technology; they adopted social welfare maximisation as the 
government’s objective function which is also used by several related studies 
(Baldwin & Krugman, 2004; Boskin & Sheshinski, 1978; Fischer et al., 2003; Krass 
et al., 2013). Social welfare is the sum of a firm’s profit and consumer surplus, minus 
its environmental impact (Krass et al., 2013). Based on the above, this research study 
applied a combination of Krass et al.’s regulatory social welfare objective function 
and Fischer et al.’s incentive welfare function as the foundation for the government’s 
objective. This objective consists of three parts: consumer benefits from the incentives 
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on the supply chain, supply chain-based producer surplus (profit) and the 
environmental impact from product use. It is assumed in this study that the 
government’s objective is to maximise the welfare resulting from its 
incentives (Boskin & Sheshinski, 1978) while maintaining a balance between 
environmental impact, supply chain profit, and consumers’ benefits. The three parts of 
the government objective are presented in section 6.2.6. 
 
6.1.3 Government incentives 
There are two categories of financial incentives for green technology development 
provided by the Taiwanese government. The first category is funding-like incentives, 
such as the Innovation Technology Application and Service (ITAS) project originating 
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2016), 
and the Industry Technology Development Program (ITDP) (Taiwan Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2004), which has been applied to car supply chain in Taiwan. Both 
of them aim to alleviate technology investment costs to a certain extent, although 
ITDP is applicable for most industries while ITAS is only applicable to some specific 
industries. Funding-like incentives are applicable to both suppliers and manufacturers 
in the car supply chain in Taiwan.  
 
The second category of financial green incentive is excise, which attempts to lower 
costs for manufacturers. An example of excise in Taiwan is a 30% discount on cargo 
tax for electric vehicles in general. However, there is no excise difference among 
different car models. That is to say, although tax reduction can lower the sale prices of 
all electric hybrid cars, it does not result in any difference in price discounts for 
different car models. Thus, tax reduction is not regarded as a decisive factor in the 
incentive model to improve green technology in the car industry. Therefore, only 
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funding-like technology incentives are considered in this project. 
 
6.1.4 Government’s green technology innovation incentives 
This research study focuses on the main green technology incentive policies in the car 
industry. In Taiwan’s car industry, suppliers and manufacturers can apply for 
government funding to financially assist their green technology innovation. The 
proposed budget of an innovation project is evaluated, and then a certain percentage 
of the budget is funded by the government as a green technology incentive. Having 
been funded by the government, the performance of the project is reviewed by the 
relevant government department at the end of a period, and an incentive rate 
adjustment is made accordingly for the next period’s incentive rate. The incentive rate 
in the present period is thus dependent on the evaluation result and the incentive rate 
of the previous period. That is, supply chain parties receive various incentive rates 
depending on the performance of their green technology. In order to maintain an 
incentive rate, supply chain parties need to ensure their green technology level aligns 
with the expected outcome proposed in the first place. 
 
A technology innovation incentives example from HAITEC 
HAITEC is a leading hybrid car manufacturer in Taiwan. HAITEC applied for 
funding for a green technology innovation project with a development plan. Quotation 
from the interview with HAITEC: “The government has approved the proposal of the 
incentive project and then gave us an incentive equivalent to 14% of the proposed 
budget for this project. The government’s representatives (academics from the relevant 
fields) then came to the factory and reviewed the green technology performance at the 
end of a certain month. We also had a meeting with them. After that, the second term’s 
incentive rate was decreased because the review result was not good.” In their case, 
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the incentive rate dropped from an initial 14% in the first period to 8% in the second 
period, because the green technology level fell. However, in period 3, the incentive 
rate was increased back to 14%, as the green technology level had increased 
significantly during period 2. 
 
 
6.2  Method 
 
6.2.1 Notation 
 : The green technology level of the supplier 
 : The green technology level of the manufacturer 
 : The per-unit wholesale price charged to the manufacturer by the supplier 
 : The price of the product in the market 
 : The incentive rate given by the government to the supplier 
 : The incentive rate given by the government to the manufacturer 
 : Market Demand 
：Market size 
 : The sensitivity of the market price’s influence on the demand function 
 : The factor/sensitivity of the product’s greenness in the demand function 
：The influence of the supplier’s green technology level on the product’s final 
greenness, illustrated by a weight 
：The influence of the manufacturer’s green technology level on the product’s final 
greenness, illustrated by a weight 
fC  : The marginal fixed cost of improving green technology for the supplier 
dC  : The marginal fixed cost of improving green technology for the manufacturer 
 : The variable production cost for the supplier 
















𝑅  : Government green technology review for the supplier 
𝑅  : Government green technology review for the manufacturer 
𝜀  : The influence of the government’s green technology review on incentive 
adjustment for the supplier, illustrated by a factor 
𝜀  : The influence of the government’s green technology review results on incentive 
adjustment for the manufacturer, illustrated by a factor 
 : Profit of supplier 
 : Profit of manufacturer 
: Total emissions 
 
6.2.2 Green technology 
 
I Green technology definition 
Green technology, or environmentally friendly technology, is technology applied to a 
product which results in less of an environmental impact from that product’s use. 
Green technology is recognized as clean technology (Hall & Helmers, 2013) and 
emissions-reducing technology (Krass et al., 2013). Green automobile technology is 
low-emission technology, which is the technology innovation for green cars (Daziano 
& Bolduc, 2013). These definitions point out that green technology can help with 
reducing emissions because it can reduce energy consumption. In addition, from the 
interview data in Preliminary Study 2, two themes have been identified to define 
green technology: one is a car’s level of environmental friendliness, and the other is 
its fuel efficiency. Thus, by taking account both of the literature and evidence from 
qualitative data, this study contends that green technology is indicated by greater fuel 








II Decision makers of green technology in the car supply chain  
In the car supply chain, suppliers and manufacturers have their own green technology 
levels. For suppliers, the green technology level is reflected in the selection of 
materials and relevant green inputs during the components’ manufacturing process. 
For instance, Interviewee no. 4 stated that “Suppliers frequently chose the high 
temperature-proof material, which is more expensive, yet more environmentally 
friendly, in order to increase the efficiency of fuel use as well as the green technology 
level”. For the manufacturer, the green technology level relates to the design of car 
systems and the manufacturing of key components. It is also confirmed in the 
interview that the only two key roles deciding a car’s greenness are the supplier and 
the manufacturer (details can be found in the application of qualitative data 2 in 
Preliminary Study 2). This coincides with the literature, suggesting that both suppliers 
and manufacturers have an impact on the greenness of a product (Lee & Kim, 2011). 
Therefore, in this study, the supplier and the manufacturer each has a green 
technology decision to make, and their combined green technology levels determine 
the car’s greenness.  
 
III Green technology level in the car industry 
From a practical point of view, the green technology adoption of a car depends on two 
aspects. Firstly, the manufacturing of key components for hybrid electric vehicles, 
such as the selection of the engine and the battery (Fish & Savoie, 2001). A quotation 
from an interview illustrates this point: “The focus of green technology for hybrid cars 
involves the engine, battery and motor for electric hybrid vehicles; the battery and 
engine for electric vehicles”. These key components are partially designed and 
produced by the suppliers, and then assembled into ready car parts for the 
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manufacturer to use in production. Secondly, the system design for green cars is 
different from traditional cars in terms of the charging system, pumped storage system, 
and the drive system (Green & Kellawa, 1997). The required components are 
designed and manufactured by the supplier and are integrated into the relevant car 
systems (charging system, pumped storage system, drive system, etc.) by the 
manufacturer. To conclude, the two categories above, regarding the supply chain 
green technology level, are designed mainly by the manufacturer and the components 
are supplied by the supplier. 
 
For the supplier and manufacturer, the green technology level is the green degree of 
these key components and the car systems. That is, their green technologies are based 
on manufacturing key components and on designing the car systems which then 
determine the car’s emission levels. According to this, this study uses car emission 
levels to measure car greenness, and car greenness has relied on both the supplier and 
manufacturer’s green technology levels.  
 
 
IV Green technology decision variables 
In each period, the supplier and the manufacturer have their own level of green 




T  are 
supply chain decision variables. 
 
ts
T : The green technology level of the supplier in period t 
tm
T : The green technology level of the manufacturer in period t 
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For the manufacturer’s green technology level,  
0 1
tm
T   
 
0, minimum green technology level is achieved in period t by the manufacturer







Green technology is defined as the emissions-reducing technology (Krass et al., 2013). 
The previous section has explained that green technology level is measured by the 
car’s fuel efficiency in this study. Fuel efficiency is often known as a car’s miles per 
gallon or litres per kilometre. When the maximum green technology level is made by 
both supplier and manufacturer, the car has the highest achievable fuel efficiency 
(lowest emission level). In contrast, when both supplier and manufacturer only reach 
the minimum green technology level, the car has the lowest possible fuel efficiency 
and the highest emission level. 
 
0, 0, minimum car greenness is reached
Gar greenness:
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0, minimum green technology level is achieved in period t by the supplier







6.2.3 Incentive review and adjustment  
 
I  Green technology incentive rates in the supply chain 
The focus of this research enquiry is the incentive-driven green technology level 
increase occurring in the supply chain. The core of the government’s green incentive 
project is to encourage supply chain parties to invest in green technology innovation 
so that product greenness can be enhanced. The incentive rate is given periodically, 
and supply chain parties are expected to achieve a certain green technology level in 
each funded period. The supply chain green technology level based on incentives has 
been selected in this study for investigation.  
 
The initial incentive rate is given by the government as a condition in the incentive 
project. The incentive rate is a percentage of the proposed incentive project’s budget 
of a supply chain party, and is adjustable based on the project periodically review. 
When the supply chain implements the incentive project, the government expects the 
green technology development to progress gradually in each period. Each period is 
expected to have a certain degree of green technology innovation according to the 
proposed green technology implementation steps in the incentive project. Initial 

















 to achieve by the 
supply chain party. 
 
ts
G : The incentive rate provided to the supplier at period t 
tm




II Review of incentive project 
According to the interview data, the government accepts applications for technology 
incentives, such as Industry Technology Development Program (Section industry 
professionals) (Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2011) and Small Business 
Innovation Research Program (SBIR) (Taiwan Small and Medium Enterprise 
Administration, 2016) in the background case of Taiwan. An initial incentive rate for 
the project will be given to the supplier and manufacturer. In their interview, 
interviewee no.7 stated that “Last year, the government reduced the percentage of the 
incentive in the budget of the technology project after the substandard periodical 
review.” This is identified as “incentive rate adjustment” from Preliminary Study 2. 
 
It is confirmed by the content of the incentive policy and the interview data in 
Preliminary Study 2 that a technology review focuses mainly on the difference in 
green technology level between the current and last periods. According to an 
interview quotation, “The government looked at our green technology at the end of 
each term and compared it with the previous period. The review is basically 
dependent on whether we have better or worse green technology in the current term.”  
 
The technology review is based on two factors that are formulated with the sensitivity 
of the green technology level change on incentive rate adjustment, and the amount of 
change between the previous and present periods. 𝜀  and 𝜀  are the sensitivities of 
green technology change for the supplier and manufacturer, and they are two 
parameters given by the government. The government review functions are based on 
the “the application of qualitative data 2” and “the application of qualitative data 4” 




sR t : The green technology review for the supplier at period t 
mR t : The green technology review for the manufacturer at period t 
 
𝜀  : The sensitivity of the green technology level change on incentive rate adjustment 
for the supplier 
𝜀  : The sensitivity of the green technology level change on incentive rate 
adjustment for the manufacturer 
 
Incentive adjustment for the supplier (green technology level dependent): 
1Rs *( )t s t tTs Ts    
Incentive adjustment for the manufacturer (green technology level dependent): 
1Rm *( )t m t tTm Tm    
Subject to, 
R [ 1,1]ti   , for t = 1,…, N, i= s, m   
 
III  Incentive rate with adjustment  
The incentive rate of this period is based on the incentive rate of the previous period 
plus a rate adjustment. When the green technology level is higher than the previous 
period, the adjustment is a positive value and the incentive rate increases. When the 
green technology level is lower than the previous period, the adjustment is a negative 
value and the incentive rate decreases. Incentive rate functions are based on the “the 
application of qualitative data 4 ” in Preliminary Study 2. 
 
The incentive rate at period t+1 for the supplier: 
1 s 1
R [ *( )]
t t t ts s s s t t
G G G Ts Ts
 
      




The incentive rate at time t+1 for the manufacturer: 
1 m 1
R [ *( )]
t t t tm m m m t t
G G G Tm Tm
 
      
10 1tGm   , for t = 0, …, N 
 
Technology innovation incentives rate, an example from the interview: HAITEC 
According to HAITEC, the example company in the interview, the initial incentive 
rate was 14%. 𝐺𝑠  = 14% (The incentive rate announced at the beginning of the 
project will be applied to period 1), and it was 8% in period 2, 14% in period 3 for 
HAITEC. The incentive rate of period 2 depends on the green technology evaluation 
at the end of period 1; The incentive rate of period 3 is dependent on the review 
outcome of period 2. The incentive rate in period t depends on the incentive rate and 
the green technology evaluation in period t-1. Hence, the better the green technology 
review at the end of the previous period, the higher the incentive rate given to the 
supply chain party in the present period. 
1
2 1 1 1






R 14%+ R =8%
R 8%+ R =14%
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If there is no change to the green technology level between period t-1 and t, the 
company remains at the same level of green technology. The incentive rate for this 
period is kept the same as the previous one. 
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If there is a change to the green technology level between period t-1 and t: 
 
For the supplier: 
 When the green technology level is higher than the previous period, 𝑇𝑠 −
𝑇𝑠 ＞0, 𝑅𝑠 > 0 , and 𝐺𝑠 > 𝐺𝑠 , the incentive rate increases in the 
following period 
 
 When the green technology level is lower than the previous period, 𝑇𝑠 −




For the manufacturer: 
 When the green technology level is higher than the previous 
period, 𝑇𝑚 − 𝑇𝑚 ＞0,  𝑅𝑚 > 0, and 𝐺𝑚 > 𝐺𝑚 , the incentive 
rate increases in the following period 
 
 When the green technology level made is lower than the previous period, 
𝑇𝑚 − 𝑇𝑚 ＜ 0, 𝑅𝑚 < 0 , and 𝐺𝑚 < 𝐺𝑚 , the incentive rate 






6.2.4 Market demand 
 
I Consumer demand 
The literature and the interviews (application of qualitative data 1 and application of 
qualitative data 2 in Preliminary Study 2) both suggest that demand for green cars is 
influenced by price and green technology adoption (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008; Lee 
et al., 2013). Firstly, a car’s greenness impacts on car sales. According to an 
interviewee quotation: “Customers are buying green cars to save the fuel cost of 
future use”. Greener cars have higher fuel efficiency, and this indicates the 
importance of green technology when a consumer buys a car. Secondly, price is also 
important when buying cars. An interviewee said: “Customers care about the price 
very much because normally, green cars are slightly more expensive than non-green 
cars, so they buy more when the price is low. For example, there was a decrease in 
green car sales in 2014 because the overall market price went up a little bit without 
government incentives”. According to interview data and the literature, both car 
greenness and price are taken into consideration in the function of cars’ demand. 
 
Because product price and green technology level are considered to be the two key 
determinants for the demand for green cars in the Taiwanese market, both have been 
included in the present model. This study assumes that the foundation of the demand 
function is led by market size and price. This assumption has been widely used in the 
field of supply chain strategy since Abad (1994) introduced the supplier pricing game 
model with a price-sensitive linear demand function. Notably, in the green car market, 
consumers tend to purchase green products from greener companies (Pickett-Baker & 
Ozaki, 2008) and they prefer cars with lower emissions (Daziano & Bolduc, 2013). 
Thus, it is believed that product greenness relates to consumers’ willingness to buy the 
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product. The influence of product greenness on demand indicates consumers’ green 
preferences. Consumers increase their willingness to buy the product when the 
greenness of a product rises, in terms, for instance of decrease in emission and/or 
increase in fuel efficiency, and this is confirmed in “application of qualitative data 2” 
in Preliminary Study 2. The market demand is the sum of the base demand from 
ordinary consumers and the greenness dependent demand from green consumers 
(Nouira et al., 2014; Letmathe & Balakrishnan, 2005). Peng (2013) and Nouira et al. 
(2014) have added the degree of sustainability for green products in the linear price 
dependent function to explain consumers’ green preference. Following the above 
demand functions in Abad (1994), Cohen et al. (2015), Nouira et al. (2014) and Peng 
(2013), this study adopted a linear demand which depends on price and car greenness: 
 
t ts m
Demand a bp c T T        
 
a:  Market size 
 
b:  The factor of the price on market demand indicates the sensitivity of demand as 
the price changes. Consumers’ preferences are different from time to time. The 
importance of price for hybrid car buyers depends on purchasing power. For instance, 
the price may become more influential on consumer behaviour when a country has a 
negative growth of GDP. 
 
c:  The value of c represents the influence of car greenness on demand, which is also 
one of the random factors in the model. With the rise of environmental awareness, 
parameter c will increase in order to reflect consumer preference, as indicated by 
interviewee no. 1 “The importance of green technology is actually changing every 
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year. Sometimes, customers care more about car greenness because they want to be 
environmentally friendly and/or save money on fuel. Sometimes they care less about 
car greenness because they are sensitive to price.” 
 
II The effect of consumer incentives on car demand 
Incentives on the green product, such as tax reduction for consumers, are identified in 
the interviews. However, consumer incentive remains constant regardless of car 
model (as long as it is a green car). The competition between green and non-green 
vehicles is not the research focus in the current model, and therefore, consumer 
incentive is not considered to be a factor determining the market demand. 
 
 
6.2.5 Supply chain objectives 
I Green technology costs 
To achieve a certain level of green technology level, both the supplier and 
manufacturer have a fixed cost and a variable cost (Krass et al., 2013). These costs 
depend on the green technology level. In the car industry, variable cost is determined 
by the material directly used to produce the car. A car of a higher green technology 
level usually requires more special parts. Because the cost of new parts causes an 
increase in the marginal cost, it is assumed that the relationship between green 
technology level and variable cost is positively linear. In addition to the variable cost, 
the fixed cost for green technology adoption is often known as the investment in a 
new production line. According to an interviewee quotation, “We have to buy new 
machines to adopt in the production line for the green technology innovation; usually 
they are expensive because green cars’ process of assembly is totally different from 
traditional cars”. In the present model, it is assumed that fixed cost is the cost of 
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technology change, that is, both the increase and decrease of the green technology 
level will cause a fixed cost. Changing cost involves upgrading to a greener machine 
for the product line, the cost of seeking new material, components, and machine 
supply. In a word, the fixed cost depends on the change of green technology level 




II Supply chain costs without government incentives 
For the supplier, technology cost is presented below: 
The variable cost at the level 
tm
T  for the manufacturer:
tm m
T C  
The fixed cost at the level 
tm
T  for the manufacturer:
1
2( )





0, variable cost increases, fixed cost increases
: 0, variable cost remains the same, no fixed cost








For the manufacturer, technology cost is presented as below: 
The variable cost at the level 
ts
T  for the supplier: 
ts s
T C  
The fixed cost at the level 
ts
T  for the supplier: 
1
2( )





0, variable cost increases, fixed cost increases
: 0, variable cost remains the same, no fixed cost

















G are the incentive rates for the supplier and the manufacturer from the 
government that indicate the percentage of the green technology development costs 
covered by the government. The relevant costs are presented below, 
 
For the supplier,  
The variable cost with green technology level 
ts
T  given the government incentives: 
*(1 )
t ts s s
T C G  
The fixed cost with green technology level 
ts
T  given the government incentives:  
1
2( ) *(1 )
t t ts s f s
T T C G

   
 
For the manufacturer,  
The variable cost with green technology level 
tm
T  given the government incentives: 
*(1 )
t tm m m
T C G  
The fixed cost with green technology level 
tm
T  given the government incentives: 
1
2( ) *(1 )
t t tm m d m
T T C G

   
 
IV  Greenness of the car 
The greenness of a car indicates its overall level of green technology adoption, as 
noted by an interviewee: “A greener car means it has higher green technology and 
can help more with carbon emission reduction on the Earth”. That is, the higher the 




The greenness of a car is determined by the aggregation of green technologies in the 
supply chain, which includes that of suppliers’ and the manufacturers’. This can be 
illustrated by a practice case from Nissan. To quote from an interview: “To have a 
greener car, we need to find the right motor, battery, and even the engine for the new 
car’s design”. Nissan attempted to design a more energy efficient electric hybrid 
vehicle. In order to do that, they needed a suitable engine. The manufacturing of the 
suitable engine by their supplier involved the selection of raw material and 
assembling sub/minor parts into ready-to-use components. This example suggests that 
the supplier can influence the greenness of a car. Nissan’s manufacturer only selected 
the engine from suppliers who can meet their requirements, and adapted it to their 
engine system. The hybrid car’s energy conversion and storage system were 
subsequently designed by Nissan (manufacturer) in order to link engine, battery and 
motor. To summerise, the supplier’s green technology affects the key components 
supplied to the manufacturer such engine, battery and motor. The manufacturer’s 
green technology affects the design of the car system such as car’s integration system, 
charging system, pumped storage system, and the drive system. In the green car 
production process, therefore, both the supplier and the manufacturers play an 
important role in determining the greenness of a car. 
 
Furthermore, it is confirmed in the application of qualitative data 2 in study 2 that the 
final car greenness is reflected both by the supplier and the manufacturer’s green 
technology. It is assumed therefore, that a car’s greenness is the combination of the 
supplier’s and manufacturer’s green technology level. 
Product Greenness = 
t ts m




𝛼: The weight of the suppliers’ green technology’s impact on car greenness 
𝛽: The weight of the manufacturer’s green technology’s impact on car greenness 
𝛼 + 𝛽 = 1 
0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 
0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1 
 
The influence of the interaction between suppliers’ and manufacturers’ green 
technology level on the final greenness of a car is not considered for two reasons. 
First, suppliers and manufacturers make decisions regarding their green technology 
level independently. A manufacturer noted in the interview: “We have been applying 
the government incentive project for many years, sometimes we know our supplier 
also applies it but they wouldn’t share the project’s content with others because it’s 
classified”. It shows that when the government provides incentives to the supplier and 
the manufacturer at the same time, the green technology decision is affected by the 
orientation of profit maximisation, rather than by each other’s decision. Secondly, 
assuming that the manufacturer is aware of the supplier’s green technology level, 
expectedly the manufacturer’s decision will still be independent of the supplier’s 
decision. It has been confirmed that the effect of green policy on green technology 
innovation is influenced by the innovation cost (Fischer et al., 2003). The objective 
for the manufacturer is profit maximisation; and for this reason, the manufacturer’s 
optimal decision of green technology level is based on the cost of relevant technology 
and the government’s incentive instead of the supplier’s green technology level. To 
conclude, the interaction between the supplier and manufacturer’s green technology 





V  Supply chain objective functions 
It is confirmed in the interview data (application of qualitative data 3 in Preliminary 
Study 2) that the objective of supply chain parties is profit maximisation. The 
objective functions are presented below. 
 
 Supplier 
For the supplier, the objective is to maximise its own profit: 
Max. Profit = (Product wholesales revenue – variable cost of manufacturing 
given the government incentives) * (market demand)-fixed cost of green 
technology given the government incentives 
Max.  
       1 2, (1 ) ( ) (1 )t t t t t t t t ts t s t s s s t s m s s f sw T w T C G a bp c T T T T C G           
 
Subject to 
0tw   
0
ts
T   
  0
t tt s m
a bp c T T        
 
 Manufacturer 
For the manufacturer, the objective is to maximise its own profit: 
Max. Profit = (sale revenue–wholesale price- variable cost of manufacturing 
given the government incentives) * (market demand) – fixed cost of green 
technology given the government incentives 
= Max.  





0tp   
0
tm
T   
  0
t tt s m
a bp c T T      
 
 
6.2.6 Government objectives 
According to the discussion in section 6.1.2, the government’s objective is divided 
into three parts, such as environmental impact, supply chain profit, and consumers’ 
benefits from the government incentives to the supply chain. 
 
I. Consumer benefit from the government incentives to the supply chain 
It has been confirmed by interview data (Preliminary Study 2) that the incentive has a 
positive effect on green technology innovation: Quotation of the interview “the 
incentives help us to invest in green technology with a lower cost because part of the 
cost is covered by the incentives.” With the green incentives, the supply chain 
provides a greener product without reflecting all the increased cost on the product 
price, and even lower the price of the green product. Price may fall when the incentive 
increases because incentives offset part of the technology cost. Since the price and the 
greenness of a product are changed by the government incentive to the supply chain, 
consumers receive benefit from these changes. In other words, a consumer is expected 
to be provided greener products and experience a reasonable price change. As an 
extended benefit of the incentive, the government also takes consumers’ benefit into 
consideration when providing incentives to the supply chain. The consumer’s benefit 
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resulted from the government’s supply chain incentive having two parts including the 
benefit from the change of product greenness and the benefit from the change of price. 
The consumer’s benefit (
cB ) is evaluated as part of the government’s objective in the 
model. 
cB = “The change of product greenness in period t” plus “The change of 
price in period t” 
 
The change of product greenness in period t : 
Car greenness of the current period – Car greenness of the previous period 
 




1( ) ( )
t t t t
t t t t
s m s m
s s m m
T T T T
T T T T







   
  
 
The change in price in period t : 
1t tp p    
 
II. Supply chain profit 
Supply chain profit includes the profit of the supplier and the manufacturer: 
       1 2, (1 ) ( ) (1 )t t t t t t t t ts t s t s s s t s m s s f sw T w T C G a bp c T T T T C G             
       1 2, (1 ) ( ) (1 )t t t t t t t t tm t m t t m m m t s m m m d mp T p w T C G a bp c T T T T C G            
 
 
III. Environmental impact 
Emissions produced during the use of cars is evaluated by the government as an 
environmental impact indicator. In the present model, it is assumed that 
me  is the 
factor of the influence of car greenness on emission produced from product use, and 
the actual emissions are dependent on car greenness which is the decision variable of 
the supplier and the manufacturer. The higher the car greenness, the lower the 
emissions. Total emission equates to total demand multiply emission produced per 
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unit. When there is only a minimum green technology development made by the 
supply chain, the total emissions produced from the product use is a maximum value. 
This project will evaluate the output of green technology level and the market demand 
to represent the discussion of the emissions. When there is a green technology 
innovation/improvement made by either the supplier or the manufacturer, the total 
emissions is dependent on the green technology level and the total car demand. 
 
The emission produced during the “production process” is not considered in this 
model because the Taiwanese government has not issued a green policy regarding the 
emissions in the supply chain. Although there are suggested maximum emission 
allowances for the manufacturing process of car companies, no actual punishment 
would be given to regulate production emissions. Hence, emission as a result of the 
production process is only taken as the “next step” of the government’s green 
intervention to the car industry in Taiwan, and it is considered as a constituent of 
further research. 
 
IV The multiple-period problem for the government 
Based on the mechanism of the government incentive and Preliminary Study 2’s 
interview data from the car industry in Taiwan, this study formulates the government’s 
function in two parts, one being the incentive rate and technology review, and the 
other the incentive rate adjustment. 
 




*T=green technology level, R=Technology review, G=Incentive rate 
 
 
6.2.7 Optimal pricing and technology level decisions in the supply chain 
Maple 16 is used for the optimisation of the problem-solving process. In the two-stage 
game model, the backward induction is conducted to obtain the optimal solution. 
There are two stages of decision making in the green product incentive model. The 
manufacturer makes the decision after the supplier has made it. Thus, to gain the 
optimal solutions, this study solves from the manufacturer and back to the supplier as 
stage 1 and 2. 
 
Stage 1. Optimal solutions of the manufacturer 
The manufacturer has decision variables with product price  and the green 
technology level  ; all other parameters are considered as known while the 
manufacturer makes the decision. The manufacturer’s profit maximisation problem 
can be illustrated as below: 
 
 
       2, (1 ) (1 )( ) *m m m m s m tm mp T p w T Cm G a b Tp c T T Cm t GTm            
(1) 
Subject to: 
0p   














  0s ma bp c T T      
 
Theorem 3. There is a unique optimal strategy including the product price and the 
green technology level of the manufacturer in this model. The optimal solution 
maximises globally the manufacturer’s profit in the supply chain model. See the proof 
of negative definition in the Hessian matrix in the Appendix. 
 
The problem-solving process of the unique optimal pricing and technology level 
decisions is summarised as follows: 
 
Assume that the manufacturer makes the product price in the market  and green 
technology level . The manufacturer pays the wholesale price  and considers a 
green technology variable cost Cm and fixed cost  to maximise its profit, which is 
equation (1). 
Equating first partial derivative of  with respect to ,  to zero, it 
obtains: 
Subject to 0p  , 0mT  ,   0s ma bp c T T       
 
    1bp a c Ts Tm p w TmCm Gm b                                 
(2) 
         1 1 2 1Cm Gm bp a c Ts Tm p w TmCm Gm c TmCtm Gm             
                                                                  (3) 
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    
                      (4) 
  
Substituting equation (2) in equation (3) and solving this equation equaling 0, given w 
and Ts and satisfying the condition of Tm  > 0, it obtains the optimal solution of 
Tm : 
  
     





4 1 1 4 1
s
Tsc Cm Gm Tsbc bcw Cm Gm b w ac Cm Gm ab
Tm w T
c Cm Gm bc Cm Gm b Ctm Gm b
   
 
       
 
     
                                                               (5) 
In addition, taking the Tm * into equation (4), and given w and Ts, the optimal 





Stage 2. Optimal solutions of the supplier 
Assume that the supplier decides the wholesale price charged to the manufacturer  
and green technology level  . The supplier has production cost  and green 
technology improvement unit cost  to maximise its own profit. Thus, the 
objective profit function of the supplier will be: 
 









Substituting ,  which is obtained from stage 1 for the supplier’s objective 





0w , 0sT  ,   0s ma bp c T T      
 
Theorem 4. It is confirmed that a unique optimal solution exists, including the 
wholesale price and green technology level of the supplier. Also, the optimal solution 
maximises globally the supplier’s profit in the supply chain model. See the proof of 
negative definition in the Hessian matrix in the Appendix. Also, due to the word limit 
of this thesis, the optimal solution of the wholesale price and the green technology 
level for the supplier are presented in the Appendix. 
 
6.2.8 Model assumptions  
 The government incentives to the supplier and the manufacturer are limited. 
 The car emission level is based on car greenness: the higher a vehicle’s 
greenness, the lower the vehicle’s GHG emission. 
 The greenness of a product depends on the supplier’s green technology level and 
the manufacturer’s green technology level. 
 Market demand increases when the green level of a product increases, and there 




       
     
   22 2 2 2
2 1 1 1 β α
1
1 2 1 β β 4 1
w TsCs Gs Ctm Gm b Cm Gm Tmtb Tmt c Ts c bw a
Ts Tst Cts Gs
Cm Gm b Cm Gm b c c Ctm Gm b
       
  
   
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 Perfect information game model is adopted between the supplier and the 
manufacturer as there is commonly a vertical integration between the supplier 
and manufacturer in the car industry. 
 The market structure is a monopoly; the other’s pricing decision is considered as 
given and the influence of the monopolist’s own price on others’ pricing strategy 
is ignored. 
 There are one main supplier and one main manufacturer in the car supply chain. 
 The government only focuses on the emissions produced by consuming/using the 
product but not the overall product life cycle. 
 The technology variable cost has a linear relation with green technology level 
and the fixed cost is also linearly dependent on the green technology level for 
both supplier and manufacturer. 
 
 
6.2.9 Simulation model 
 
I Uncertainty of the simulation model  
 
Consumers’ sensitivity to price 
The price of a product is often a key factor affecting consumers’ purchasing behaviour. 
Price sensitivity is defined as consumers varying their decision of product purchase 
when the product price changes (Tellis, 1988). Price sensitivity can differ between 
individuals, or when the environment changes such as from offline to online 
(Degeratu, Rangaswamy, & Wu, 2000). The economic environment also affects 
consumers’ price sensitivity because it relates to what consumers can afford. For 
example, consumers are more sensitive to price when an economic crisis occurs, but 
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they are less price-sensitive when their financial status is good. Thus, in the incentive 
model of this study, price sensitivity is considered as an uncertain factor which 
moderates the market demand. 
 
Consumers’ sensitivity to green technology level 
It was indicated in the literature, that green car demand is influenced by price and 
green technology adoption (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008; Lee et al., 2013) so the 
sensitivity of consumers’ green preference is also considered in the simulation model. 
In the market, some green consumers prefer to buy the green product and non-green 
consumers who have less interest in buying green products. It was noted in 
Preliminary Study 2 that consumers’ response to car greenness changes over time. 
This change is affected by the market environment, and it is also dependent on 
consumers’ environmental awareness and other concerns. Therefore, because it 
significantly changes the market demand, this study takes consumers’ sensitivity to 




II Distribution of random variables 
The distributions of two random variables (price sensitivity and technology sensitivity) 
in the simulation model are based on the coefficients of car sales regression model. 
The car sales data used in this project has been collected in Taiwan between 2011 and 
2015. The data includes car brands, car models, car sales, car prices, and unit fuel 
consumption (LTR). The data has been obtained from the Ministry of Transportation 
and Communications, Directorate General of Highways (MOTC) in Taiwan. To build 
the distribution of these two variables, price and technology sensitivity are revealed 
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by the coefficients of car price and the fuel efficiency from the regression model. It 
was indicated in the qualitative date in Study 2, fuel efficiency is the level of 
energy-saving that represents the green technology level (obtained from interview). 
Thus, an average litre per kilometre (LTR) is used to indicate car greenness in the 
analysis in the regression. 
 
Table 12 - Example data used for generating the distribution of uncertainties  
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Regression model of the sales 
A regression model was used to predict electric vehicle adoption (sales) in Norway 
(Mersky et al., 2016) and Malaysia (Sang & Bekhet, 2015). It is a suitable approach to 
analyse the market demand (Cohen et al., 2013) and it has been applied in operation 
management research (Flammer, 2015; Koumanakos, 2008). Thus, regression analysis 
has been selected here to present the demand function in the incentive model to 





Dependent variable: Market demand (Q) 
The market demand is revealed by the total quantity of cars purchased by consumers. 
 
Independent variables: Price (p) and Green technology level (Tm, Ts) 
 The green car demand is determined by several factors such as car selling price, the 
expected operating costs in the future and the number of charging stations (Yu et al., 
2015). Comparing the literature and the semi-structure interviews in Taiwan, this 
study listed the following factors to be considered in the regression model. 
 
 Price: 𝛽  
Market price has a key impact on consumer preference and thus affects market 
demand (Wu et al., 2009). In Taiwan, consumers face a high price as the main 
problem in affording green cars. Although consumer incentives help, there is still a 
significant price difference between grey and green vehicles in the Taiwanese market. 
 
 Car greenness: 𝛽  
Higher greenness level leads to more car sales in the market (Lee et al., 2013) because 
greener products are not only environmentally friendly but they can also help reduce 
future energy cost. For example, the better the green technology of a car’s engine 
system, the higher its energy efficiency, and thus the less its future use will cost. 
Therefore, car greenness is believed to be an important variable when forecasting 
green car demand. In the model, car greenness is indicated by a car’s fuel 
consumption. That is, a high level of car greenness has higher fuel efficiency and less 
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fuel consumption. Fuel consumption in the car data is presented as average unit fuel 
consumption, LTR (km/litre). 
 
Applying the regression model in linear demand function 
In the simulation model, a linear market demand function based on Abad’s (1994) 
work is adopted. Similar to Abad (1994), Peng (2013) proposed a green product 
demand which is dependent on market size, product price and product greenness. This 
study follows Abad (1994) and Peng (2013), a linear demand function is presented as:
Demand a bp cT   , s mT T T   , a is the market size, p is price and T is 
overall car greenness which is the sum of the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s green 
technologies. Factor b is the sensitivity of price and c is the sensitivity of green 
technology in the demand function.  
 
Demand function:      * * * * Demand a b p c T b p c T a        
Regression model based on sales:           1 2* *Sales p T      
βi : The correlation coefficients for each independent variable, i=1, 2 
𝜀 ∶ The constant 
 
In this model, the correlation coefficient of price 1  in the sales regression model is 
used to indicate the sensitivity of price b in the demand function. The correlation 
coefficient of price 2  in the sales regression model is used to represent the 
sensitivity of price c  in demand function. 1 and 2  are taken to examine the 





Table 13 - Example input data of the January 2011 (period 1) 
Car 
model  Price LTR Sales 
Car 
model  Price LTR Sales 
Car 
model  Price LTR Sales 
1 57.9 16.8 1185 33 88.9 11.8 298 65 87.9 12.3 9 
2 93.5 12.5 49 34 83.9 11.8 310 66 81.5 12.9 5 
3 66.9 15.4 428 35 62.9 11.1 540 67 71.9 15.5 71 
4 77.9 15.4 802 36 85.9 10.4 191 68 71.5 15.5 119 
5 80.9 14.3 132 37 62.9 14.5 715 69 81.9 12.5 45 
6 77.9 12.4 608 38 65.9 18.2 4997 70 82.9 12.6 81 
7 54.8 12.1 402 39 93.9 18.1 71 71 60.9 12.9 249 
8 91.5 11.6 25 40 82.9 17.7 209 72 54.5 11.3 705 
9 95.5 11.6 13 41 88.9 17.7 75 73 76.9 15 274 
10 69.3 11.6 221 42 71.9 12.3 1107 74 63.9 15.4 452 
11 65.9 11.4 633 43 75.5 12 747 75 56.9 15.4 1906 
12 88.5 10.5 54 44 51.9 11.9 600 76 119.9 9.5 11 
13 59.5 10.8 645 45 151 11.4 18 77 109.9 9.5 24 
14 77.9 10.2 270 46 121 11.7 29 78 165 10 28 
15 62.5 12.8 392 47 102.9 18.2 1 79 62.5 12.7 680 
16 78.7 12.8 232 48 65.9 17.4 1129 80 73.9 12.3 276 
17 78.5 16.2 125 49 48.9 17.4 688 81 84.9 11.1 37 
18 78.5 16.2 91 50 56.8 13.7 1384 82 62.5 15 1990 
19 70.6 16.2 314 51 60.8 13.3 121 83 39.9 15.3 299 
20 88.9 11.5 81 52 56.8 13.7 738 84 41.5 16 747 
21 70.6 11.5 202 53 39.8 16.5 494 85 140.9 14 62 
22 99.9 11.2 7 54 66.9 16.6 1797 86 94.9 14.2 40 
23 87.5 12.4 55 55 98.9 15.5 58 87 105.9 9.5 0 
24 105.9 16.5 9 56 53.3 12.8 314 88 92.5 9.5 0 
25 72.9 16.5 126 57 59.9 12.9 369 89 109 9.5 149 
26 95.9 12.4 57 58 63.5 13.1 212 90 52.9 9.5 344 
27 132.9 11.8 1 59 61.9 12.9 465 91 100 9.5 172 
28 97.9 11.8 87 60 67.9 12 59 92 39.9 9.5 336 
29 113.9 9.9 15 61 99.9 12.4 5 93 63 9.4 773 
30 78.9 13.4 201 62 52.9 12 527 94 62.5 9.4 1163 
31 65.9 13.4 458 63 87.5 12.6 2 95 67 8.4 314 





A multiple regression model was conducted to predict car sales based on the price and 
greenness. There are 60 periods sales data used, thus 60 regression models are 
calculated to generate the distribution in the next section. To avoid repetitions, this 
study presents the example of the regression model in observed period 1. A significant 
regression equation was performed F (2, 92) = 11.767, p < .05 , with an R2 of 0.204, 
adjusted R2 is 0.186. It was found that two independent variables, price and car 
greenness can significantly predict car sales. For Price variable, 1  = -0.338, p < .05; 
For LTR (Greenness) variable, 2 = 0.229, p < .05. There is a significant positive 
relation between car greenness and sales. Also, there is a significant negative 







t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 352.140 428.044 
 
0.823 0.413 
Price -9.245 2.618 -0.338 -3.531 0.001*** 
LTR 59.595 24.885 0.229 2.395 0.019** 
 *Dependent Variable: Car sales 
       
The statistical regression result has confirmed the assumption of the linear demand 
function from the significant positive/negative relationship between the dependent 
variable (sales) and independent variables (price and car greenness). The above result 
from the regression model has confirmation two points. First, it is appropriate to apply 
a linear demand function in the model of this research as the linear regression model 
is valid to predict car sales by price and car greenness. Secondly, the coefficients of 
price and car greenness can be used as sensitivities in the simulation model because 
they are proven to be significantly correlated to sales (demand).  
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III Generating the distribution of random variables 
The regression model revealed coefficients of price and car greenness which represent 
the sensitivities of these two variables on demand, price sensitivity and green 
technology sensitivity. Minitab 19 software has been used to produce the distributions 
of input random variables. There are four steps of computing the distribution of two 
random variables. 
 
Steps of generating the distributions of price and green technology sensitivities 
For price sensitivity: 
(1) Input the sales data with two predictors, car price and car greenness level, building 
regression models for each period from 2011 to 2015. 
(2) The price sensitivities factors from 2011 to 2015 will be collected from the 
coefficients of price variables in regression models.  
(3) Input the 60 periods of data into Minitab software and output distribution for the 
price sensitivity. 
(4) Define the range of the distribution according to the result in (3). 
 
For green technology level sensitivity: 
(1) Input the sales data with two predictors, car price and greenness, building 
regression models for each period from 2011 to 2015. 
(2) The green technology sensitivities data from 2011 to 2015 will be collected from 
the coefficients of green technology level variables in regression models. 
(3) Input the 60 periods of sales data into Minitab and output distribution for the 
green technology sensitivity. 




Data of Step 1 and Step 2 is obtained from the last regression model in the previous 
section. The output data of 60 periods which have 60 values for both price sensitivity 
and green technology level sensitivity. In the Minitab 19, 60 values are input to 
generate the distribution of the variables, the result is presented below: 
 
Table 14 – The Goodness of Fit Test for distribution identification of random 
variables 
Distribution AD P LRT P 
Normal 0.552 0.144   
Box-Cox 
Transformation 
0.237 0.770   
Lognormal 1.078 0.007   
3-Parameter Lognormal 0.219 * 0.004 
Exponential 2.462 0.003   
2-Parameter Exponential 2.315 <0.010 0.284 
Weibull 0.281 >0.250   
3-Parameter Weibull 0.273 >0.500 0.928 
Smallest Extreme Value 2.197 <0.010   
Largest Extreme Value 0.210 >0.250   
Gamma 0.416 >0.250   
3-Parameter Gamma 0.218 * 1.000 
Logistic 0.317 >0.250   
Loglogistic 0.623 0.067   
3-Parameter Loglogistic 0.202 * 0.046 
 
Distribution AD P LRT P 
Normal 0.566 0.132   
Box-Cox Transformation 0.566 0.132   
Lognormal 2.215 <0.005   
3-Parameter Lognormal 0.565 * 0.000 
Exponential 4.610 <0.003   
2-Parameter Exponential 4.468 <0.010 0.278 
Weibull 0.781 0.039   
3-Parameter Weibull 0.591 0.093 0.156 
Smallest Extreme Value 1.112 <0.010   
Largest Extreme Value 0.914 0.019   
Gamma 1.292 <0.005   
3-Parameter Gamma 1.251 * 0.016 
Logistic 0.513 0.151   
Loglogistic 1.334 <0.005   
3-Parameter Loglogistic 0.510 * 0.001 
 
Identifying the distribution requires to find the highest p-value from the distributions 
in the result table from the Minitab 19 software. It was identified that Price sensitivity 
follows a 3-Parameter Weibull distribution which has a p-value >0.500. The Green 
technology sensitivity follows a normal distribution which is selected because it has 
the highest p-value among all distributions (p = 0.132). Two transformations are not 
considered because this study aims to identify nature distribution. For Price sensitivity, 
the identified 3-Parameter Weibull distribution has a Shape value of 1.66276, a scale 
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of 0.06381, and a threshold of -0.00038. For Green technology sensitivity, identified 
normal distribution presents a mean value 0.30354 with a standard deviation 0.14114. 
The information of the distribution is used to generate random values of the Price 
sensitivity and Green technology sensitivity as uncertainties in the simulation model. 
 
IV Experiment design  
The effect of incentive change on the supply chain’s decision making is examined by 
comparing the following design points. Based on the qualitative data obtained in 
Preliminary Study 2 (Application of qualitative data 4), incentive rates are categorized 
into “low” and “high” rates. In this project, 20% is considered to be a low incentive 
rate, whereas 50% is considered to be a high incentive rate. The first combination is 
“Low Incentives” strategy where both the supplier and the manufacturer are given a 
low incentive rate. The second combination is the “Supplier Focus” strategy where 
the supplier is given a high incentive rate, while the manufacturer is given a low 
incentive rate. The third combination is the “Manufacturer Focus” strategy where the 
supplier is given a low incentive rate, while the manufacturer is given a high incentive 
rate. The fourth combination is the “High Incentives” strategy where both the supplier 
and the manufacturer are given a high incentive rate. 
 










1 20% 20% Low Incentives 
2 50% 20% Supplier Focus 
3 20% 50% Manufacturer Focus 




V Scenario analysis 
In each section, a scenario analysis is conducted to predict the supply chain decisions 
under different scenarios. Two scenarios are considered in this research project as 
follows. 
Scenario 1: High investment cost of green technology development and adoption   
This scenario is employed for two reasons. First, the Manufacturing cost in supply is 
related to profit directly and thus is an important factor for decision makers to 
consider. Although the performance of green product innovation is associated with a 
company’s competitive advantage (Chen et al., 2006), companies are fundamentally 
profit-oriented. There are two factors affecting the strategy of technology 
innovation, economic performance and environmental performance (Ambec & 
Lanoie, 2008). The trade-off between economic performance and environmental 
performance is often considered to be an issue by companies when developing green 
technologies (Figge & Hahn, 2012), whose main objective is usually profit. As 
economic performance (profit) is positively related to a company’s willingness to 
invest in green technology, it is likely to have an impact on the decision of green 
technology innovation. Thus, it needs to be considered when evaluating the 
influence of incentives on green technology adoption. Moreover, when evaluating 
the circumstances of green technology innovation, companies’ decisions are usually 
influenced by cost and revenue related factors. For example, the opportunity to 
increase revenue via selling green technology, and the opportunity to reduce cost via 
reducing the cost of manufacturing materials or cost of labour can boost company 
profit (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008) and further enhance green technology innovation. 
This suggests that the manufacturing cost of green technology development can 
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change the supply’s decision making regarding green technology adoption. Second, 
the empirical evidence obtained in Preliminary Study 2 (Application of qualitative 
data 3) suggests that the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s main concern of green 
technology development was the profitability of an investment. As the cost is 
directly linked to the supply chain’s profitability, scenarios where the supply chain 
experiences a high or low cost of green technology investment have been 
considered. The influence of this scenario on supply decision making is then 
analysed in the incentive model. 
 
Scenario 2: The size of the green car market is small 
Car companies are more willing to develop green technologies when there is 
relatively greater market size. This scenario is considered for two reasons. First, 
extant literature suggests that it is important to consider the size of green market and 
the ability to differentiate one’s own product from that of competitors when making 
green product marketing strategy (Ginsberg & Bloom, 2004). Second, the empirical 
data obtained in Preliminary Study 2 (Application of qualitative data 3) suggests that 
the expected green car market size was one of the main concerns of supply chain 
decision makers when making green technology innovation operational decisions. A 
rational decision maker tends to invest more if the size of the green car market is large. 
However, compared to the non-green car market, the size of the green car market is 
significantly smaller. This can be a barrier to the promotion of green technology 
through government incentives. Thus, a scenario is considered where the size of a 
green car market is small, and the supply chain’s decision making is studied under 
this scenario. This scenario also reflects the current situation of the car market in 
Taiwan. The scenario of big market size is also conducted for comparison with the 
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results of the small market size. In order to understand the effect of market size on the 
supply chain’s decision making, supply chain behaviours in a small and a large green 
car market have been observed and compared. 
 
VI Parameters setting 
In the sensitivity analysis and scenario analysis, parameters’ values are obtained using 
the following technique. First, for supply chain parties, the cost of green technology 
includes variable cost and fixed costs. Cost related parameters are generated as the 
percentage of a cost range. The cost range is presented by the maximum and 
minimum cost collected from the car industry in Taiwan. Cost information is collected 
through interviews with the manufacturers and suppliers in the car supply chain in 
Preliminary Study 2. These ranges are standardized so that all the values are defined 
between zero and one. When the value equals one, the possible cost value reaches its 
maximal/highest. When the parameter of cost equals zero, the possible cost value 
reaches its minimal/lowest. The definition of “High” and Low” cost values 
corresponding to the range are determined by the interviewees for use in the scenario 
analysis. Second, the green car market size represents the overall market capacity, the 
bigger the more potential consumers in the market. For the convenience of analysis, 
the value of market size parameter is taken from zero to one. It is assumed that value 
one in market size indicates the largest green car market size, whereas the value zero 
in market size indicates the absence of the green car market. Third, government 
incentive rates for the supplier and manufacturer are based on the previous incentive 
projects’ data which have been collected in Preliminary Study 2. Because the 
incentive rate is given as a percentage of the green technology innovation cost, the 
rate range is set from zero to one. One means all costs are funded/covered by the 
government (100%), whereas zero means no green technology innovation cost is 
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covered by the government (0%). The definitions of “High” and “Low” incentive 
rates have been derived from the relevant interview data on previously completed 
green technology incentive projects in Preliminary Study 2.   
 
VII Simulation process 
Assuming supply chain parties make decisions based on the conditions of the current 
period. Their objectives are profit maximisation, meaning that the technology and 
pricing decisions are made to achieve the maximum estimated profit. The government 
monitors project performance to ensure the incentive is used effectively. The supply 
chain green technology level is the key index for monitoring project progress, the 
supply chain technology levels are reviewed periodically, and within each period the 
following sequence of events occurs:  
 
 First step: Incentive rate announcing 
The government provides the incentive rates to supply chain (supplier and 
manufacturer) as the initial incentive rate in period 0. 
Government’s incentive given to the supplier, parameter setting [0, 1] 
Government’s incentive given to the manufacturer, parameter setting [0, 1] 
 
 Second step: Market response 
A price and green technology level based linear demand function is established as the 
market response,  s mDemand a bp c T T     . Uncertainty on market demand is 
demonstrated by the random values of consumers’ sensitivities of price “b” and 
product greenness “c” which are obtained from the distributions.  
 
 Third step: Supply chain decision making 
Supplier and manufacturer behavioir are based on a two-stage game model. Pricing 
and technology decisions are made with the consideration of government incentives, 
market demand, and relevant costs. An optimisation model is conducted to provide the 
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supplier’s and the manufacturer’s optimal technology and pricing decisions. 
 
 Fourth step: Government reviews the green technology improvement and adjusts 
the incentive rate for the next period accordingly 
 
Government incentive rate adjustment based on the output of step 3. According to the 
interview in Preliminary Study 2, government incentive rate is adjustable in each 
period. The incentive rate is altered for the period after the green technology adoption 
review. The simulation starts again after this step. 
 
VIII  Decision Making Framework 
The model starts with the government providing incentives to the supply chain. The 
supplier and the manufacturer will be informed of the initial incentive rates for green 
technology adoption. The supply chain then determines the pricing and technology 
decisions based on the relevant costs (variable and fixed technology investment costs) 
and the offered incentives. On the market side, the greenness dependent demand is 
demonstrated, which is led by the price and greenness of the product. Consumers’ 
green technology sensitivity and price sensitivity changes over the periods, which 
indicates the uncertainties of the market. Incentive rates also vary in response to the 
green technology level (evaluation) in the supply chain. Finally, the government 
adjusts the incentive policy at the end of each period according to the green 
technology levels and its evaluation of the supply chain. Stopping criteria are also 
implemented at the end of the model. The total number of rounds is given at the 
beginning to match the practice. The simulation process ends at period N (when 
incentive runs out), obtaining the mean of the value of decision variables. Examine 
the mean and standard deviation, ensuring reasonable differences appear between 










Government provides incentive 





Green technology sensitivity 
Demand function formed 
Two-stage game model between supplier and manufacturer 
Objective: Profit maximisation 
Supplier makes the pricing 
and technology decisions 
Incentive rate for 
next period will 





Review: check the project 
performance 
(if adjustment is required) 
Review: check the project 
performance 




Government generate the 
















Incentive rate for 
next period will 
remain the same 
 
End: if the n=N 
Manufacturer makes the pricing 
and technology decisions 
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IX Input and output  
Input Parameter Output Parameter 
• Government initial 
incentive rates for supply 
chain parties 
Gt=0 
• Wholesale price w  
• Product market price 
p  
• Manufacturer’s marginal 
variable green technology 
cost 
mC  




• The factor of green 
technology level change 
of total fixed green 
technology cost for 
manufacturer 
dC  




• Product Greenness * *
t ts m
T T   
• Market demand 
Q  
• Supplier’s marginal 
variable green technology 
cost 
sC  




• Consumer benefit 
from government 
incentives to supply 
chain 
cB  
• The factor of green 
technology level change 
of total fixed green 
technology cost for 
supplier  
fC  
• Supply chain’s profit 











• Government initial incentive rates for supply chain parties 
It is the percentage of investment cost covered by the government in the supply 




: Initial incentive rate for the supplier 








• Incentive rates for 





• Consumer’s price 
sensitivity on demand  
b 
 
• Consumer’s greenness 
sensitivity on demand 
c 
• The weight of the 
supplier’s green 
technology level impact 
on final product 
greenness 
  
• The weight of the 
manufacturer’s green 
technology level impact 

















• The manufacturer’s marginal variable green technology cost 
mC = [0, 1] 
• The factor of green technology level change of the total fixed green technology cost 
for the manufacturer 
dC = [0, 1] 
• The supplier’s marginal variable green technology cost 
sC = [0, 1] 
• The factor of green technology level change of the total fixed green technology cost 
for the supplier  
fC = [0, 1] 
• Market size 
      a = [0, 1] 
• The weights of the supplier’s and manufacturer’ green technology level impact on 
final product greenness 
  = [0, 1] 
  = [0, 1] 




Output variables  
• Wholesale price 
Wholesale price is revealed by the optimal solution from the game model between the 
supplier and manufacturer as the supplier’s decision variable. See Appendix 7 for the 
w*. 
 
• Product market price 
Market price is revealed by the optimal solution from the game model between the 
supplier and manufacturer as the manufacturer’s decision variable. See Appendix 7 
for the p*. 
 
• Supplier’s green technology level 
ts
T : The green technology level of the supplier in period t 
The supplier’s green technology level is revealed by the optimal solution from the 





• Manufacturer’s green technology level 
tm
T : The green technology level of the manufacturer in period t 
The manufacturer’s green technology level is revealed by the optimal solution from 
the game model between the supplier and manufacturer as the manufacturer’s 




• Product Greenness  
Product Greenness is the aggregation of the supplier’s and manufacturer’s green 
technology levels, it is formulated as * *
t ts m




• Market demand 
 s mQ a bp c T T      
 
• Consumer benefit from government incentives for the supply chain  
The change of green technology level:    
1 1t t t ts m s m
c T T c T T   
 
    
The change of the price: 1t tp p   
   
1 1 1
[ ( )]
t t t tc s m s m t t
B c T T c pT pT   
  
       
 
• Supply chain profit 
       1 2, (1 ) ( ) (1 )t t t t t t t t ts t s t s s s t s m s s f sw T w T C G a bp c T T T T C G           
       1 2, (1 ) ( ) *(1 )t t t t t t t t tm t m t t m m m t s m m m d mp T p w T C G a bp c T T T T C G            
 
• Technology review in the supply chain 
𝑅𝑠   : The green technology review for the supplier at period t 
𝑅𝑚  : The green technology review for the manufacturer at period t 
   Green technology level dependent review for the supplier: 
𝑅𝑠 = 𝜀 ∗ (𝑇𝑠 − 𝑇𝑠 ) 
Green technology level dependent review for the manufacturer:  
𝑅𝑚 = 𝜀 ∗ (𝑇𝑚 − 𝑇𝑚 ) 
 
• Incentive rates with adjustment for each period for supply chain 
The incentive rate at period t for the supplier: 
𝐺𝑠 = 𝐺𝑠 + 𝑅𝑠  
The incentive rate at time t for the manufacturer: 







In order to increase the efficiency of government incentives to drive green technology 
development and adoption in the supply chain, it is important to understand the 
implementation of government incentives and the corresponding decision making. 
Although this issue has been examined before, previous studies have taken the 
perspective of the government, and thus are limited in providing an understanding of the 
issue from the perspective of supply chain management. In an attempt to address this 
research deficit, this study aims to gauge the influence of government incentives on green 
technology development and adoption in the automobile industry from the perspective of 
supply chain management, and illustrate the optimal decision making for the supply chain 
management. This section presents the analysis of the stochastic simulation model. The 
design of the experiment is based on the research questions. 
 
I The structure of the section 
The analysis is organised in accordance with the sequence of the research questions. 
Firstly, section 6.3.1 presents the introduction of the result section. In order to answer the 
main research question, “How do government incentives affect supply chain behaviours?”, 
two sub questions have been asked. The results of the analysis are presented accordingly. 
It is worth noting that the supplier and the manufacturer are the two main decision makers 
in the supply chain, and thus the decision making of these two parties is examined 
separately. Results concerning sub research question 1, “How do government green 
incentives affect supply chain’s green technology decision making?”, are presented in 
section 6.3.2. Under this section, the influence of government incentives on the supplier’s 
decision making regarding green technology adoption is demonstrated in section Part 1, 
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whereas similar results on the manufacture’s green technology decision making are 
presented in section Part 2. Results concerning the sub research question 2, “How does 
the government’s green incentive affect supply chain’s pricing?”, are presented in section 
6.3.3. Under this section, the influence of government incentives on the supplier’s pricing 
decision is demonstrated in section Part 1, and similar results regarding the manufacture’s 
pricing decision are presented in section Part 2. Finally, section 6.3.4 is the conclusions 
that summarises the research findings.  
 
6.3.2 Sub research question 1 
This section aims to address sub research question 1: “How does the government’s 
green incentive affect supply chain’s green technology decision making?”, by 
illustrating the influence of government incentives on supply chain decisions 
regarding green technology development and adoption.  
 
The aim of this research is the supply chain behaviour change given the government 
incentives. As government provides incentives separately to the supplier and the 
manufacturer, their behaviour (decision making) is expected to be observed 
separately. To consider the sum of the supplier and manufacturer weighted green 
technology level, the factors setting of the weights will be involved in the analysis 
which affects the focus of a supply chain party’s green technology level. Thus, the 
influences of incentive on the change of green technology levels of the supplier and 
the manufacturer are presented separately in the result section, including Part 1: 
Implication to the supplier’s green technology decision making and Part 2: 





Part 1:  Implications to the supplier’s green technology decision making 
The relationship between the government incentive rate and the supplier’s green 
technology level is illustrated in this section in order to demonstrate the impact of 
government incentives on the supplier’s decision making regarding its green 
technology development and adoption. The following figures present the mean value 
of 150 runs of simulation for 50 periods. The variances are between 2% to 10% of 
the mean values in all periods. 
 
 
Figure 32- The influence of government incentives on the supplier’s green 
technology level when the cost of green technology innovation is low 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.1, Cts = 0.2, Ctm = 0.1, Cm = 0.25, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
The results suggest that the most efficient incentive strategy to enhance the 
supplier’s green technology level is to provide both the supplier and the 
manufacturer with high government incentive rates. The relationship between the 
government incentive rate and the supplier’s green technology level is more 
significant when the supplier is given a high incentive rate. The slope of the 
supplier’s green technology level over time is smaller when the supplier is given a 































low incentive rate.  
 
 
Figure 33 - The influence of government incentives on the supplier’s green 
technology level when the cost of green technology innovation is high 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 
0.6  
 
Figure 33 shows that different incentive strategies can possibly have a similar effect 
on the supplier’s green technology level. “High incentive” and “Supplier focus” 
strategies result in the same improvement to the supplier’s green technology level. 
“Low incentive” and “Manufacturer focus” strategies lead to less positive influence 
on green technology innovation by incentives. In general, the supplier is likely to 
make a decision to improve its green technology level if a high incentive rate is 
provided to the supplier itself.  
 
 































Figure 34 - The influence of government incentives on the supplier’s green 
technology level when the size of the green car market is small 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.2, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
Four combinations of government incentive strategies have been employed in this 
project, and they all show a positive influence on the supplier’s green technology 
level. It is found that the supplier has better green technology improvement of the 
incentive project when it is given a high rather than low incentive rate. 
 
Figure 35 - The influence of government incentives on the supplier’s green 
technology level when the size of the green car market is big 





























































*Input parameter values:  a = 0.9, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
Figure 34 and Figure 35 suggest that there is no significant difference between the 
small market size and big market size regarding the selection of incentive strategies. 
In general, bigger market size leads to more improvement in the supplier’s green 
technology level over time. 
 
 
Figure 36 - The impact of government incentives on the supplier’s green 
technology level in a long-term view 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
Figure 36 shows that from the long-term viewpoint, the High Incentive strategy is the 
best one to conduct for supplier’s green technology innovation. Supplier Focus strategy is 
the second-best, and it is followed by Manufacturer Focus strategy.  
 
Findings of the supplier’s green technology decision 
To improve the supplier’s green technology level to its best, High Incentive strategy 
should be employed when the green technology cost is low (Figure 32). The second-best 






























strategy is Supplier Focus, and this is followed by Manufacturer Focus strategy. This 
indicates that the supplier’s green technology level can be enhanced to its highest when 
both the supplier and the manufacturer receive high incentive rates. A supplier in 
Preliminary Study 2 illustrates this: “We are sometimes asked by the manufacturer to 
customize a part used in green cars manufacturing when the downstream participates in 
a government green technology funded project”. The supplier can be motivated by either 
the government or the manufacturer to improve the green technology level. When the 
government and the manufacturer encourage/motivate the supplier simultaneously (High 
incentive strategy), the supplier has the strongest will to invest in green technology 
innovation. However, when the green technology innovation cost is high, no significant 
difference appears between High Incentive strategy and Supplier Focus strategy (Figure 
33). This implies that whether the manufacturer is receiving the high incentive rate does 
not affect the supplier’s green technology improvement when the supplier’s green 
technology costs are high. As the upper tier in the supply chain, the supplier’s green 
technology decision is more independent from the manufacturer when the investment cost 
is high. However, when the cost of green technology innovation is low, the supplier must 
consider the manufacturer’s incentive rate. In this case, the incentive rate of the 
manufacturer does not only affect its own green technology improvement, but also the 
supplier’s green technology decision. Only when the supplier and the manufacturer work 
together (both supported by government’s high-rate incentives at the same time), can the 
supplier overcome the difficulty of high cost and invest more in green technology.  
 
Proposition 1:  The supplier’s green technology decision is influenced by both the 
supplier’s and manufacturer’s incentives, however, it is only influenced by the 
manufacturer’s incentives when both the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s cost of green 





Although the market size is important for supply chain’s marketing strategy concerning 
green products (Ginsberg & Bloom, 2004), for the objective of improving the supplier’s 
green technology, the government’s selection of incentive strategy is not affected by the 
market size (Figure 34 and Figure 35). For the supplier, High Incentive strategy and 
Supplier Focus strategy are the best in terms of maximising the supplier’s green 
technology level. These two strategies have similar effects: Manufacturer Focus strategy 
and Low Incentive strategy have resulted in a similar green technology improvement of 
the supplier. The best government incentive strategy is dependent on the presence of the 
supplier’s high incentive rate. Because the supplier is at the upper stream of the supply 
chain and does not face the market directly, the influence of market size shows no 
significant impact on the selection of incentive strategies in regard to the supplier’s green 
technology improvement. 
 
Proposition 2:  The size of the green car market has a positive effect on the supplier’s 
green technology improvement driven by the incentives, whereas it does not have a 
significant influence on the selection of government incentive strategies in terms of the 
supplier’s green technology improvement. 
 
 
Observed long-term, the differences between the four strategies of the supplier’s green 
technology innovation become apparent (Figure 36). With a short-term project, the 
positive effect on the supplier’s green technology innovation of the High Incentive 
strategy and the Supplier Focus strategy is close, but the High Incentive strategy is 




Part 2: Implications of the manufacturer’s green technology decision making 
The relationship between government incentive rates and the manufacturer’s green 
technology level is illustrated in this section in order to demonstrate the ways in which 
government incentives affect the manufacturer’s decision making regarding its green 
technology development and adoption. The following figures present the mean value of 
150 runs of simulation for 50 periods. The variances are between 2% to 10% of the mean 
values in all periods. 
 
 
Figure 37 - The influence of government incentives on the manufacturer’s green 
technology level when the cost of green technology innovation is low 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.1, Cts = 0.2, Ctm = 0.1, Cm = 0.25, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
In general, the government’s incentive rate for the manufacturer increases over the 
periods. As this incentive rate increases, its effect on the manufacturer’s green technology 
level becomes more significant. Government incentives demonstrate a consistently 
positive effect on the manufacturer’s green technology level.   
 





































Figure 38 - The influence of government incentives on the manufacturer’s green 
technology level when the cost of green technology innovation is high 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 
0.6  
 
When the manufacturer is given a low government incentive rate, the manufacturer’s 
green technology level fails to show any significant improvement over time. 
However, when the manufacturer receives a high government incentive rate, its 
green technology level increases along with time. 
 
Figure 39 - The influence of government incentives on the manufacturer’s 
green technology level when the size of the green car market is small 






























































*Input parameter values:  a = 0.2, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
It can be observed in Figure 39 that the manufacturer’s green technology level 
increases overtime only if the government offers a higher incentive rate than the 
supplier to the manufacturer. The incentive strategy of “High incentives” and 
“Manufacturer focus” both provide the manufacturer with a high incentive rate, and 
it is found that the manufacturer improves its green technology as long as its 
incentive rate is high. This is regardless of the government incentive rate received by 
the supplier. 
 
Figure 40 - The influence of government incentives on the manufacturer’s green 
technology level when the size of the green car market is big 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.9, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
The results suggest that the manufacturer improves its green technology over the 
periods only if it is provided with a high incentive rate. Compared to the results in 
Figure 39, the manufacturer’s green technology level tends to be higher in general, 
when the market size is bigger. In other words, the green technology investment of 
the manufacturer is less likely to be driven by the government incentives when the 



































incentive rate is relatively low. 
 
 
Figure 41 - The impact of government incentives on the manufacturer’s green 
technology level in a long-term view 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
Figure 41 indicates that, from a long-term viewpoint, the High Incentive strategy is the 
best one to conduct for the manufacturer’s green technology innovation. The second-best 
is the Manufacturer Focus strategy. Even given long-term incentives, both Supplier Focus 
strategy and Low Incentive strategy only present a minimal positive impact on the 
manufacturer’s green technology innovation.  
  

































Findings of the manufacturer’s green technology decision 
To increase the manufacturer’s green technology level, High Incentive strategy and 
Manufacturer Focus incentive strategy should be employed (Figure 37) when the 
manufacturing cost is low. It is found that all four incentive strategies can help to increase 
the manufacturer’s green technology level when the cost is low. The improvement 
resulted from Low Incentive strategy and Supplier Focus strategy is less than that from 
High Incentive strategy and Manufacturer Focus strategy. When the manufacturer makes 
its green technology decision, a trade-off between the increase of cost and the increase of 
green technology appears. Given the low cost of green technology investment, the 
manufacturer is less concerned of cost. Hence, the financial obstacle of green technology 
investment is reduced. In the case of the high cost of green technology, a manufacturer 
suggested in an interview that “Our main problem for green car design and 
manufacturing is the money (cost), even with the support of the government’s project we 
still cannot ensure that it is profitable to invest in green technology development.” When 
manufacturing cost is high, the improvement in green technology is less than that in the 
scenario of low manufacturing cost (Figure 37 and Figure 38). This indicates that the 
manufacturer’s willingness to invest is higher when the cost is low, and the manufacturer 
tends to be more reserved when the cost is high. To achieve the best improvement in the 
manufacturer’s green technology, either High Incentive strategy or Manufacturer Focus 
strategy should be employed. When the cost is high, both the Low Incentive strategy and 
Supplier Focus strategy have only minimal positive impact on green technology 
improvement. Thus, when the aim is to improve the manufacturer’s green technology, the 
government should allocate more incentives to the manufacturer instead of balancing the 





Proposition 3:  The manufacturer increases its green technology level over time in 
response to the incentives. Providing high incentive rate to the manufacturer is needed in 
order to drive the manufacturer’s green technology improvement when the cost of green 
technology innovation is high. 
 
It is found that the manufacturer’s green technology improvement is more significant 
when the size of the green car market is large (Figure 39 and Figure 40). One of the main 
issues in green product development is the size of the green car market. A quotation from 
an interview in Study 2 notes that “It is a fact that the green car market is still very small 
compared to the non-green car market, most of we manufacture are still for the non-green 
car market”. This suggests that the manufacturer is more willing to invest in green 
technology when the size of the green car market is large enough to significantly increase 
expected car sales. In a green car market of a large size, the High Incentive strategy 
proves to be the best strategy. The second-best strategy is the Manufacturer Focus 
strategy, which brings slightly less green technology improvement than the High 
Incentive strategy. This is due to the manufacturer expecting the supplier to collaborate 
on green technology improvement, and this requires a high incentive rate not only to the 
manufacturer but also the supplier. When the size of the green car market is small, both 
High Incentive strategy and Manufacturer strategy have similar positive impacts on the 
manufacturer’s green technology improvement (Figure 39 and Figure 40). Under this 
circumstance, the supplier’s incentive rate only has a minimal effect on the 
manufacturer’s green technology decision. Overall, the influence of the green car 
market’s size on the government’s incentive strategy selection in terms of the 
manufacturer’s green technology improvement is not significant. Notably, the impact of 
incentives on the manufacturer’s green technology for a long-term project is consistent 
with a short-term project (Figure 41). Thus, the government is suggested to use the same 
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strategy for both short-term and long-term incentive projects for managing the 
manufacturer’s green technology improvement.  
 
Proposition 4:  The size of the green car market has a positive effect on the 
manufacturer’s green technology improvement driven by the incentives, whereas it does 
not have a significant influence on the selection of government incentive strategies in 




6.3.3 Sub research question 2 
This section aims to address sub research question 2, “How do government green 
incentives affect the supply chain’s pricing strategy?”, by illustrating the influence of 
government incentives on supply chain decisions regarding pricing. The influences on the 
pricing decisions of the supplier and the manufacturer and the corresponding findings are 
demonstrated in section Part 1 and Part 2 respectively. 
 
Part 1: Implications to the supplier’s pricing decision 
The relationship between the government incentive rate and the supplier’s pricing 
decision is illustrated in this section in order to demonstrate the effect of government 
incentives on the supplier’s decision-making regarding pricing. The following 
figures present the mean value of 150 runs of simulation for 50 periods. The 
variances are between 2% to 10% of the mean values in all periods. 
 
 
Figure 42 - The influence of government incentives on the supplier’s 
wholesale price when the cost of technology innovation is low 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.1, Cts = 0.2, Ctm = 0.1, Cm = 0.25, α = 0.4, 𝛽 
= 0.6  
 























The results suggest that the supplier’s wholesale price changes gradually over time 
when the supplier receives a high government incentive rate. The supplier’s wholesale 
price has limited changes if the supplier is given a low government incentive rate. 
 
 
Figure 43 - The influence of government incentives on the supplier’s wholesale 
price when the cost of technology innovation is high 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6  
 
Figure 43 shows that the supplier’s wholesale price goes up over time. It also reflects the 
cost of the supplier’s green technology improvement as the level of green technology 
increases over time. “High incentive” strategy proves to be most effective on the supplier’s 
wholesale price as it provides both the supplier and the manufacturer with high government 
incentive rates. When the government provides low incentive rates to the supply chain, a 
limited change in the wholesale price is observed. Notably, the government incentive rate 
for the manufacturer, in comparison to that for the supplier, has a more significant effect on 
the supplier’s wholesale price.  
 
 





















Figure 44 - The influence of government incentives on the supplier’s wholesale 
price when the size of the green car market is small 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.2, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6  
 
The curves in Figure 44 indicate that the government incentive rate is positively 
related to the supplier’s wholesale price. Because the green technology level in the 
supply chain increases over time (Figure 34), the increase of the supplier’s 
wholesale price actually reflects the green technology innovation cost. Hence, the 
price goes up when the government incentive rate for either the supplier or the 
manufacturer increases, to reflect the cost of green technology investment. 
  
Figure 45 - The influence of government incentives on the supplier’s wholesale 










































price when the size of the green car market is big 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.9, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6  
 
Having compared Figure 44 and Figure 45, it was found that the market size has no 
significant effect on the selection of government incentive strategies. The supplier’s 
wholesale price is influenced by the government incentive rate for both the supplier 
and the manufacturer. Moreover, the government incentive rate for the manufacturer, 
in comparison to that for the supplier, has a more positive effect on the supplier’s 
wholesale price. 
 
Figure 46 -The influence of government incentives on the supplier’s pricing decision 
from a long-term perspective 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
Long-tern, it can be observed that the High Incentive strategy leads to the highest 
wholesale price, and Low Incentive strategy leads to the lowest wholesale price. The 
Manufacturer Focus strategy and Supplier Focus strategy show a medium wholesale 
price. Wholesale price increases over the period in all strategies.  
 






















Findings of the supplier’s pricing decision 
The wholesale price goes up as the supplier’s green technology level increases. When 
green technology costs are low, the High Incentive strategy leads to the highest wholesale 
price (Figure 42). This is because when the supplier’s green technology level is high, the 
supplier tends to increase the wholesale price to reflect the cost of green technology 
investment. Looking at the green technology improvement in Figure 32 where the 
Supplier Focus strategy performs better than the Manufacturer Focus one, it is found that 
the Supplier Focus strategy corresponds to a lower wholesale price than the Manufacturer 
Focus strategy. This is due to the supplier only receiving low incentive rates in the 
Manufacturer Focus strategy, and thus the green technology cost results in the increase of 
the wholesale price. Although the Supplier Focus strategy leads to more improvement in 
the supplier’s green technology, the supplier tends not to significantly increase the 
wholesale price. This is because that part of the cost is already covered by the 
government through a high incentive rate. In the case of a high manufacturing cost, 
comparing Figure 33 and Figure 43 it has been found that the wholesale price moves 
along with the green technology improvement in all incentive strategies. The High 
Incentive strategy shows the highest wholesale price because this strategy leads to the 
highest green technology level. When the green technology costs are high, the difference 
in pricing decisions between any two strategies is more significant than when the costs 
are low. That is, a pricing decision is more sensitive to the green technology level resulted 
from high costs. The wholesale price is less sensitive to the green technology level when 
the costs of green technology are low. 
 
Proposition 5: When the cost of green technology is high, the supplier offers a higher 
price to the manufacturer, and at the same time, the supplier’s pricing decision is more 




Overall, the wholesale price is higher when the size of the green car market is larger 
(Figure 44 and Figure 45). Having observed the supplier’s green technology level and the 
wholesale price jointly (Figure 34, Figure 35, Figure 44 and Figure 45), it has been found 
that the wholesale price does not necessarily follow the supplier’s green technology level. 
In addition, there is no significant difference of incentive strategy selection between 
short-term and long-term incentive projects. Although both the High Incentive strategy 
and the Supplier Focus incentive strategy lead to a high level of improvement in the 
supplier’s green technology, the wholesale price is lower in the Supplier Focus strategy 
than that in the High Incentive strategy. This is due to the manufacturer receiving only 
low incentive rates in the Supplier Focus strategy, and thus its willingness to invest in 
green technology remains relatively low. As a result, the optimal wholesale price to offer 
to the manufacturer should be low enough to reflect its green technology level. This can 
ensure that the manufacturer sets a reasonable product price to secure the market demand 
since the demand is price sensitive (Abad, 1994). 
 
Proposition 6: There is a positive relationship between the size of the green car market 
and the pricing decision of the supplier. When the size of the green car market is big, the 





Part 2: Implications to the manufacturer’s pricing decision 
The relationship between government incentive rates and the manufacturer’s pricing 
decision is illustrated in this section in order to demonstrate the effect of government 
incentives on the manufacturer’s decision-making regarding pricing. The following 
figures present the mean value of 150 runs of simulation for 50 periods. The variances are 
between 2% to 10% of the mean values in all periods. 
 
Cost of technology innovation  
Under the scenario of the low cost of technology innovation, the result from the 
manufacturer’s perspective is similar to the supplier’s perspective. That is, the pricing 
decision affected by the incentives in both supplier and manufacturer have the same trend. 
High Incentive strategy and Manufacturer Focus strategy lead to higher wholesale price 
and higher product price. Supplier Focus strategy and Low Incentive strategy result in 




Figure 47 - The influence of government incentives on the manufacturer’s product 
price when the cost of technology innovation is high 
















*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6  
 
The results suggest that the influence of government incentives on product price becomes 
more significant when the manufacturer is given a high incentive rate. In terms of the 
manufacturer’s green technology improvement, the government incentive strategies of 
“High incentive” and “Manufacturer focus” are more efficient than the “Low incentive” 
and “Supplier focus” ones. That is, the manufacturer improves more when it is given an 




To compare the scenarios of small and big market sizes, it was found that a bigger market 
is generally associated with a higher product price. When the market size is big, the 
supply chain green technology level tends to be high as well. Hence, the price is affected 
by the cost of green technology innovation. There is no significant difference in terms of 
the selection of government incentive strategies between small and big markets.  
 
The influences of four incentive strategies have the same effect on both supplier and 
manufacturer’s pricing strategies. The results suggest that higher incentive rates for both 
supplier and manufacturer have a more significant effect on the price compared to other 
incentive strategies. Notably, the increase in government incentives tends to result in the 
rise of the product price, because green technology increases at the same time. Thus, to 
reflect the green technology investment, product price rises when the government 





Figure 48 - The influence on the manufacturer’s pricing decision from a 
long-term perspective of government incentive rate for the supplier 
*Input parameter values:  a = 0.5, Cs = 0.2, Cts = 0.4, Ctm = 0.2, Cm = 0.5, α = 0.4, 𝛽 = 0.6 
 
Long-term, product price increases over the periods. Both the High Incentive strategy and 
the Manufacturer Focus strategy cause a significant increase in the price over the 
time-periods. The product price shows only small changes over time with the Supplier 
Focus and Low Incentive strategy.   
 
Findings of the manufacturer’s pricing decision 
It was found that the product price increases as the manufacturer’s green technology level 
increases. When the green technology costs are low, the product price rises along with the 
manufacturer’s green technology level, and this is consistent with the trend of the 
supplier’s wholesale price. A manufacturer stated in an interview that “The manufacturing 
cost normally is reflected by the price, because now we still have a problem to cost down 
the green cars’ manufacturing. The marketing team has the cost information and they 
determine the price according to the company’s current marketing strategy.” Thus, the 
result shows that the product price is more sensitive to the manufacturer’s green 

















technology level when the manufacturing cost is high (Figure 47). With Low Incentive 
strategy and Supplier Focus strategy, product price increases slowly even when the 
increase of green technology is very small. To conclude, market size does not have a 
significant influence on the selection of incentive strategies, but the sensitivity of green 
technology to price is high when the cost of technology innovation is high. 
 
Proposition 7: The product price does not reflect the increase of green technology 
innovation cost directly, yet it is highly dependent on the manufacturer’s green technology 
decision. The product price is more sensitive to manufacturer’s green technology when 
the cost of green technology innovation is high. 
 
Overall, product price is lower in a larger green car market than in a small one. This is 
because the manufacturer tends to invest more in green technology (high car greenness) 
in the large green car market. The product price is connected to product greenness, and 
thus the price goes up over the periods when the green technology level increases. The 
trend of price increases over time is consistent also for a long-term incentive project 
(Figure 48). Due to the green technology innovation performing well in the High 
Incentive strategy and the Manufacturer strategy, it is expected to obtain high product 
prices from these two strategies. Notably, the product price stays low even if the 
manufacturer only receives low incentive rate (in Low Incentive strategy and Supplier 
Focus incentive strategy). This is possibly due to the manufacturer being aware of its own 
low green technology level and thus keeping its price low in order to maintain a certain 
level of demand. A manufacturer in an interview mentioned that “We need to produce 
green cars with a reasonable price, otherwise the consumer will find it difficult to accept 
the price difference between green cars and normal cars; normally cars with good 
greenness degree and low price are most popular.” In the green car market, a balance 
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between price and green technology is necessary in order to ensure product sales. To 
conclude, it has been found that the manufacturer’s pricing decision is affected by its own 
green technology level, government incentive strategy and the size of green car market. 
No significant evidence has been discovered to suggest any effect of the green car market 
size on the selection of incentive strategy.  
 
Proposition 8: There is a positive relationship between the size of the green car market 
and the pricing decision of the manufacturer. However, the size of the green car market 
does not have a significant influence on the selection of government incentive strategy in 




6.3.4 Conclusion  
In summary, both the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s green technology innovations are 
influenced by the selection of government incentive strategy. A different incentive 
strategy is suggested in different market scenarios. Furthermore, the supply chain’s 
pricing decisions are not directly affected by the incentives. The wholesale price and the 
product price are not reduced by the incentive offered to the supply chain, and they are 
not significantly affected by the cost of green technology. Instead, pricing decisions 
follow the trend of green technology innovation closely. Evidence shows that higher 
green technology level leads to higher total green technology costs, meaning that supply 
chain pricing reflects indirectly the increase of green technology costs. To conclude, 
government incentives influence directly the supply chain’s green technology decisions, 
and indirectly the supply chain’s pricing decisions.   
 
High Incentive strategy is found to be the most efficient incentive strategy for green 
technology innovation. However, this strategy is likely to result in a high product price. 
When there is a priority between the supplier’s and the manufacturer’s green technologies, 
this relates to whether the Supplier Focus strategy or the Manufacturer Focus strategy 
should be employed. Because Manufacturer Focus strategy has the same positive impact 
as the High Incentive strategy on the manufacturer’s green technology improvement, this 
is proposed for use when the aim is only to improve the manufacturer’s green technology. 
To achieve a high level of green technology at a low price, the Supplier Focus strategy 





Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
To investigate the influence of government incentives on supply chain behaviour from a 
supply chain management perspective, this research study provides answers to one main 
research question “How do government incentives affect supply chain behaviours?” and 
two sub research questions: “How do government green incentives affect supply chain’s 
green technology decision making?” and “How does government green incentives affect 
supply chain’s pricing?” By answering the research questions, this research contributes in 
supply chain management from an operational research perspective.  
 
In this research, incentive models have been built to illustrate how government incentives 
affect supply chain behaviour and change supply parties’ green technology and pricing 
decisions. In addition, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with car suppliers 
and manufacturers in Taiwan. The qualitative data obtained from the semi-structured 
interviews was used to validate and inform the model. The results confirmed the 
influence of government incentives on the supply chain’s decision making. Both the 
green technology decision and pricing decision in the supply chain are affected by 
government incentives. Generally, in short term observation, the green technology levels 
of supplier and manufacturer increase following the rise of incentive rates by the 
government. However, the impacts of incentives are various under different scenarios of 
the market environment, which is high or low investment costs in supply chain and big or 
small green car market size. In the long-term, government incentives tend to have 
positive effects on green technology improvements in the supply chain. In order to 
achieve optimal decision-making for profit maximisation, supply chain parties ought to 
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consider the incentive circumstances of their upstream and downstream at the same time. 
Based on the analytical results of the model, this research study proposes four incentive 
strategies in response to different market scenarios for the government’s green policy 
making. High incentive strategy leads to the best green technology improvement in the 
supply chain. When the government has a limited budget of green incentives, the use of 
Manufacturer Focus strategy or Supplier Focus strategy is considered.  
 
To achieve the manufacturer’s green technology improvement by providing government 
incentives, High Incentive strategy and Manufacturer Focus strategy are more efficient 
than Supplier Focus and Low Incentive strategies. This study found that the 
manufacturer’s green technology level increases more when the manufacturer receives 
higher incentive rates than the supplier. The manufacturer’s green technology has only 
limited improvement when the supplier receives higher incentive rates than the 
manufacturer especially when green technology innovation costs are high. It was also 
found, however, that the manufacturer is willing to invest more in green technology with 
a bigger green car market. The selection of the government’s green policy strategy is not 
significantly affected by the green market size. 
 
To achieve the supplier’s green technology improvement by providing government 
incentives, High Incentive strategy and Supplier Focus incentive strategy are more 
efficient than Low Incentive strategy and Manufacturer Focus incentive strategy. When 
the green technology innovation costs are reasonably low, whether the manufacturer’s 
incentive rate is as high as the supplier’s incentive rate or not, has an impact on green 
technology decisions. That is, High Incentive strategy performs better than Supplier 
Focus incentive strategy in terms of the green technology improvement. However, when 
the green technology costs in the supply chain are high, there is no difference between 
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High Incentive strategy and Supplier Focus strategy. This enquiry has also found that 
green market size does not influence on the selection of the government’s green policy 
strategy. 
 
This project concludes that the pricing strategy in the supply chain is also affected by the 
government green incentives. Notably, higher incentive rates in the supply chain lead to 
higher wholesale and final product prices because green incentives enhance green 
technology so that the marginal green technology cost increases. Thus, the increase of the 
pricing decisions is due to the high production costs. Government incentives do not lower 
the price offered to the market but increase product greenness.  
 
Having answered the main research question of the influence of government incentive on 
supply chain behaviour, the sub research questions of the influence of government 
incentives on green technology decisions and the influence of government incentives on 
pricing decision, this study does not only make significant contributions to the literature 
but also provides managerial implications to practitioners in the field of supply chain 
management and public policy management. These will be elaborated on in section 7.2 
and section 7.3 of the chapter respectively. Given the theoretical contributions and 
practical implications, this enquiry is faced with a number of limitations, which are 
identified and discussed in section 7.4 of the current chapter. Potential avenues for future 




7.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
Three theoretical and methodological contributions are made in this research, which are (i) 
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understanding the influence of government incentives on supply chain parties’ decision 
making, (ii) the consideration of market uncertainties in policy making and (iii) the 
consideration of green technology performance dependent incentives. Two 
methodological contributions are presented, (i) relaxing the assumptions of modelling 
research, (ii) capturing supply chain behaviour by combining optimisation and simulation 
methods.  They are discussed in detail as follows. 
 
 
7.2.1 Theoretical contribution 1 (Key theoretical contribution) 
 
Understanding the influence of government incentives on supply chain parties’ 
decision making 
This project presents an incentive model that considers the decision making of both 
government and supply chain parties, and thus addresses the research gap in the extant 
literature. In the incentive project, the government has the main role in providing 
incentives, and the supply chain parties are the ones who receive incentives. Both the 
government’s and the supply chain parties’ decision-makings are influential to the 
adoption of incentive projects and the adoption of green technology in the supply chain. 
However, none of the previous studies has considered both the government’s and the 
supply chain parties’ decision-makings simultaneously when discussing government 
incentives on green technology. Several scholars have investigated the management of 
incentive policy from the government’s perspective (Baldwin & Krugman, 2004; Boskin 
& Sheshinski, 1978; Chappin et al., 2009; Clemens, 2006; Cohen et al., 2015; Coria, 
2009; Diamond, 2009; Dowson et al., 2012; Gallagher & Muehlegger, 2011; Goulder & 
Mathai, 2000; Jena et al., 2018; Zhang & Wang, 2017). Others have addressed the supply 
chain’s operational strategies/decisions with government green incentives from the 
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manufacturer’s perspective (Fischer et al., 2003; Goulder & Mathai, 2000; Krass et al., 
2013). This marks a research gap in the literature. Although some scholars have 
attempted to model the interaction between supply chain decision makers (Sheu & Chen, 
2012; Xie, 2015) and the interaction between a single supply chain party and the 
government, the above research gap has yet to be effectively addressed. This study has 
built an incentive model to formulate the decision making in the incentive project in the 
real world including government and supply chain parties. The influence of government 
incentive on supply chain behaviour is explained in detail in the current enquiry. Building 
a comprehensive model which captures in detail the decision flows of government 
incentive projects, the current project is the first to address the research gap. 
 
7.2.2 Theoretical contribution 2 
 
Consideration of market uncertainties in policy making 
The present research considers market uncertainties including the uncertainty of price 
sensitivity and the uncertainty of greenness preference on demand. Uncertainty has been 
indicated as an essential issue that should be taken into account in modelling the market 
demand (Bernstein & Federgruen, 2005; Burgers et al., 1993; Cardoso et al., 2013; Gupta 
& Maranas, 2003; Xiao & Yang, 2008). The market environment is an important factor 
affecting the influence of government policy on supply chain because the expected 
responses from the market can change the supply chain’s decision making. None of the 
existing literature has considered market uncertainties in government policy making, thus 
constituting a research gap. Since green car demand is influenced by price and green 
technology adoption (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008; Lee et al., 2013), and consumers’ 
green technology and price sensitivity are not fixed in the different market environment, 
it is necessary to consider them into the model’s formulation. In additional, by analysing 
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the secondary data, it was also confirmed that consumers’ green technology sensitivity 
and price sensitivity were various in the different time periods in the Taiwanese green car 
market. Although it is necessary to formulate the uncertainty of these two variables into 
market demand, this has not been studied in previous green policy management or supply 
chain management related research. By considering this significant factor in the incentive 
model, the present study thus contributes to and extends the existing knowledge. 
 
 
7.2.3 Theoretical contribution 3 
 
Consideration of green technology performance dependent incentives 
In this research project, a green technology dependent incentive is considered in green 
policy implements. It was found that government incentives can shape the operating 
strategy of the supply chain (Zhao et al., 2012; Sheu & Chen, 2012), such as supply chain 
integration (Sheu et al., 2005). Government green incentives may not only help to 
promote green products to the market (Webster & Mitra, 2007; Jin, 2011), but also 
financially support the green technology development and adoption into the supply chain 
(Xu et al., 2013). Although the impact of government green incentives on green 
technology innovation has been popularly discussed in the existing literature (Diamond, 
2009; Fischer & Newell, 2008; Phaneuf & Requate, 2002; Van Soest, 2005), previous 
studies tend to overlook the interplay between government green incentives and green 
technology adoption in some contexts. No previous investigation has considered the 
existing green technology dependent incentive which is currently applied in China and in 
the background case of this study, Taiwan. Even though China is the biggest source of 
greenhouse gas emission growth in the world (Boden et al., 2013), the green technology 
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level dependent incentives have not been studied by previous research, unlike traditional 
green incentives which provide a constant amount of incentive to green product providers. 
A more realistic and efficient way of incentivising is to provide incentives to the supply 
chain according to their green technology performance so that the green technology 
improvement can be directly driven by the incentives. Although green incentive approach 
implementation is important, the literature fails to discuss it in the same way as 
investigating government green policy strategies or supply chain green technology 
innovation management has not been sufficiently dealt with. It is for this reason that the 
previous understanding of government green policy strategy and green technology 
innovation management in the supply chain is limited: only constant incentive has been 
considered instead of green technology dependent incentives. By investigating supply 
chain behaviour based on green technology dependent incentives provided by the 
government, this research enquiry presents a more valid incentive model that applies 
real-life green policy into a mathematical model. This project constitutes the first attempt 
to address this research gap and thus contributes to the existing literature. 
 
7.2.4 Methodological contribution 1 
 
Relaxing the assumptions of modelling research 
The current study has used modelling technique to build the foundation of the model, and 
the qualitative method was then employed to validate and inform it. Mathematical models 
have been popularly applied to study policy management in the extant literature (Boskin 
& Sheshinski, 1978; Cohen et al., 2015; Coria, 2009; Krass et al., 2013; Jena et al., 2018). 
However, they tend to be highly dependent on modelling assumptions and suffer from the 
lack of empirical support in general. The present study contributes to the literature by 
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addressing this research deficit. The proposed model integrates empirical information into 
the foundation of the incentive model, and thus relaxes the assumptions in the existing 
literature. Integrating information from a real case study in the industry into the 
mathematical model, places the proposed model on a base of empirical data instead of 
pure mathematical assumptions. Notably, the qualitative data collected through the 
interviews with supply chain practitioners do not only verify the components and 
cross-validates the model, but also provides explanations to the supply chain behaviour 
change caused by government incentives. In doing so, this research study contributes to 
the literature by building a more valid government incentive model to explain the 
influence of government incentives on supply chain behaviour and the model developed 




7.2.5 Methodological contribution 2 
 
Analysing supply chain behaviour making by combining optimisation and simulation 
methods 
In order to formulate precisely a real-life decision-making process into a mathematical 
model, the present project has adopted a combination of optimisation and simulation 
methods. An optimisation-based simulation model was built to demonstrate the 
mechanism of green incentive policy applied in the supply chain. Supply chain parties 
aim to maximise short-term profit, whereas incentive projects are usually a long-term 
operation. Thus, an innovative approach is needed. In this study, a multiple-period 
simulation model was developed with the consideration of single-period optimisation in 
supply chain decision making. Because of the difficulty of solving multiple-period 
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optimisation models in a close form, previous studies have only conducted a single period 
optimisations approach to formulating similar problems (Sheu & Chen, 2012; Xie, 2015), 
and lack the consideration of long-term incentive periods. In the present project, the 
adoption of both optimisation and simulation methods helps to overcome this difficulty. It 
allows the researcher to analyse not only complicated multiple-period incentive problems, 
but also consider single period optimisations. Having considered the supply chain’s single 
period optimisation in a multiple-period simulation process, this model closely fits reality. 
Thus, this research enquiry contributes to the literature by building a more valid and 
efficient model which closely describes the single-period optimisation problem in the 
supply chain and the multiple-period decision making process of the whole incentive 
project. 
 
7.3 Implications to Policy and Practice 
This research study contributes to practice in two aspects. First, it provides managerial 
implications to green policy makers in governments. Second, it offers insights into 
decision making in the field of supply chain management. These two practical 
contributions are elaborated as follows. 
 
7.3.1 Government policy making  
This project provides insights into government policy management. It is suggested that 
governments should allocate resources/incentives effectively in order to maximise the 
efficiency of the incentives. Four incentive strategies have been proposed for government 
policy making; Low Incentives, High Incentives, Supplier Focus, and Manufacturer 
Focus strategies. High Incentive strategy leads to best green technology improvement. 
However, Supplier Focus or Manufacturer Focus strategies are suggested for 
implementation when the budget of green incentives is limited. To allocate the incentive 
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based on a priority rather than equally share it between supplier and manufacturer is more 
efficient regarding the green technology improvement. This project proposes that the 
selection of the best incentive strategy is dependent upon market scenarios such as green 
car market size, the cost of green technology innovation in the supply chain, and whether 
product greenness is supplier-driven or manufacturer-driven. To select the appropriate 
incentive strategy, it is necessary to consider the market scenario. Findings of this study 
can help to increase green technology improvement in the supply chain by implementing 
an appropriate incentive strategy. 
 
Government incentives do not affect supply chain pricing as directly as expected. This 
research project has found that the pricing strategy in the supply chain is affected by the 
green technology level, and green technology level is influenced by the incentives. 
Government green incentives can effectively and directly lead the supply chain to 
produce greener products but cannot lower the product price offered to the market. That is, 
the supply chain uses the government incentives to enhance their green technology, then 
their pricing reflects the increase of product greenness. The current enquiry suggests 
furthermore that governments should provide incentives directly to consumers when the 
economy is relatively worse than normal (economy depress) and the consumers’ 
greenness sensitivity is low. This suggestion is because incentives on the supply chain can 
only benefit consumers by providing greener products but not cheaper green products 
with the same greenness level. 
 
7.3.2 Supply chain management  
This study provides managerial implications to supply chain decision making. First, the 
optimal green technology decision making for the supplier and the manufacturer with the 
response to the government incentive is illustrated. The incentive model provides an 
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optimal strategy to guide the supplier and the manufacturer’s determining their green 
technology levels given the government incentives. When the government provides 
incentives to the supply chain, there is a trade-off between investing the incentive money 
in green technology improvement or using it to reduce product price. This study 
contributes to supply chain management by guiding supply chain parties to make optimal 
decisions in response to government green incentives. Second, the optimal pricing 
decisions for the supplier and the manufacturer are proposed. Green technology decisions 
are changed by the government incentives, and the pricing in the supply chain is affected 
by the change of green technology. In this case, supply chain parties have to consider the 
incentives from the government, the expense occurred from green technology investment, 
and the influence of the pricing on the market demand at the same time, which is a 
complicated supply chain problem. This project enables the supplier and manufacturer to 
have clear pricing strategies when the government provides green incentives. In addition, 
due to the interaction between supply chain parties, it was found in this study that 
incentives can influence multiple supply chain parties. It is thus suggested that supply 
chain parties consider the incentive situation of their upstream and downstream so that 
the green technology and pricing decision can be made optimally. 
 
 
7.4 Reflections on Research Limitations 
 
7.4.1 Assumptions of linear demand in the model 
Linear market demand function has been applied in the supply chain parties’ objective 
functions in both Preliminary Study 1 and Main Study 3. In Main Study 3, the linear 
relationship between independent variables (green technology and price) and dependent 
variable (sales) has been confirmed by using five years’ worth of (2011-2015) car 
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registration data from Taiwan (a linear regression model was built). However, other forms 
of demand function could possibly be found based on different countries or different 
periods in the same country. Thus, the assumption of the linearity of the market demand 
is considered a research limitation in this project. 
 
7.4.2 Supply chain parties considered in the model 
Out of many supply chain roles, only the supplier and the manufacturer have been 
considered when modelling supply chain framework in both Preliminary Study 1 and 
Main Study 3. These two parties have been used in many previous studies to formulate a 
mathematic model in green supply chain management (Webster & Mitra, 2008; Chen & 
Sheu, 2009; Zhao, 2012) precisely because their operational decisions are more 
influential than those of other parties in the supply chain. Although manufacturers and 
suppliers usually have a significantly stronger impact on determining a car’s greenness 
level than other supply chain parties, the rest of supply chain such as retailers and dealers 
could potentially influence it as well. For this reason, the lack of the consideration of 
other supply chain parties is considered as a limitation within this project.  
 
7.4.3 Consideration of green policies 
Although incentive policy is the most frequently studied issue in the area of green 
technology promotion (Coria, 2009; Fischer et al., 2003; Requate & Unold, 2003; Jung et 
al., 1996), other green intervention, such as tax-related green policies and government 
subsidies, could also influence green technology development. Due to the lack of other 
green policies’ direct impact on the supply chain’s green technology development in the 
interviews, green incentives were regarded in this enquiry as to the only government 
green policy for promoting green technology innovation. The lack of consideration of 
other government green interventions thus poses another limitation to this study. 
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7.4.4 The assumption of monopoly in the model  
In the incentive model, it is assumed one supplier and one manufacturer in the supply 
chain. That is, the market structure is a monopoly. In the monopoly market, the 
competitor’s price is considered as given and the influence of the monopolist’s price on 
others’ pricing strategy is ignored (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2008). The assumption of the 
monopoly market is adopted in the incentive models in both Preliminary Study 1 and 
Main Study 3 which is considered as a research limitation in this project. 
 
7.4.5 The consideration of the source of the emissions 
In this research, it is assumed that government only considers the emission produced 
from product use and the emissions from the production process is not included in the 
incentive model. This is due to the lack of evidence indicates the connection between the 
emission produced from the production process and the final product greenness. Although 
there is no relevant emission regulation that can directly drive the adoption of green 
technology in the background case of this research, Taiwan. The government in other 
countries may have published emission regulation that can directly lead the supply chain 
to invest in green technology. The assumption in the incentive model that the government 
only focuses on the emissions produced by product use but not the overall product life 
cycle is considered as a research limitation. 
 
 
7.5 Further research 
 
7.5.1 Non-linear demand function  
A linear relation between car sales and predictors has been identified by examining five 
years’ (2011-2015) car registration data in Taiwan. In this study, it was only assumed that 
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a linear demand occurs in the green car market. Future researchers may consider using 
other forms of demand function to build the model. For example, a non-linear 
relationship may be found between the demand estimation and predictors. Further 
research may also use a different data set to test the form of the demand function. 
 
7.5.2 The influence of other green interventions on supply chain behaviour 
This study has only focused on government financial incentives provided to the supply 
chain. However, other green policies, such as green infrastructure deployment strategy for 
charging stations and emission penalty to the production process in the supply chain, are 
also likely to contribute to changing supply chain behaviour (Mak et al., 2013). 
According to the background cases of this project, the Taiwanese government aims to 
reduce carbon dioxide emission in the manufacturing process from 2025 which is 
considered to be the next step of the supply chain green technology development in 
Taiwan. Thus, additional green policies could be considered in the investigation of the 
influence of government intervention on green technology development in further 
research. 
 
7.6 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has presented the conclusion of the research project. First, the theoretical 
contributions to the literature have been discussed, and then the practical implications to 
supply chain management and policy management were elaborated on. Finally, 
discussions of research limitations were provided, and potential avenues for future 
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Appendix 1 : The Proof of the Optimal Solution of the 
Decision of the Manufacturer 
 
 
The following is the proof of the optimal solution of the decision of manufacturer by 
hessian matrix calculation.   
 
 
Taking the second partial derivatives of the manufacturer’s profit function  in 
equation (1) with respect to  ,  , we obtain: 
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From the above calculations, it is conformed that there is a unique optimal solution 
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Appendix 2: The Proof of the Optimal Solution of the 
Decision of the Supplier 
 
The following is the proof of the optimal solution of the decision of supplier by 
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From the above calculations, it is conformed that there is a unique optimal solution 
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Appendix 3: Optimal Solution for the Supplier’s Decisions 
 

























































Government incentives for the use of green product technology by the supplier and 
the manufacturer in the green supply chain 
 
Aims of the semi-structured interview: 
 To gather practical information on car industry in UK market, car supply chain 
management, and the government green incentives. 
 To identify the parties that may be influenced by government’s the green product 
incentive policy. 
 To explore the structure of decision making process in the green car product 
incentive model. 
 
Description of the research: 
The research aims to identify the green product incentive model through a number of 
interrelated stages. In the first stage, a mathematical game incentive model is used to 
investigate the incentive influence on supply chain and market. To date, the first stage is 
completed. I have found that the government incentive has positive influence to supply 
chain and the green product market. In the second stage, practical information will be 
collected in order to construct a green product incentive model. Such information is 
collected through semi-structured interview. In the third stage, an incentive model will be 
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created based on simulation based modeling approach, which contains the government, 
the supplier, the manufacturer, the distributor, and the retailer (multiple players involved). 
Simulation will be used to analyse the decision making process in the incentive model. 
The research aims to contribute to the extant literature by establishing an incentive model 
on the basis of simulation approach. It also aims to provide managerial insights to the 
government and supply chain decision managers. 
 
Risks to the participants: 
It is believed that this study will incur no physical or psychological harm to its 
participants. In order minimize potential risks to participants’ safety, interviews will be 
carried out wherever the respondent feel most comfortable – usually the places of their 
residence or work. All the potential risks will be minimized. 
 
Consent 
Consent is given in an oral form. Participants are approached before the interviews. They 
will be briefed about the research, and thus asked for the consent. Every potential participant is 
given time to consider and/or question before a final decision of participation is made. An 
interview is scheduled, only the consent of a participant is given.  
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity 
 Audio recording is employed in all interviews. 
 The information obtained from this interview will only be used for the purpose of 
academic research, and no information obtained from this interview will be passed 
on to a third party. The individuals, firms and organisations involved in this 




Data access and Dissemination 
Only Yuling Lin, PhD student; and Baris Yalabik, Christos Vasilakis and Paul Goodwin, 
the research supervisor, have the access to the data. The research report (thesis) will be 
available at the Library of University of Bath. Conference and seminar papers will be 
written and published based on this study. 
 
Contact of the researcher 
Yuling Lin, PhD student of Management school, University of Bath 
yll41@bath.ac.uk 














My name is Yuling Lin from the management school, University of Bath in the U.K., I 
am studying a PhD research degree in operation management field. 
My research has focused on the investigation of the influence of government incentive on 
supply chain green technology’s decisions. A mathematical game model is used to verify 
the influence of incentive through 3P perspectives which is people, profit and planet. My 
research project firstly examines the influence of the incentives on the decision of supply 
chain roles. Also, a simulation model is built on the basis of considering supply chain 
operations. This incentive model will be supported by practical cases from a 
semi-structure interview data. Eventually, we will propose the best incentive strategy for 
government, and the suggestions for supply chain decision making will be provided. All 
the participants of the interviews will be received a report with research findings. 
The interview will be conducted within one hour from the beginning to the end. 
Interviewers will ask you a list of interview questions regarding the information of supply 
chin behavior. The questions will be mostly focus on the government incentives and 
green technology development/innovation (environmental friendly technolgy). No 
commercial, sensitive, valuable information will be involved in the interview questions. 
The collected information revealed in the interview will be only used in academic 
research propose, additional information obtained in the interview will be kept 













Appendix 6: Interview Questions in Preliminary Study 2 
 
Interview question and prompts (for the Manufacturer): 
 
1. Which is the best seller green car in your company in the past five years? 
P1.Why do you think this model can be the best seller? 
P2.What role do you think government has played when you promote this model? 
 
2. When your company delivery the green car marketing strategy, what factors of the 
car do you think are more influential for consumer preferences? 
P1. Can you give me an example car model? 
P2. Why do you think these factors can affect consumers’ choices? 
 
3. Can you describe how does your company consider/evaluate when developing a new 
green model?  
P1. Can you give an example? 
P2. What are the issues you consider during the process? 
P3. What are the main reasons stopping/driving your company from/toward green 
technology innovation? 
 
4. Following the question 3, does government’s incentives involve in green car design 
in your company? 
P1. If yes, can you describe how does government policy affect the car design? 
P2. If no, does tax/emission penalty or any other government policy drives has 
influence on the car green technology design? 
 
5. What is the key production processes/components that highly relevant to green 
vehicle’s environmental friendly technology? 
P1. Why do you think so? Does your company have any problem accessing these key 
components? 
P2. Which parts you have described take account most production cost? 
 
6. Which roles in the car supply chain do you think are relatively influential for green 
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vehicle green technology development? 
P1. Why do you think so? 
P2. Can you give me an example? 
 
7. Does your company have received any government incentives/funding on green 
technology development? 
P1. If yes, can you provide an example? 
P2. If no, did your company try to apply, and the reason of failure? 
P3. Do you know any of your upstream or downstream has received the incentives? 
 
8. Follow the previous question, what are the incentives you have received and how 
did it apply? 
P1. Do you think the government financial support influence your company’s green 
technology innovation? Why do you think so? 
P2. Do you think the incentives affect operation decisions and why? 
 
9. Has your company participated the Taiwanese emission trading and for what 
reasons? 
P1. If yes, for how long? 
P2. If yes, has your company trade for buying permit or selling? 





Interview question and prompts (for the Supplier): 
 
1. Which is the best seller green car in the company you supply in the past five years? 
P1.Why do you think this model can be the best seller? 
P2.What role do you think government has played when you promote this model? 
 
2. When the company you supply delivering the green car marketing strategy, what 
factors of the car do you think are more influential for consumer preferences? 
P1. Can you give me an example car model? 
P2. Why do you think these factors can affect consumers’ choices? 
 
3. Can you describe how does your company consider/evaluate when developing a new 
green component?  
P1. Can you give an example? 
P2. What are the issues you consider during the process? 
P3. What are the main reasons stopping/driving your company from/toward green 
technology innovation? 
 
4. Following the question 3, does government’s incentives involve in green technology 
development in your company? 
P1. If yes, can you describe how does government policy affect the car design? 
P2. If no, does tax/emission penalty or any other government policy drives has 
influence on the car green technology design? 
 
5. What is the key production processes/components that highly relevant to green 
vehicle’s environmental friendly technology? 
P1. Why do you think so? Does your company have any problem accessing these key 
components? 
P2. Which parts you have described take account most production cost? 
 
6. Which roles in the car supply chain do you think are relatively influential for green 
vehicle green technology development? 
P1. Why do you think so? 




7. Does your company have received any government incentives/funding on green 
technology development? 
P1. If yes, can you provide an example? 
P2. If no, did your company try to apply, and the reason of failure? 
P3. Do you know any of your upstream or downstream has received the incentives? 
 
8. Follow the previous question, what are the incentives you have received and how did 
it apply? 
P1. Do you think the government financial support influence your company’s green 
technology innovation? Why do you think so? 
P2. Do you think the incentives affect operation decisions and why? 
 
9. Has your company participated the Taiwanese emission trading and for what reasons? 
P1. If yes, for how long? 
P2. If yes, has your company trade for buying permit or selling? 






Appendix 7: Optimal Solutions of Supplier and Manufacturer 
in Main Study 3 
 
 
Optimal solution for product price: p* 
 
 
Optimal solution for wholesale price: w* 
 
 








Optimal solution for manufacturer’s green technology level: *
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